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Abstract 
 
The present work deals with interactions between firms. Literature that inspired our 
work comes from organizational ecologists, evolutionary economics and Agent-Based 
Computational Economics. Our general belief is that organizations are adaptive at 
different levels of analysis: individually, or as a group. We dedicate a special attention 
to the network formation and regard networks as new forms of organizations. 
 
In order to understand these interactions and the different mechanisms of adaptation, 
that include learning and evolution, two studies have been developed in this work: 
CASOS and NetOrg. Our main objective with CASOS – Cellular Automata System for 
Organizational Survival - is to analyse the effects of a set of parameters (organizational 
density, size and age) in the founding and in the mortality of organizations. The best 
combination of these parameters will produce the best solution for the simulation. The 
cellular automata approach is embedded with a Genetic Algorithm that calibrates the 
parameters in order to validate the final solution with real data coming from the 
Portuguese Industry. We have observed similar tendencies between simulated and real 
data that represent the evolution of the number of industries in this region. We used 
survival analysis techniques that also confirm the capability of the model to reproduce 
the reality: the effect of the size on the mortality of the firms is negative and statistically 
significant. 
 
NetOrg – Adaptive Networks of Organizations – is a Multi-Agent framework that aims 
at analyzing the dynamics of organizational survival in cooperation networks. Firms 
cooperate horizontally (in the same market) or vertically with other firms. Cooperation 
decisions involve cognitive and microeconomic modelling. To validate our approach, 
we considered some evidences from three industrial real life examples: Automobile 
manufacturing, Textile and e-Marketplaces. We observed that organizations increase 
their stock of knowledge due to the spread of innovation, and that this is a direct 
consequence of the fact that organizations are linked to networks. The network is a 
mechanism undergoing adaptation, where the internal synergies shape the course of 
evolution. 
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“Einstein has said (...) the supreme task is to 
arrive at those universal laws from which the 
cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There 
is no logical path to these laws”. 
 
Robert M. Pirsig,   
in “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
- An inquiry into values” 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Edgar Morin (Morin, 1977) once wrote that an “organization can be defined as an 
arrangement of relationships between components or individuals.” These elements or 
individuals become the components of a whole (a unit or a system) endowed with 
qualities not apprehended at the level of the components or individuals.  
 
This description can be applied to any entities defined as components or individuals. In 
organizational studies, this definition may refer to components of firms1, or firms, or 
even groups of firms. In other words, Morin’s definition of organization considers and 
includes several stages of analysis that can be interrelated. 
 
The present work deals with the interconnection between these different levels of 
analysis. Our general belief is that organizations are adaptive at different levels of 
analysis: individually, or as a group. We dedicate a special attention to the network 
formation and regard networks as new forms of organizations.  
 
                                                 
1
 In this work we use indistinctively the terms “firm” and “organization”. 
 2 
Literature that inspired our work comes from organizational ecologists and evolutionary 
economics. Different levels of analysis were taken into account as organizational 
scientists used different perspectives to study firms.  
 
During the last three decades, organizational ecologists have developed theories with 
the aim of understanding the forces that shape the structures of organizations over long 
time spans. Their scope of analysis is the study of organizational populations as a 
whole, i.e., ecological concern was most heavily concentrated on the probability of 
survival of the organizational population, rather than the individual organization.2  
 
The organizational competences (Penrose, 1959), the relationships involving 
organizations, and microeconomic modelling were introduced in organization studies. 
The field of evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982) emerged and, therefore, 
the possibility of extending individual attributes had a positive effect on the study of 
inter-organizational networks, a form of interaction among firms through the definition 
of inter-organizational relations.  
 
Within this perspective, we have introduced inter-organizational collaboration or 
cooperation3. Collaborative strategies encourage firms to specialize in more critical 
activities where they can be more proficient letting other activities to be accomplished 
by other members of the network. Collaboration can be understood as the 
complementary action between the elements of a network, namely in terms of the 
efforts towards technological innovation.  
 
The analysis of inter-organizational networks stands simultaneously at the global 
(population) and local (individual) levels. Both levels of analysis are important and 
complementary. On one hand, the study of a population at its global level is incomplete. 
                                                 
2
 Special attention will be given to the work of Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984), 
Freeman (1982, 1997), Carroll and Hannan (1989, 1992), among other authors. A. Stinchcombe studied 
the impact of social conditions as way to introduce the environment on the development of organizational 
structure. Subsequently, M. Hannan, J. Freeman and G. Carroll, among others, analysed the effects of the 
environment on organizational structure with a deeper focus on ecological issues as a metaphor to study 
organizations.  
3
 Collaboration and cooperation will be used indifferently, although these terms have different meanings, 
as we will see later on. 
 3 
On the other hand, the analysis of interactions, only at the individual level, may also 
lead to phenomenon misunderstanding. Usually, mainstream economics assume that the 
market is in equilibrium and that the individual preferences are constant. Thus, the 
analysis of mixed levels may constitute the answer to some of these problems.  
 
The links between individual and aggregate levels are essential to understand global 
phenomena. According to Axelrod (1997), the large-effects of complex locally 
interacting individuals lead to the appearance of emergent properties at the aggregate 
global level, i.e., the level of the population.  
 
Organizations interact with the environment and with other organizations, and these 
interactions constitute an important way of learning and evolution. To overcome the 
problems that they face during their existence, organizations must certainly adopt 
survival strategies, both individually and in group.  
The way in which organizations adopt survival strategies by network formation to avoid 
failure constitutes the main motivation of our work. Therefore, the main question to be 
answered is: 
 Are networks of organizations adaptive in a comparable way as organizations 
are adaptive? 
 
The question of adaptation is an issue that can be studied simultaneously at individual 
and at population level. At individual level, there is evidence that organizations adapt 
themselves to environmental pressures by replacing less effective competences with 
more effective ones. Similarly, the organizational population changes as new members 
holding more favourable competences drive into failure members holding less effective 
competences. 
 
It is possible, though, to build an overall view of an adaptation process that is 
simultaneously individual and collective. Ferber (1999) affirms that adaptation is either 
a consequence of learning, as an individual characteristic of the agent, or a consequence 
of evolution. In this last situation, adaptation is seen as a collective process bringing 
reproductive mechanisms into play.  
 4 
 
The specific questions we want to answer are connected with density, survival and 
collaboration among firms and can be summarized as follows: 
 What are the effects of organizational density in the survival of organizations? 
 What are the effects of organizational density in the survival of networks? 
 What are the effects of organizational density on the survival of networks? 
 How does cooperation motivate the formation of networks? 
 What is the effect of individual learning in the formation of networks?  
 Does the network shape matter? In other words, has the shape of the network 
some kind of influence in its performance? 
 Does duration of relationships matters? 
 What is the impact of the distance on the type of relationship (vertical/ 
horizontal) in a network? 
 How does knowledge transmit through networks? 
 How do cognitive capabilities, that are available in the organizations, intervene 
in the formation and success of the networks? 
 
In order to understand the interaction between different mechanisms of adaptation, that 
includes learning and evolution, we have created a simulated environment. Simulation 
permits to simplify the world, and is a well-recognized way of understanding it. It 
provides tools for implementing different scenarios, by constructing a virtual economic 
world with the appropriate parameterisation.  
 
Emergent behaviour of aggregate variables is then captured and the parameters of the 
model can be reformulated in order to simulate different scenarios related to different 
socio-economic perspectives.  
 
The simulation of individual agents and the consequent analysis of aggregate behaviour 
produced from their interaction may be achieved using, for example, Agent-Based 
modelling, or Cellular Automata. The work benefits from the contributions of Agent-
Based Computational Economics (ACE), a recent field of analysis, that aims at 
“growing economies from the bottom up” (Tesfatsion, 2006). Economies are 
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complicated systems encompassing micro behaviours, interaction patterns, and global 
regularities. 
 
Two studies have been developed in this work: CASOS and NetOrg. Our main objective 
with CASOS – Cellular Automata System for Organizational Survival - is to analyse the 
effects of certain parameters in the founding and in the mortality of organizations. The 
best combination of these parameters will produce the best solution for the internal 
parameters of the simulation. The cellular automata approach is embedded with a 
Genetic Algorithm that calibrates the parameters in order to validate the final solution 
with real data coming from the Portuguese Industry. 
 
NetOrg – Adaptive Networks of Organizations – is a Multi-Agent framework that aims 
at analyzing the dynamics of organizational survival in cooperation networks. Firms 
cooperate horizontally (in the same market) or vertically with other firms that belong to 
the supply chain. Cooperation decisions involve cognitive and microeconomic 
modelling. To validate our approach, we consider some evidences from the real world 
and therefore decide to focus our analysis on three real life examples from Automobile 
manufacturing, Textile Industry and e-Marketplaces. 
 
We concluded that inter-organizational networks are dynamic entities running into 
adaptation, where the internal synergies and the relationships with other networks shape 
the course of evolution. Networks are particular forms of organizations, in which firms 
jointly create both their destiny an the destiny of others and they come to see themselves 
as parts of business ecosystems. 
 
Our main contribution focuses in the following aspects: 
 Examples of literature on firm survival that relate density dependence with 
the development of relationships are few or inexistent. The complexity of 
analysing the setting up and evolution of networks is maybe one of the 
aspects that make this issue difficult;  
 The bottom-up analysis, typical from Multi-Agent simulation is applied to a 
network-based approach in an economical context. This situation is original 
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in what concerns the use of networked Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) in an 
industry-based application; 
 The cognitive perspective, with its several characteristics is unexplored in 
the literature of Organizational Ecology. This view offers the advantage of 
facilitating the individual modelling of the firm as well as a good way to 
understand firm behaviour. 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows:  
In Chapter 2, we start with a general overview of the main concepts of firm and 
market (2.1), focusing on the organizational ecology perspective (2.2). Inter-
organizational networks are described in Section 2.3.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the links between individual and aggregate levels of 
analyses. In Section 3.1, we introduce the issue “individual versus social”, where 
the individual is originally treated as an adaptive individual or organization. In 
Section 3.2., we describe the types of interactions between individuals, namely 
forms and methods of cooperation. In Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, our main goal is 
to provide a framework for the empirical applications. We introduce the 
simulation issues, where individuals are considered simulated agents and Multi-
Agent Systems are provided. 
 
In Chapter 4 we define the main questions and the modelling strategy of this 
work: we define the problem and the main questions that are considered as the 
research questions (4.1); an overview of the state of the art in the resolution of 
similar problems, is discussed in Section 4.2.; finally, in Section 4.3., the 
modelling strategy is introduced and discussed.  
 
Two studies will be presented after that. In the first study (Chapter 5), a Cellular 
Automata-based application, CASOS, is used. Our main objective with this 
application is to analyse the effects of the contemporaneous and founding 
density on the mortality of organizations and determine the density survival 
limits of a particular niche. 
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In Chapter 6, we present the second study using a Multi-Agent System for 
modelling collaboration networks. Interactions between organizations are more 
complex, given that the framework includes a set of initial definitions, a 
microeconomic model, a decision-making process, and a cognitive model.  
 
Chapter 7 contains conclusive remarks and directions for future work. 
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2. Organizations and Networks: an overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we start with a general overview of the main concepts of firm and 
market. Then, the perspective of Organizational Ecology will be introduced and finally 
the main mechanisms that rule the creation of inter-organizational networks are 
described. 
 
 
2.1. A general overview of the main concepts  
 
A brief overview of the main organizational concepts that are studied in theory, namely 
firms and markets, is made in this section.  
 
In a seminal work, with the aim of studying the function and nature of the firm, Penrose 
(1959) stated that “the primary economic function of an industrial firm is to make use of 
productive resources for the purpose of supplying goods and services”.  
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Mainstream economics assumes that profit maximization is the goal of the firm. More 
recent analysis suggests that sales maximization or market share combined with 
satisfactory profits may be the main purpose of large industrial corporations.  
 
The reasons for the existence of firms take into account the following aspects: 
 internalization of risk; 
 minimization of transaction costs; 
 internalization of the benefits of knowledge; 
 internalization of the benefits of size. 
 
The control of determinant aspects as risk, knowledge and size is of crucial importance 
for firms. With respect to the minimization of transaction costs, a central factor for the 
existence of firms, Ronald Coase (Coase, 1937) represents one of the first attempts to 
define theoretically the firm in relation to the market. Within a firm, market transactions 
are eliminated and an entrepreneur, who controls production, substitutes the 
complicated market structure of exchange transactions. According to Coase (1937), a 
firm has a role in the economic system if transactions can be organized within the firm 
at less cost than if the same transactions were carried out through the market.  
 
In the article “The logic of economic organization”, Williamson (1991) analyses the 
work of Ronald Coase referred to above. Williamson’s main contribution is the 
formalization and the systematization of several concepts that were presented by Coase. 
For instance, Williamson insisted on the need of identifying micro-analytic factors that 
are responsible for differences among transaction costs.  
 
Within a firm perspective, these costs are internalized through a set of processes 
vertically integrated in a hierarchy.  Discussion about markets and hierarchies are 
thoroughly analysed by several authors. Williamson has distinguished markets from 
hierarchies as two different and exclusive alternatives for economic organization4. 
 
                                                 
4
 A short discussion about markets and hierarchies will be presented in the course of this work. 
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The essential difference between economic activity inside the firm and economic 
activity in the market is that “the former is carried on within an administrative 
organization, while the later is not”, (Penrose, 1959). According to the perspective of 
organization studies, Firms are characterized by the fact that members (or actors) 
combine their resources and establish a corporate actor with collective decision-making 
rules, as well as rules for the allocation of income from the joint activities and resources 
(Ebers, 1997). Markets institutionalize competition among actors for opportunities of 
exchange. 
 
However, there have been different perspectives in the study of these concepts. 
Mainstream economics focus on individual firm and attribute rational behaviour to 
firms in addition to profit motives. Organizational ecologists make no such 
assumptions. Organizations may compete successfully without maximizing any 
observable utility (unless the term ‘utility’ is tautologically defined to mean any 
consequence of organizational action). Ecological concern is most heavily concentrated 
on the probability of survival of the organizational form, not the individual 
organization. 
 
In the following sections we analyse the perspective of organizational ecology where 
the fields of sociology, ecology and organizational theories were combined to provide a 
different description of the phenomena linking organizations and the environment. 
 
 
2.2. The perspective of Organizational Ecology  
 
 
In the following sections5 we make a connection between different perspectives that 
have been fruitfully combined providing a new field called Organizational Ecology 
(OE). We introduce some important concepts such as selection, adaptation, 
isomorphism, competition theory, innovation, niche, generalism, specialism, inertia, 
legitimation and competition.  
                                                 
5
 In some of these section we are grateful for the preliminary dratf of Silva (2006). 
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Special attention will be given to the work of Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and 
Freeman (1977, 1984), Freeman (1982, 1997), Carroll and Hannan (1989, 1992) and 
Wissen (2004), among other authors. 
 
We will also focus on the aspects of density dependence because of its importance to 
one of the objectives of this work, namely the founding and survival of firms. 
 
2.2.1. Social Structure and organizations 
 
Organizational ecologists introduced a perspective in the analysis of organizations that 
is different from that of economists. Just as economists view the market as optimizing 
social utilities, organizational ecologists view competitive processes as optimizing 
fitness (Freeman, 1982).  
 
According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), the ecology of organizations is an approach 
to the macro-sociology of organizations built on general ecological and evolutionary 
models of change in populations and communities of organizations. The goal of this 
perspective is to understand the forces that shape the structures of organizations over 
long time spans.  
 
One fundamental step for exploiting the work in the fields of sociology, ecology and 
organizational theories was the contribution of Stinchcombe (1965), who has studied 
the relation of the society outside organizations to the internal dynamics of 
organizations.  
 
For Stinchcombe (1965), the term social structure, means “any variables which are 
stable characteristics of the society outside the organization”, while, by organization, 
the author means “a set of stable social relations deliberately created with the explicit 
intention of continuously accomplishing some specific goals or purposes”. 
 
 12 
By analysing the society outside the organization, Stinchcombe introduced the idea of 
the environment where organizations live in, in the same way that ecology uses the 
milieu for the study of animals and plants. In this framework, Stinchcombe (1965) asks 
two main questions: 
 How do Social conditions affect the degree of motivation that a population has 
to start new organizations? 
 How do Social conditions affect the likelihood that a given foundation of an 
organization will survive? 
 
For a summary on the social conditions affecting the founding of organizations, the 
author turns to general features of populations and social structure, for example: the 
level of literacy, the degree of urbanization, the existence of money economy, the 
incident of political revolution, and the level of past organizational experience in the 
population. Such characteristics affect motivation to start new organizations and the 
probability of survival of new organizational forms. 
 
In general, a percentage of organizations that fail is higher amongst new ones. One of 
the most important aspects of Stinchcombe’s work is the idea of the “Liability of 
Newness”. In such cases, when this liability of newness is extremely large, 
organizations will tend to be accepted only under extreme conditions, for example in 
wartime. 
 
New organizations involve new roles that have to be learned and the process of creating 
new roles has costs. Stinchcombe, subsequently, stressed the importance of standard 
social routines that reduce the liability of newness.  
 
Besides that, as the author refers, the empirical evidence shows that certain structural 
characteristics of an organizational form are surprisingly stable over time. Where data 
are reasonably and readily available, structural characteristics of a type of organization 
tend to endure, and so there is a strong correlation between the age at which industries 
were developed and their structure at the present time. This is the concept of 
organizational inertia that will be discussed later. 
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2.2.2. Selection, Adaptation and levels of analysis 
 
 
In a seminal paper written in 1977, Hannan and Freeman (1977) analysed the effects of 
the environment on organizational structure with a deeper look on ecological issues as a 
metaphor to study organizations. The ecological perspectives focused on selection while 
most of the literature on organizations adopted a different view, which the authors 
called the adaptation perspective.  
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) drew attention to the subtle relationship that exists 
between selection and adaptation by stating that “adaptive learning for individuals 
usually consists of selection among behavioural responses”. 
 
Adaptation involves selection among certain possibilities. Almost all evolutionary 
theories in social science claim that social evolution is Lamarckian rather than 
Darwinian in the sense that human actors learn by experience and incorporate learning 
into their repertoires. “To the extent that learning about the past helps future 
adaptation, social change is indeed Lamarckian – it transforms rather than selects. In 
other words, major change processes occur within behavioural units”, (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984).   
 
Combining and applying these two evolutionary perspectives, Usher and Evans (1996) 
demonstrated how Darwinian processes at the unit level, may lead to Lamarckian 
adaptations at the organization level, through purposeful replication of successful forms. 
The issue here is to find a balance between the relative contributions of two 
fundamental processes that work towards the reconfiguration of populations of 
organizations: Selection/replacement and transformation.  
 
The scope of this empirical study from Usher and Evans, included the following types 
of organizations: (i) gas stations in Edmonton, Alberta, from which gasoline was 
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available for retail sale at any time between 1959 and 1988; (ii) new forms of gas 
stations that arose meanwhile; (iii) changes that took place in individual stations.  
 
Whether changes are intentional or accidental, managers viewed the outcomes of these 
changes and selectively retained those that they believed would be the most beneficial, 
thus effecting changes in individual organizations. A comparison between Lamarckian 
and Darwinian processes would conclude that: 
  “via the Lamarckian process, an organizational population changes as existing 
members adapt to environmental pressures by replacing less favoured 
competences with more favoured competences”.  
  “via the Darwinian process, an organizational population changes as new 
members holding more favoured competences compete into failure members 
holding less favoured competences” 
 
According to the adaptation perspective, subunits of the organization, typically 
managers, or dominant coalitions, examine the relevant environment, for opportunities 
and threats. Then, they define strategies and adjust organizational structure. Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) clearly recognize that leaders of organizations do prepare strategies and 
organizations to adjust to the environment.  
 
Therefore, at least some of the connection between structure and environment must 
reflect adaptive behaviour or learning. However, there is no reason to presume that the 
vast structural variability among organizations reveals only or even mainly adaptation. 
To support this, Hannan and Freeman (1977) claim the existence of several obvious 
limitations on the ability of organizations to adapt. 
 
Levels of analysis in OE 
 
Ecological analysis is introduced at three levels – individual, population and 
community. Events at one level almost always have consequences at other levels; 
however it is impossible to reduce population events to individual events, as individuals 
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do not reflect the complete genetic variability of the population. The study of 
organizations is more complex since the research faces at least five levels of analysis:  
 members,  
 subunits,  
 individual organizations,  
 populations of organizations  
 communities of (populations)  organizations.  
 
The extra complexity occurs because organizations tend to be more easily 
decomposable into component parts than organisms. Also, individual members and 
subunits may move from organization to organization in a way that has no parallel in 
nonhuman organizations.  
 
Some of these concepts are not easy to define. In fact, Hannan and Freeman (1977) 
admit the difficulty in defining “population of organizations”. The authors recall that all 
organizations are distinct and so no two are affected identically by any given exogenous 
shock. Even so, they consider the identification of relatively homogeneous classes of 
organizations (shall we call them “representative ones”) in terms of environmental 
susceptibility as viable. 
 
According to the authors, it is important for the study of organizational populations to 
make an analogy to the biologist’s notion of species. Monod (1971)’s suggestion is that 
the genetic content of any species is a blueprint which holds the rules for transforming 
energy into structures. Therefore, the adaptative capacity of a species is summarized in 
the blueprint. Based on Monod’s insight, organizational theorists argue that to identify a 
species analogue for organizations, it is necessary to search for such blueprints, that is, 
the rules or procedures for obtaining and acting upon inputs in order to produce an 
organizational product or response. 
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The way how this blueprint can be inferred within organizations is usually done by 
examining the formal structure of the organization in the narrow sense, that is: (i) its 
tables of organization, written rules of operation, etc; (ii) the guides of activity inside 
the organization; (iii) the normative order, i.e., the ways of organizing that are defined 
as right and proper by both members and relevant sectors of the environment. 
 
A complete analogy to species demands a search for qualitative differences among the 
formal structure. Hannan and Freeman (1977) consider that such differences mainly 
appear in the formal structure and the normative order that feature the organization. In 
the next paragraphs, we give a more detailed analysis of this formal structure, 
considering different forms of organizations. 
 
2.2.3. Isomorphism , Competition theory and Innovation 
 
One of the concepts explored by the Organizational Ecology is the ‘Form‘. But what 
exactly is a form? Although the literature uses the form notion indiscriminately, little 
attention has been paid to clarify and develop this theoretical concept. Following Carroll 
and Hannan (2000), “forms are abstract specifications of types of organizations. 
Populations are concrete manifestations of the types, bounded in time and place”. 
 
A complete analogy to species is possible within the context of Organizational Ecology 
but demands a search for qualitative differences among forms. Hannan and Freeman 
(1977) consider that such differences mainly appear in the formal structure and the 
normative order that characterizes the organization. Adaptation is a concept that may be 
measured in terms of fitness. Fitness is then defined as the probability that a given form 
of organization would endure in a certain environment. 
 
In what concerns new forms of organizations, Freeman (1982) stressed the importance 
of the distinction between two different types of organizational birth: creating new 
forms and copying existing forms. Freeman’s goal is to analyse the role of 
organizational innovation, and therefore he has defined “life cycles processes” and 
“natural selection processes” as follows: 
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 Life cycle process: the patterns over time through which new organizations 
come into being, change, and disappear. 
 Natural selection: the differential reproduction and survival of organizations 
depending on relative competitive advantages.  
 
This distinction leads to the concept of entrepreneurship and the employment 
relationship. Entrepreneurs rarely begin without extensive experience in similar kinds of 
organizational activity.  
Freeman also studied innovation as the development of new forms and described 
several models of growth and development of organizations. “The importance of such 
models for the purpose at hand is that they provide a rationale for differences among 
organizations (…). Innovation is the development of new forms” 
 
Selection may operate in such way that the proportion of organizations affected 
increases with population size. This is called density-dependent selection’. Therefore, if 
organizations change according to the number of already existing organizations, then 
the form may also change as organizations grow. Freeman concludes: “We expect to 
find diversity of organizational forms, then, either because growth leads to change of 
form (metamorphic development) or because single organizations have difficulty 
growing fast enough and simultaneously being efficient enough to prevent the 
appearance of competing forms of organizations”. 
 
Another concept studied by Hannan and Freeman (1977) is isomorphism, which 
constitutes an answer to the question: “why there are so many kinds of organizations?” 
In fact, the diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to the diversity of 
environments. This means that each unit experiences constraints which force it to 
resemble other units with the same set of constraints. Thus, isomorphism is a good 
concept only in stable environments. 
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) propose a formulation of isomorphism based on the 
mechanism or mechanisms responsible for equilibrium. In this respect, the principle of 
isomorphism must be supplemented by a criterion of selection and competition theory. 
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In what concerns competition theory, Hannan and Freeman (1977) recall the formal 
framework of Lotka-Volterra equations. They evoke two distinctive ecological 
considerations: ‘the capacity of the environment to support forms of organization and 
the rate at which the populations grow (or decline) when the environmental support 
changes.’ To explain these considerations, Hannan and Freeman start with the models 
of population dynamics that were independently proposed by Alfred Lotka (Lotka, 
1925) and Vito Volterra (Volterra, 1927) that incorporate the effects of competition 
between populations. Assuming that population growth of isolated populations has a S-
shaped growth path, the growth rate is given by the product of a growth rate and the 
current size of the population: 
 
rN
dt
dN
=       Equation 2-1 
 
where N denotes the size of the population and r is defined as the difference between 
the birth and the death rates of the population. This model is the basis for other 
population models, as the logistic model of population growth, that incorporates the 
carrying capacity, K6:  
 

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

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rN
dt
dN
     Equation 2-2 
 
This parameterization provides a substantial appealing to introduce competition: two 
populations compete if the size of each population lowers the carrying capacity of the 
other. Therefore, a new formulation of the Lotka-Volterra model can be considered for 
competitive interactions. It assumes that the effect of the density of the competitor on 
the realized carrying capacity is linear. In the case of two populations we have: 
  
                                                 
6
 The carrying capacity, K is the maximum size a population can attain, under the conditions of the 
current environment. 
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in which N1 and N2 are the sizes of the two populations, K1 and K2 represent the 
corresponding carrying capacity of the two populations, and α12 and α21 are the 
competition coefficients for competing populations that represent how increases in one 
population affect the growth of the other. 
 
A stable two-population equilibrium exists for the system if,  
 
12
1
2
21 K
K1
α<<
α
.      Equation 2-5 
 
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) extend the Lotka-Volterra system to include M 
competitors and develop a model that demonstrates that when growth in population is 
limited only by resource accessibility, the number of distinct resources sets an upper 
bound on diversity in the system.  
 
2.2.4. Niche theory, generalism, specialism 
 
 
Bridges between ecological theories and organizations have been built and researchers 
tried to identify important features that allow them to define and characterize 
organizational populations. One of these features is organizational niche. In Ecology, a 
niche describes the relational position of a species or population in an ecosystem, 
including how a population responds to the abundance of its resources and enemies, etc. 
In organizational studies, a niche is characterized by a set of organizational capabilities 
and a location in a resource space (Baum and Singh, 1994). It includes all the 
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combinations of resource levels at which the population can survive and reproduce 
itself. The location is important and each population occupies a different niche.  
 
Niche theory is also related with the dynamic of the species. Following Hannan and 
Freeman (1977), in terms of the population characteristics over time, two kinds of 
phenomena can occur: generalism and specialism. In the generalism view we can 
observe a wider band in environmental variation, while specialism implies a smaller 
variation.   
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) showed interest in determining which points will be 
favoured by natural selection and made some effort to model the optimization process 
they distinguish two situations, in terms of environment: 
 fine-grained: when an organization encounters many units or replications; from 
a temporal perspective, we can say that typical durations in states are short 
relative to the lifetime of organizations; it is better for specialisation. 
 coarse-grained: when the duration of environmental state changes is long, 
generalists need not spend most of their time and energy altering structure. It is 
better for generalisation. Coarse-grained and uncertain variation favours a 
distinct form of generalism: polymorphism. 
 
As we have stated before, location is also an important feature for the definition of an 
organizational population. Organization environments have spatial components that 
affect the evolutionary dynamics of organizational populations. Lomi (1995) 
investigated the effects of location dependence on founding rates of rural cooperative 
banks in Italy from 1964 to 1988.  
 
Baum and Mezias (1992) found that hotel failure rates have increased significantly and 
this was due to the effects of localized competition in terms of geographic location, size, 
and price. Localized competition was measured by comparing the position of a focal 
hotel to the position of the others within a given distance. They found that more 
similarly sized, priced, and located hotels compete more intensely. 
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We will come back to this subject later in this work and will take a closer look at the 
relation between niche theory and the density dependence theory. 
 
2.2.5. Inertia and Change 
 
Studies have been developed where the growth and survival of organizations were the 
main research topics. Freeman (1982) studied the evolution of organizations and 
described the organizational life cycles and natural selection processes.  
 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) introduced the concept of structural inertia, which is 
defined in the following way: inertia, like fitness, refers to a correspondence between 
the behavioural capabilities of a class of organizations and their environment.  In fact, 
“structures of organizations have high inertia when the speed of reorganization is much 
lower than the rate at which environmental conditions change”.  
 
In their article Hannan and Freeman search for an explanation for the structural inertia 
due to the organizational change. The major assumption of this idea is that individual 
organizations are subject to strong inertial forces, that is, they seldomly succeed in 
making radical changes in strategy and structure in the face of environmental threats.  
 
The authors argue that selection processes tend to favour organizations whose structures 
are difficult to change. In addition, they state that organizations with high levels of 
structural inertia are an outcome of an ecological-evolutionary process. Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) also studied the effects of age, size and complexity in structural inertia. 
Based on several assumptions for selection and reproduction, they have proposed the 
following theorems: 
 Theorem 1: Selection within populations of organizations in modern societies 
favours organizations whose structures have high inertia. 
 Theorem 2: Structural inertia increases monotonically with age. 
 Theorem 3: Organizational death rates decrease with age. 
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 Theorem 4: Attempts at reorganization increase death rates. 
 
The third theorem is often called the “liability of newness” – a very well recognized 
hypothesis proposed by Stinchcombe (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
 
Size and complexity also play an important role in organizational inertia. Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) assumed that small organizations are more likely to die when they start 
the process of reorganization. On the other hand, “complexity” (defined as patterns of 
links among subunits) increases the risk of death. The level of complexity is 
proportional to the number of links - delimiting a network - among the members of the 
community: firms or subunits inside an organization.  
 
2.2.6. Legitimation and Competition 
 
Legitimation plays an important role in theories of Organizational Ecology. Following 
Wissen (2004), legitimation refers to the degree that a new organizational form is 
known and accepted in society7. In spite of this quite simple definition, legitimation and 
competition are two concepts that researchers find difficult to measure. Carroll and 
Hannan (2000), distinguish two types of legitimation:  
 an organizational form can receive legitimation to the extent that its 
structure and routines follow the prevailing institutional rules (coercive 
isomorphism)  
 an organizational form gains legitimation when it attains a social taken-for-
granted  character (constitutive legitimation). 
 
                                                 
7
 According to Poston and Micklin (2005) the concept of Legitimation can be explained as follows: when a new 
industry emerges, customers are not familiar with the product, investors are reluctant, and there may be legal or 
institutional constraints that prevent free market introduction. Legitimation increases with the number of firms: the 
product becomes more familiar for customers, knowledge increases and investors become less reluctant. Founding 
and disbanding are related to the level of legitimation of an organizational form. 
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These two concepts differ, but authors say that the conception of constitutive 
legitimation has been more interesting for research in organizational demography 
because it has greater connection to density.  
 
For example, when automobile manufacturers appeared in the nineteenth century they 
usually lacked constitutive legitimation and this usually makes organizing more 
difficult. Following Carroll and Hannan (2000), “capital sources are wary, suppliers 
and costumers need to be educated, employees might be hard to identify and recruit; 
and in many cases hostile institutional rules existed”. Legitimation increases as the new 
form is disseminated. The way as legitimation (and competition) relates with the 
founding and death rate is explained in the following sections. 
 
Competition refers to some kind of negative effects of the presence of one or more 
actors on the life chances or growth rates of some local actor. In the context of 
demography of organizations, there are two kinds of competition: 
 Structured or directed, when two actors engage in rivalry or head-to-head 
competition; 
 Diffused or undirected, when a set of actors are dependent upon a pool of 
limited resources. 
 
Both structured and diffused competition are important to understand the life chances of 
organizations but the demographic theory of density dependence focuses on diffused 
competition because it arises as a function of the number of potential bilateral 
competitors. So, the concept of competition will mean, in general, diffused competition.  
 
There is clearly a positive relationship between the number of firms and the level of 
competition. As the size of a population increases linearly, the level of competition may 
grow geometrically. This means that adding a new firm to a large population has more 
impact than adding a new firm to a small population (Wissen, 2004).  
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In the next section the relation between competition and vital rates (birth rate, death 
rate) will be presented. In other words, we will take a closer look in the density 
dependence process, which is vital to the analysis of the survival of the organizations. 
 
2.3. Density Dependence Processes  
 
In this section, we analyse the importance of the density dependence process on the 
survival of the organizations. First, we define the concept of Density Dependence and 
then relate it with to the concepts of legitimation and competition that were introduced 
in the previous sections.  
 
Different perspectives are studied: Wissen (2004) introduced a spatial interpretation of 
the density dependence that relates it to economies of agglomeration in industrial 
economics. Other authors (as Baum and Singh, 1994), analyse the importance of density 
in the context of organizational niches.  
 
2.3.1. The importance of density dependence 
 
 
Organizational density of a population is defined as the number of organizations in the 
organizational population. Density dependence is introduced in the study because of its 
importance to the founding and failure of firms. In this section, we start by stressing the 
role of density in organizational demography and then relate this concept to those of 
founding, failure, legitimation and competition. 
 
In human demography there is a concept named demographic transition which refers to 
a specific chronological sequence of changes in vital rates (death rate, birth rate, fertility 
rate). In pre-industrial stages, mortality rate (number of deaths in a population of given 
size) and fertility rate (number of births relative to a given population of women) are 
high, so there is a great amount of deaths and births.   
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The demographic transition consists of a decline of the mortality rate, followed by a 
decline in the fertility rate. As long as societies undergo this transition, the rate of 
population growth changes from high to low. There are some details in this transition 
that depend on the vital rates and the age structure of the population (Keyfitz, 1977), but 
what is interesting in this phenomenon is that it produces rapid transitions in the 
population growth because of particular patterns of historical time dependence in vital 
rates.  
 
In corporate demography researchers have found that similar historical periods of rapid 
organizational population growth often arise because of particular patterns of density 
dependence in vital rates (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). One of the main efforts has been 
to come up with the general model of a long term organizational evolution: the density 
model of legitimation and competition.  
 
As Freeman (1982) puts it, “Density dependence is important because it generates 
homeostatic processes in populations, that is, it generates equilibrium levels toward 
which population sizes adjust, usually at decelerating rates”. Density dependence can 
be defined as follows: 
  
Density dependence = 




 −
=
K
NK
rN
dt
dN
.     Equation 2-6 
 
As we saw before, this model is associated with the S-shaped logistic growth curve that 
is used to model situations in which the growth of the population is limited to K (the 
carrying capacity, that is to say, the maximum size a population can attain, under the 
conditions of the current environment). N represents the population size and r is the 
intrinsic rate of population growth.  
 
Equation 2-6 (named Verhulst equation) constitutes a typical application of the so called 
logistic equation, often used to model the growth of population . It states that the rate of 
reproduction, r, is proportional to the existing population, N, and that the rate of 
reproduction is proportional to the amount of available resources, all else being equal. 
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Thus the second term models the competition for available resources, which tends to 
limit the population growth. The solution of this equation is proved to be K (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989).  
 
According to Carroll and Hannan (2000), this model is deficient in a least three ways:  
 The model does not consider the effects of competing organizational forms 
(on the contrary, the Lotka Volterra model captured by equations 2.3. and 
2.4 does); 
 The model does not take into account variations in carrying capacities (i.e., 
the limits of the population according to the limited stock presented in 
equation 2.1); 
 The model does not consider organizational growth or decline. 
 
2.3.2. Relation with legitimation and competition 
 
 
Carroll and Hannan (1989) presented formal models of density dependence using 
legitimacy (L) and competition (C) as explanatory variables. In particular, they argued 
that the founding rate is directly proportional to legitimacy and inversely proportional to 
competition. The reason for that to happen with legitimation is that a taken-for-granted 
form can be more readily visualized by potential organizers than one with unknown 
reputation. Therefore, more organizations will be born when legitimation grows.  
 
In what concerns diffused competition, organizational analysts believe that intense 
competition causes supplies and resources to become exhausted and markets get packed 
tightly (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). So, the founding rate in an organizational 
population is inversely proportional to the intensity of diffuse competition. We also 
know that competition increases with density at an increasing rate.  
 
In equation 2.6., λ(t) denotes the founding rate at time t and α(t) is a function that 
summarizes time-varying environmental conditions. Lt designates the legitimaton and 
Ct, the competition. 
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C
L)t()t( α=λ         Equation 2-7 
 
Following the argument that organizational density (n) increases legitimacy at a 
decreasing rate and increases competition at an increasing rate, Hannan (1986) proposed 
the following parametric relationships: 
 
Lt = nβt          Equation 2-8 
 
Ct = exp (γn2t)       Equation 2-9 
 
where β and γ are constant parameters, with 0<β<1 and γ>0. Combining these two 
equations, we can obtain a model for the effect of density in founding rate: 
 
λ(t) =  α(t) nβt exp (-γn2t)       Equation 2-10 
 
with γ<0 and 0<β<1. 
 
According to this model, the founding rate has a monotonic inverted U-shape 
relationship with density: initial growth in density increases the founding rate but 
further increases eventually depress it.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 – Relationship between the founding rate and population density 
 
Founding rate 
Population 
density 
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Similar arguments hold for the mortality rate – but with the rate proportional to C and 
inversely proportional to L. Carroll and Hannan (1989) revised a previous model from 
Hannan and Freeman (1988) with the following form: 
 
µ(a)= ζ(a) exp(θ1na+θ2n2a)      Equation 2-11 
 
where θ1 and θ2 are constants, with θ1<0 and θ2>0; |θ1| > |θ2|,  na denotes  the density of 
the population at time the organization attains age a and ζ(a) summarizes the effects of 
of environmental conditions operating at that time. 
 
The mortality rate, µ(a), has a monotonic U-shape relationship with density as shown in 
Figure 2-2. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 – Relationship between the mortality rate and population density 
 
 
Actually, these models of founding and failure belong to a more general family of 
density dependence models with the form: 
 
Ψt = exp (αnt+βn2t).     Equation 2-12 
 
When Ψt is the rate of entry or growth, the model predicts that α>0 and β<0. When Ψt 
is the rate of failure or exit, the model predicts that α<0 and β>0. A possible 
interpretation of the two parameters α and β is that they represent, respectively, the 
Mortality  rate 
Population 
density 
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Population 
Density 
(1) 
(2) 
t’ time 
effects of the legitimation (the institutionalization of an organization form) and 
competition. 
 
These relationships have been well explained by Wissen (2004) that argues that these 
two basic forces (legitimation and competition) are responsible for the dependency 
between the population density and founding (birth) and failure (death) of firms. The 
founding rate is directly proportional to the level of legitimation whereas the mortality 
rate is inversely proportional to the level of legitimation; opposite associations are 
observed with respect to competition.  
 
Furthermore, the joint effects of legitimation and competition explain to a large degree 
the shape of the density function over time. As the population grows, legitimation 
increases and competition remains very restricted, and so the growth rate increases (see 
dotted line in Figure 2-3). At a certain level (1), the maximum level of legitimation is 
reached, and competition starts to increase fast. Consequently, the growth rate decreases 
quickly to zero or even to a negative value (2), and the density falls down to very low 
values. Population density function has a specific S-shaped, attained before the level 
(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3 - S-shaped form of density over time (until instant t’), followed by a fast decrease to near 
zero 
 
The point (1) corresponding to the maximum level of the density is named the carrying 
capacity. 
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2.3.3. Delayed density dependence  
 
 
Carroll and Hannan (1989)’s main concern was whether density at the time of founding 
might change the mortality rate of adult organizations. The authors considered some 
mathematical specifications of the mortality rate (Gompertz and Weibull models) to 
analyse empirically three types of industries. The authors have called this phenomenon 
of postponement between the cause (density at founding) and the effect (contemporary 
death), delay density model.  
 
The most important variables of this density delay model are the density at the time of 
founding (delayed density), density at present time (contemporaneous density) and 
organization age. They have concluded that density at time of founding had a positive 
effect on mortality rates in all the populations that have been studied. 
 
Some years later, Lomi and Larsen (1998) introduced another approach regarding the 
delayed density dependence process using a model of cellular automata8. Synthetic data 
was produced according to a process of life and death in a grid where an organization 
lived if the number of organizations around it belonged to a certain interval (the same 
applied to new births).  
 
Data was applied to the Gompertz and Weibull model and some parameters have been 
estimated. In spite of some lack of agreement with reality of this cellular automata 
model, authors argued that the local interaction represents a good means to understand 
the phenomenon of density processes. Furthermore, Lomi and Larsen (1998) claimed 
that the connection between density at founding and mortality rates is an emergent 
feature of the evolution of organization populations. This model will be brought to 
analysis again in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                 
8
 As we will see later in Chapter 3, Cellular Automata are cells located in a regular grid where the 
behaviour of an individual cell is determined by a set of rules which specify how that state depends on the 
previous state of that cell and the states of the neighbour cells. 
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2.3.4. Introducing other variables in the models  
 
 
Density plays an important role in Organizational Ecology but it is not always the main 
determinant of firm survival. Bearing on the key question of how the number of firms in 
a population and the population density affect the intensity of competition within the 
industry, Barron (2001) compared three dynamic models of organizational populations. 
Some of the models used size and age of firms too. Monte-Carlo micro-simulations 
have been used and the vital rates (founding, failure, and growth/decline) have been 
modelled as stochastic processes taking a regression model for each vital rate.  
 
The corresponding hazard rate function, µ(a), depends on the population density, age 
and size of the organization, and other variables required by the three models. In the 
models compared by Barron, Ψt represents the rates of entry, growth or exit, depending 
on the signal of the involved parameters and Nt represents
9
 density at time t:  
Barnett’s model: )QTMNNexp( it3t2t12ttt γ+γ+γ+β+α=Ψ     Equation 2-13 
Hannan’s model: )tNtNNNexp( 2t2t12ttt ×θ+×θ+β+α=Ψ    Equation 2-14 
Barron’s model: [ ])Slog(N)Slog(NNexp ittit2ttt ×pi+ξ+β+α=Ψ     Equation 2-15 
 
In these specifications, ∑
=
=
tN
1i
itt AT is the sum of organization ages (being Ait the age of 
the firm i at instant t) ; ∑
=
=
tN
1i
itt SM , is the population mass, i.e., the aggregate size of all 
the organizations in the population (Sit being the size of firm i at instant t);  and 
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. 
As it can be seen, some of the models do not use all the variables. In the Barnetts’ 
model, as well as in the Barron’s model, the effect of the size appears as an independent 
                                                 
9
 The notation Nt instead of nt is often used to represent density (total number of organizations in a given 
area) at time t. 
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variable. The variable age is considered only in the Barnetts’ model, although we may 
consider the age as an implicit variable in these models, because as time goes by the 
firms get more mature.  
 
The parameters of these models have been estimated using real data through maximum 
likelihood techniques (Barron, 2001). Barron concludes that all three models work well 
when looking at the founding rates (some different values were obtained for death 
rates), but it is difficult to distinguish the models in terms of a statistical test. 
 
 
2.3.5. Critics to the density model and the spatial interpretation  
 
 
The density dependence model has been criticised, although recently some other 
variables were introduced. Wissen (2004) puts forward a criticism of the model by 
saying that: “Legitimation and competition explain the S-shaped form of population 
growth which leads to a stable population size at the level of the carrying capacity, but 
no explanation is given to the decline of the growth rates in the peak of density curve 
since a decrease in the population size would lead to less competition and therefore a 
return of the growth rate to zero.” 
 
Furthermore, size is not taken into account in the theory, whereas clearly large and 
small firms have very different chances in a population. Firms differ not only with 
respect to size and economic activity, but also with respect to geographical location, 
which may be labelled spatial heterogeneity. Lomi and Larsen introduced spatial 
proximity into ecological models of populations, but they do not take into account 
agglomeration economies explicitly, which can be viewed as an extension of density 
model at the local level. 
 
In the next paragraphs we will introduce the concept of agglomeration economies and 
then we will present the niche theory. In both cases, analysts consider the geographical 
proximity of firms. 
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Wissen (2004) compared the density dependence model from Organizational 
Economics (OE) with the notion of agglomeration economics which deals with the 
aggregation or concentration of firms in an economy. Both (density dependence model 
and agglomeration economies) share some features because both involve some form of 
positive feedback between size of the population and growth.  
 
In Economics, there are two important concepts associated with agglomeration or 
aggregation economies: localization economies and urbanization economies. 
Localization economies result from the geographical clustering of similar types of 
firms, while urbanization economies involve firms from different industries (regional 
diversification). In urbanization economies, inter-firm interaction is very important in 
terms of input-output relationship of suppliers and deliverers.  
 
Wissen (2004) compared density and location theories from industrial economics and 
tried to discover in what way one theory can improve the other. As we saw before, 
legitimation (which is not an economical concept) may have two meanings in OE:  
conforming to a set of rules or conventions and refer to constitutive legitimation (taken-
for-grantedness). The author has identified these indicators of legitimation that resemble 
in many aspects the emergence of agglomeration economies. 
 
Legitimation also involves the establishment of networks of other firms not only in 
input-output market relations, but also in various networks, involving entrepreneurs and 
organizations. In the next figure, the differences involving legitimation and 
agglomeration approaches are apparent (see Figure 2-4): 
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Figure 2-4 – Main differences between legitimation and agglomeration economies. 
 
 
We could summarize the aspects about agglomeration effects in OE and density effects 
in models of agglomeration economies, as follows: 
 
 In OE, the spatial dimension has not been very important and attention has been 
solely devoted to temporal variation in population change.  
 Agglomeration effects are stronger in knowledge intensive industries.  
 There are examples of spatial analysis within OE: a related development views 
resources as heterogeneous and deals with market partitioning into segments; for 
instance, we note the resource partitioning model (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).  
 
Finally, to introduce the notion of agglomeration economies into the density 
dependence model, a number of extensions are necessary: 
 Processes of legitimation and competition must be defined geographically. 
It also contains some 
elements of urbanization 
economies, especially the 
creation of input-output 
relationships with other 
industries. Lack of an explicit 
geographical dimension in 
legitimation, whereas it is a 
central concern in 
agglomeration economies 
Legitimation ignores the inter-
industry linkages and 
urbanization economies) 
Agglomeration economies 
have in principle no upper 
limit, but according to OE, 
there is a maximum to the 
level of legitimation (in parallel 
with the exogenous carrying 
capacity for a population) 
The element of creating a 
social structure of an industry 
is highly similar to the defining 
features of a new industrial 
district. 
Legitimation involves 
elements of localization 
economies: the size of the 
costumer base, marketing, 
the size and quality of labour 
pool and a network of 
producers that may share 
common knowledge and 
experience. 
 
Differences 
between 
legitimation  
and 
agglomeration 
economies 
 
Similariries 
between 
legitimation  
and 
agglomeration 
economies 
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 Interactions between firm populations should be incorporated in order to capture 
urbanization economies. 
 Local variations in population density can also have a positive effect on 
founding and firm growth, especially in the early life cycles of the industry and 
in knowledge intensive industries. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we provide a more detailed analysis of organizational 
niches and their importance to density, competition and legitimation. 
 
 
2.3.6. Organizational Niches and density  
 
Usually firms occupy niches in the market, which may be defined as geographical 
niches. In the empirical analysis of geographical heterogeneous populations two strands 
of research can be observed: 
 A statistical approach, where the optimal size of the geographical region is 
determined as a result of an analytical model, as in Lomi (1995). 
 An approach where, based on a priori examination, the size of the market area is 
fixed (Baum and Mezias, 1992). 
 
Baum and Singh (1994) studied how organizational niches within populations influence 
patterns of competition and mutualism. A population of day care centres was analysed 
and a density model was implemented and tested. The density dependence model 
focuses on the dynamics of competition (organizations diminishing each other’s fate) 
and mutualism (organizations enhancing each other’s fate) to describe the evolution of 
organizational populations. 
 
Several authors (e.g. Hannan and Freeman 1989, Hannan and Carroll, 1992) proposed 
that initial increases in density produce mutualism by increasing the institutional 
legitimacy (consitutive legitimation) of a population. As the number of organizations 
grows, competition for scarce common resources begins. Baum and Singh (1994) refer 
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the effect of geographical proximity too, but the focus of their research is organizational 
niche, which is characterized by a set of organizational capabilities and a location in a 
resource space.  
 
Authors refer the problem of overlapping organizational niches, as a way to capture 
competition. Overlap density is thus defined by the equation: 
Overlap density= jt
ij
ijit NwN ∑
≠
+ ,    Equation 2-16 
 
where Nit is the number of organizations in organizational niche i at time t, Njt is the 
number of organizations in organizational niche j at time t and wij is the weight of 
organizational niche overlap of organizational niche i with organizational niche j. 
Overlap density depends on the organizational niche because competition occurs within 
the same niche and differs among competitive landscapes. Overlap density is also time 
variant.  
 
The authors establish the hypothesis that “overlap density is positively related to the 
mortality rate”, because greater overlap density implies greater competition for 
resources between a specific organization and all the other organizations in the 
population, and so competition for resources can influence the likelihood of mortality. 
In fact, organizations that attract more resources are more efficient at converting these 
resources into high quality services than others. 
 
Baum and Singh (1994) have used a hazard function10 to analyse the instant rate of 
failure. At the population level, the results of this study support the idea that there exists 
a curvilinear relationship between population density and failure rates. Increases in the 
population with differential organizational niches can lead to the emergence of an 
organizational system comprising organizations that work together because they are 
complementary. 
  
                                                 
10
 Hazard functions measure the failure rate and will be introduced and estimated later (in Chapters 5 and 
6) in order to analyse the impact of some variables on the mortality of firms. 
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2.4. Inter-organizational networks  
 
Introduction 
 
In organizational ecology (OE), populations of organizations are studied and 
information about their evolution is of interest. In this section we introduce inter-
organizational networks, a form of interaction among firms through the definition of 
inter-organizational relations. The network concept is a powerful metaphor, permitting 
to capture the connection between entities in space (Purchase and Olaru, 2003).  
 
The liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and the liability of smallness (Baum 1996) 
concepts (some given in the previous sections), assume that a new firm does not have 
sufficient resources. The strategic use of external resources through inter-organizational 
networks provides an important base for growth. For that reason, the survival and 
growth of an organization depends on its capacity to maintain and extend its network of 
inter-firm relationships (Venkatamaran and Van de Ven, 1998). 
 
Networks have been extensively studied from different perspectives: graph theory, 
transport economics, social sciences, etc.. Earlier, Kamann and Strijker (1991) classified 
the research on networks into four domains: regional science, infrastructure and 
logistics, industrial marketing and social science. However, nowadays the application of 
the network metaphor is observed in almost all disciplines and sciences. 
 
In the past, division of labour in agriculture and in industrial society can be seen as a 
form or networking and a prerequisite for increasing prosperity. As stated by Smith 
(1776), the division of labour is limited by the geographical proximity of the market. 
Nowadays, the introduction of transportation technologies and information technology 
are driving the physically disintegrated markets and enterprises to global markets 
enabling thus maximal specialization of enterprises (Osterle et al. 2001) 
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In this section, we begin with the definition of the concepts related to inter-
organizational networks, structured according to different perspectives: the first one is 
the system of relationships perspective based on the work of authors such as Hakansson, 
Gulati and Nohria, and on Williamson’s transaction costs theory.  
 
After that, we introduce the idea of collaboration as a fundamental concept in networks. 
Collaboration is associated with innovation and technological development as a result of 
exchange among different agents with the goal of overcoming the problems of a 
company related to the loss of competitive advantages. Finally, the concepts related to 
the network structure and its topology are described and analysed. 
 
Motivation and Concepts 
 
There are several approaches that can be pursued when studying inter-organizational 
networks: we give an overview of the theory and systematize the different points of 
view on this area concerning the issues of industrial economics to management11. 
 
In this section, we introduce the concept of network as it is analysed by organizational 
theorists such as Mitchel (1969), Hakansson (1982, 1987), Hakansson and Snehota 
(1995), Hakansson et al. (1999), and Koleva (2002), that recognize social networks as 
the basis to organizational networks. The section is divided into several parts, according 
to different perspectives that are followed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  The IMP Group has given good contributions in the study of inter-organizational networks. IMP Group 
(www.imp.org) is an informal international group of scholars concerned with developing concepts in the 
field of business-to-business (B2B) marketing. More recently, the IMP group incorporated the study of 
complex networks within which business communities operate. 
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2.4.1. The concept of inter-organizational network  
 
 
An inter-organizational network is a set of firms that interact through inter-
organizational relations (Eiriz, 2004). Johanson and Matsson (1987) describe the 
network as a system of relationships based on a division of work in the network.  
 
The notion of inter-organizational network is applied to a wide variety of relationships 
among organizations. The concept of inter-organizational networks can be applied to 
joint ventures, strategic alliances, industrial districts, consortia, social networks and 
others. In summary, it can be used to define any set of recurring ties (resource, 
friendship and informational ties) among a set of nodes (individual, groups, 
organizations, information systems, etc.). 
 
Hakansson (1982, 1987), Hakansson et al. (1999) has studied the importance of 
relationships and learning in networks, giving important contributions to the study of 
inter-organizational networks. According to Hakansson (1987), a network of 
organizations is made up of three classes of basic variables, namely: agents (that 
manage activities or control resources), resources and activities12.  
 
Agents can be individuals, groups or organizations.  It is assumed that the generic goal 
of an agent is to control other agents, allowing the mobility of resources for specific 
purposes. According to this view, activities permit agents to combine, develop or 
exchange other resources. Agents divide activities among them and must complete them 
in the most efficient way. Resources are prior conditions to the accomplishment of the 
activities. Resources are heterogeneous and there are many possibilities of how these 
can be combined. There are tangible resources (products, equipment) and intangible 
resources (knowledge, experience, contacts).  
 
Kamann and Strijker (1991) give examples of two categories of agents (called actors) in 
a network: market actors (individual entrepreneurs, firms and subsidiaries, profit 
centers, or business units belonging to a corporate network) and non-market-actors 
                                                 
12
 The first letters of each word give rise to the acronym - ARA model. 
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(journalists, politicians, lobbies). These actors operate on a plain and abstract economic 
space, where they interact with other actors. 
 
Based on Hakansson’s approach and some empirical studies about networks, Ratti 
(1991) states that cohesion of the network is determined by certain specific forces: 
interdependence among agents; a structure of power; a structure of knowledge; a 
temporary structure (historic development) and spatial structure. Some of these forces 
are very important to the survival of the network and can be understood as the 
mechanism that rules the network. We will come to this issue later in this section. 
 
In a different approach, Koleva (2002) distinguishes three types of concepts that are 
often used as synonyms in network theory: Alliances, Networks and Joint ventures.  
While joint ventures originate from formal agreements, based on a priori specified 
contractual relationships, networks and alliances emerge from less formalized 
mechanisms. According to Kogut (2000) they differ due to technological, institutional, 
or social processes of origin and organization.  
 
In the following, we describe the general idea of transaction costs economics and 
illustrate its importance in theories concerning networks. 
 
 
2.4.2. Transaction Costs Economics  
 
 
According to Mattsson, (1997), the study of organizational networks can be done at 
different levels of analysis: Micro-level (dyadic relations, that is, on a pair of 
organizations creating a new partnership), Meso-level (network of relationships of one 
single firm) and Macro-level (network encompasses all the market). Our analysis 
focuses essentially at the micro-level (since we take into consideration the choice of the 
partner from a single firm perspective) and at the meso level, because it is concerned 
with networks of firms and their inter-organizational relations. 
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The study of inter-organizational networks also involves the study of other aspects. One 
of them is the reason for the existence of organizational networks: the transaction costs 
theory, which will be briefly revised here.  
 
Transaction costs economics studies costs of negotiation, contract achievement, and 
contract attendance, Williamson (1985). These costs can occur in a market or in the 
core of a firm (internalised through a set of a processes vertically integrated in a 
hierarchy).  
 
Markets and hierarchies have been analysed by several authors. Williamson (1975) has 
distinguished markets from hierarchies as two different and exclusive alternatives of 
economic organization, but this vision is not completely clear and accepted, because 
these forms of economic organization are not seen as totally distinct alternatives and 
they sometimes overlap. As these forms or organization were thought as having the goal 
of reducing the costs of a firm, it seemed not reasonable to require that firms always 
maintain the goal of minimizing the transactions costs. In some situations firms must 
increase their production or transactions costs when there are reasons to believe that 
they can obtain some kind of strategic advantages by doing so13 (Cruz, 1999).  
 
Williamson (1991) has revised his previous work and incorporated the concept of 
hybrid form as an intermediate form of economic organization. Cooperation agreements 
between firms are important intermediate forms of organization that can be identified 
with these hybrid forms. It has been recognized that there are many intermediate forms 
of governance that use trust and interdependency instead of rationality (an important 
attribute in the Transactions Costs Theory) in these intermediate governance structures.  
 
Furthermore, based on Williamson’s work, Jarillo (1988, 1993) has studied the 
economic conditions for the existence of networks and argued that networks can be seen 
as a form of economic organization that stands between markets and hierarchies. He has 
                                                 
13
 Networking inherent costs can be classified as internal and external networking costs. According to 
(Ebers, 1997), there is little research concerning the costs that are generally associated with the 
management of networks.  
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also suggested that the actions of entrepreneurs can reduce the transaction costs, and 
establish relations of cooperation (Eiriz, 2004).  
 
 
2.4.3. Relationships and Networks  
 
 
Inter-organizational relationships may contribute significantly to the firm performance. 
Establishing a network relationship requires that the firm should not only desire to form 
a linkage, but that it should also be attractive to other potential partner agents. Some 
authors have studied the skills that firms must have to be able to build and manage 
network relationships that give them a competitive advantage. Ritter (1999) defined 
network competence that is measured by assessing a company’s degree of management 
of qualifications and execution of network activities.  
 
Ritter found four important factors that contribute to the network competence and 
constitute four antecedents that account for the development and establishment of 
relationships in a network: availability of resources, network orientation of human 
resource management, integration of intra-organizational communication and openness 
of corporate culture.  
 
The evolution of network relationships changes with the development of firms. Based 
on a research case study, Lechner and Dowling (2003) identified that every firm has an 
individual relational mix14 and that this relational mix changes with the development of 
firms. The authors studied one Information & Technology cluster (the Munich IT 
cluster) and have identified different types of networks that firms used to realize 
growth: 
• Entrepreneurs, as individuals, have social networks with individuals from other 
firms that are important to the business relationships of the firm. 
                                                 
14
 According to Lechner and Dowling (2003) the number of relations within each network and the 
importance firms give to these networks constitute what they call the relational mix. 
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• Firms have reputation networks that create future options for relational ties; 
when an entrepreneurial firm builds reputation networks, it begins to develop its 
own reputation and moves from being a reputation-taker to a reputation maker. 
• Cooperation with competitors is not uncommon and then Co-opetition networks 
emerge, and are important in all stages of a firm’s development.  
• Marketing networks – relationships with other firms that enable the central firm 
to gain better market information for launching new products, to reach new 
markets, or to gain new clients. 
• Knowledge, innovation and technology (KIT) networks – these networks are 
relationships that allow firms to have access to technological knowledge and 
innovation. 
 
 
2.4.4. Social Networks and Organizational Networks  
 
 
Social networks are one of the bases of organizational networks. According to Mitchell 
(1969), “a social network is a specific set of linkages among a set of persons, with the 
additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to 
interpret the social behaviour of the persons involved. Social networks are an entrance 
ticket for inter-firm relations, but networks are believed to face quality problems if they 
are based solely on social relationships (Lechner and Dowling, 2003). Social and 
reputation networks set the basis for network options in the future but as the firm begins 
to develop its own reputation, the dependence on reputation networks decreases over 
time.  
 
Analyzing the persistence of relationships and measuring their survival, Venkataraman 
and Ven (1998) established a bridge between organizational ecology and network 
issues. Using temporal data from five start-up firms, these authors investigate certain 
questions concerning the connection between environmental jolts and changes in the set 
of relationships of the firms. The authors conclude that: 
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 Environmental jolts have significant impact on the ending of relationships of a 
new small firm but not necessary on the creation of new relationships into the 
same firm. Thus, although liabilities of newness and small size seem to affect 
the ability of entrepreneurs to hold on to their existing relationships during 
environmental jolts, these jolts do not seem to affect the entrepreneur’s ability 
to add ties, at least in the very early life of the firm.  
 Second, the level of reduction of relationships after environmental jolts seems 
to be less severe during the early life and greater during the adolescent period. 
Further entries of new relationships decrease with each succeeding jolt. 
 
Venkataraman and Ven (1998) argue that one implication of their findings is that 
environmental selection pressures are more severe after an incubation period, called 
honeymoon period. The second implication is the way in which liability of adolescence 
manifests itself. The honeymoon does not provide incubation against exits of 
relationships. Rather, the incubation manifests itself in the form of the willingness of 
new costumers and suppliers to join the entrepreneur’s transaction set even during a jolt. 
 
 
2.4.5. Capabilities and Inter-Organizational Relationships 
 
 
In the industrial sector there are a great number of industrial activities that firms have to 
execute. However, firms have a tendency to execute activities that are more related to 
their specialization, according to competences that offer them more competitive 
advantages (Penrose, 1959).  
 
Within a network, inter-organizational relationships are not isolated because the 
capabilities that are explored in each relationship are based on other relationships and 
activities. Besides, inter-organizational relationships are a way to manage the 
capabilities that firm does not control. 
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Loasby (1994), studied the bridge between knowledge and capabilities, and stated that 
most part of the knowledge that a firm must achieve to be successful reside outside the 
firm. According to the author, firms detain two types of knowledge: the know-what (i.e., 
the formal knowledge that can be codified) and the know-how, which is associated with 
the capacity of developing appropriate actions to achieve a specific goal (Roseira, 
2005).  
 
The issue of knowledge transmission in inter-organizational networks leads us to the 
study of other topics such as collaboration, technological innovation, etc. So, in the 
following section the issues of cooperation and collaboration are analysed from the 
perspective of networks. Technological innovation is introduced as a way to promote 
cooperation between firms, contributing thus to the creation of inter-organizational 
networks. 
 
 
2.5. Collaboration Networks and Innovation 
 
In this section, we present an overview of the areas that deal with the concepts of 
cooperation/collaboration and innovation. Before introducing technological innovation 
as a key issue in collaborative networks, we discuss the difference between the concepts 
of collaboration and cooperation (and coordination). After that, we will include the 
perspective from other authors that classify the types of networks according to their 
business-level strategies. Finally, after discussing the role of technological innovation in 
the formation of collaborative networks, we introduce a new networking perspective, 
coming from the field of virtual organizations and introduce the concept of virtual 
breeding environments. 
 
 
2.5.1. Cooperation and collaboration 
 
 
As introduced in the previous section, collaboration is a fundamental concept in the 
theory of networks. Collaboration and cooperation can be considered as the 
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complementary action between the elements of a network. Collaborative strategies 
permit firms to specialize in certain activities where they can be more efficient, letting 
other activities to be accomplished by other members of the network.  
 
Consequently, economies of scale 15  can be attained and costs can be reduced. 
According to Ebers (1997) collaboration permits firms to enter in inter-organizational 
networks with the purpose of: 
• increasing their revenue by binding competitors as allies and accessing 
complementary resources and/or capabilities; 
• reducing their costs as the result of economies of scale that can be achieved, for 
example, through joint research, marketing or production (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995). Inter-organizational networking represents a cost-efficient way 
of gaining access to crucial know-how that can neither be made available 
internally nor be easily transferred by licensing. 
 
Although we have described collaboration as a complementary action between the 
elements of a network, there are different definitions or views of collaboration and 
cooperation in literature. Sometimes there is, indeed, not a clear distinction between the 
concepts of collaboration and cooperation and they seem to be used indiscriminately.  
 
The work of Wang and Archer (2004) offers a framework that classifies collaboration 
activities along two dimensions: the level of collaboration and the parties involved in 
the collaboration. Based in the driving forces and outcomes of collaboration (as shared 
risks, information sharing, achieving synergies and seeking competitive advantage), 
collaboration is defined as the “effort made by two or more organizations to achieve 
results that they cannot achieve working by themselves” Wang and Archer (2004). On 
the other hand, in cooperation, each party retains its own independence and resources 
and organizations do not share a common main goal or mission. 
 
                                                 
15
 Economies of scale characterize a production process in which an increase in the scale of the firm 
causes a decrease in the long run average cost of each unit. 
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Winer and Ray (1994) address different levels of collaboration providing a distinction 
between cooperation, collaboration and coordination: 
• In Cooperation, each party retains its own authority and resources. Cooperation 
can take place among parties even when they have not a common goal and a 
clearly defined and shared mission. Generally, a cooperative relationship 
involves few risks and little gains. Each party maintains their full independent 
autonomy and the level of trust16 between parties is very low. 
• In Coordination each party retains its individual authority and independence, 
but specific modifications in the way it operates may begin to occur such as 
changing work routines, staff task changes, etc. Coordination requires mutual 
planning and open communication among participants as missions and goals 
begin to be shared. 
• In Collaboration, separate parties with commitment to a common mission come 
together to form a new structure. Collaboration requires comprehensive planning 
as decision-making, power, authority, and resources are shared. These 
synergistic efforts often result in innovations that benefit all participants. 
 
Regarding cooperation and collaboration, we will adopt the view above. With respect to 
cooperation, we assume that there is not a mutual goal (or that this goal is not clear) 
between the elements of the group, while in collaboration this goal exists.   
 
Coordination will be seen as an intermediary level between cooperation and 
collaboration and will be associated with of one of these concepts, depending on the 
type of approach. However, as there is not a consensus in all the literature about this 
distinction17 , we will avoid a rigid distinction between these concepts, unless this 
distinction is considered important. Preferentially, collaboration will be referred as the 
generic type of interaction between organizations (that includes cooperation or 
collaboration).  
                                                 
16
 Several authors that analyse the role of trust in organizations. Young and Wilkinson (1989), for 
instance, analyzed the role of trust and cooperation in marketing channels. 
17
 In Industrial Economics, for instance, cooperation is often seen as collaboration or a coordination 
mechanism. 
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Cooperation and collaboration are examined again in Chapter 3 when presenting the 
perspective of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. This will help us to develop our 
approach that involves Cellular automata and Agent-Based simulations. Meanwhile, we 
will analyse how collaboration interacts with other important issues as technology, 
innovation, and networks.  
 
 
2.5.2. Business-level collaborative strategies 
 
 
In the literature on business, cooperation and collaboration are often seen as a decision 
of strategic management. Firms typically join forces following multiple cooperative 
strategies. According to Hitt et al. (2005), a network cooperative strategy covers 
situations where several firms agree to form multiple partnerships to achieve shared 
objectives.  
 
Multiple partnerships are particularly important when they are formed by 
geographically clustered firms (as in Silicon Valley) that maintain effective social 
relationships and interactions among partners while sharing their resources and 
capabilities. Besides, one of the advantages of a network cooperative strategy is that 
firms gain access to their partners’ partners (Cline, 2001).  
 
Doing better than competitors (through strategic execution or innovation) and merging 
and acquiring other companies are the two primary means by which firms develop a 
cooperative strategy. Following Hitt et al. (2005), cooperative strategies represent one 
of the major alternative firms use to grow. Hitt et al. (2005) see strategic alliances as a 
primary type of cooperative strategy and define strategic alliances as cooperative 
strategies in which firms combine some of their resources and capabilities to create a 
competitive advantage.  
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2.5.3. Technology and collaboration 
 
 
Technology is a key factor in the economy. With the fast diffusion of technologies, 
companies unable to face the challenge can rapidly become uncompetitive (Solé and 
Valls, 1991).  If firms are not able to preserve their advantage for long term, 
technological cooperation may be a possible course of action.  
 
From the technological point of view (De Woot, 1987), cooperation may be used to 
obtain a technology to overcome the problems of a company which has lost some of its 
competitive advantages or because the company intends to diversify. From a regional 
perspective, cooperative forms (as joint ventures) may be seen as strategies for firms to 
achieve their own aims (e.g. production) in a given geographical territory.  
 
Hakansson (1987) suggests a new perspective that sees innovation (and technological 
development in general) as a product of exchange among different agents (i.e. a product 
of a network). The former view treated innovation either as an individual fact (like a 
Nobel Prize) or as a secret process in an enterprise. In the following we discuss the links 
between innovation and the formation of inter-organizational networks. 
 
 
2.5.4. Innovation, Learning, and networks 
 
 
Innovation is essential to competitiveness and represents the way in which to anticipate, 
live with, or react to change (Ratti, 1991). Innovation capabilities and technological 
advance have been enhanced by strategic alliances that have proliferated in recent years, 
particularly in information technology sectors (Gordon, 1991) . 
 
Based on the origin of an innovation, three types of network relations can be 
distinguished (Kamann and Strijker, 1991): (1) the supplier-dominated relation; (2) the 
user-dominated relation; (3) the research-dominated network. The question of the origin 
of the innovation (who gave the impetus) was studied by Laage-Hellman (Kamann and 
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Strijker, 1991) that supported that innovations are the result of the joint effort of various 
actors.  
 
As innovation involves learning, Hakansson et al. (1999), stress the importance of the 
business relationships in the diffusion of learning through the network. The more 
complementary are the organizational competences, the more advantage the firms get 
from each other.  
 
The authors mention that “there are reasons to believe that the more connections a 
relationship has, the greater are the possibilities to learn. […] The argument for this is 
that if a relationship has a number of connections there are also a number of interfaces 
where learning could appear: between products, between production facilities and 
between different backgrounds and competences. A large number of interfaces increase 
the variation, which is one basic condition for learning”.  
The relationship between the connections (network links) and the knowledge stock will 
be studied in the course of this work, in Chapter 6. 
 
 
2.5.5. Collaborative Networked Organizations 
 
 
Collaborative networked organizations (CNO) are a new concept that is emerging in 
electronic business models. In addition to the rapid evolution of traditional supply chain 
and outsourcing practices, a growing trend consists of tasks performed by autonomous 
teams of a small number of people or small and medium enterprises (Camarinha-Matos 
and Afsarmanesh, 2004). The autonomous teams can be formed by independent firms 
that are linked by a network, coming together to tackle various projects. They may 
dissolve once the work is done.  
 
Information and Communication Technologies are frequently seen as an important 
enabler for CNO’s. However, in order to initiate a CNO, the environment where it 
operates (as well as the organizations and involved individuals) must be previously 
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prepared. Therefore, a long-term base cooperation agreement should be established: it 
requires the virtual organization breeding environment (VBE).  
 
The breeding environment is a long-term networked structure, having an adequate base 
environment for the establishment of cooperation agreements, common infrastructures, 
common ontologies and mutual trust. 
 
Other concepts are also important: Virtual Enterprise (VE) is a temporary alliance of 
enterprises that come together to share skills of competences and resources in order to 
better respond to business opportunities. The cooperation of the alliance is supported by 
computer networks. Virtual Organizations (VO’s) are similar to VE’s except that they 
are not limited to cooperation agreements in order to obtain profit. A computer network 
that associates a municipality with other public or private services in order to provide 
useful information to the citizens with no implicit profit goods is an example of a 
Virtual Organization. 
  
The establishment of cooperation agreements between firms is not a new phenomenon, 
but rather belongs to the very nature of the business world. But, as Camarinha-Matos 
and Afsarmanesh (2004) indicate, “the use of communication and information 
technologies to support agile communication as one key characteristic of the virtual 
concept, brings this approach to a new level of effectiveness. Cooperation on a global 
scale (intercontinental) is expected to substantially increase, as distance will no longer 
be a major limiting issue”.  
 
Organizational networks can be viewed as Virtual Enterprises. Industry clusters or 
industrial districts are examples of breeding environments in which the cluster is formed 
by organizations located in the same region, although the physical distance is not the 
major attribute when cooperation is supported by computer networks. 
 
In addition and according to Osterle et al. (1991 p. 2),“The introduction of 
transportation technologies and IT, are pushing the physical disintegration of markets 
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and enterprises to its global limits and thus enabling the maximal specialization of 
enterprises”.  
 
In Chapter 6 we will present an application which involves the field of virtual 
networked organizations. 
 
 
2.6. Structures and topologies of collaboration networks 
 
This section concerns the structure and topology of networks. After a short foreword, in 
which we introduce the network structure, we make an overview of certain aspects that 
are related to collaboration networks, such as clustering, network communities, 
topologies, etc. After that we identify the main topologies that characterize the most 
common processes of collaboration. 
 
 
2.6.1. Key Indicators for Network Structure18 
 
 
 
Network structure examines how the nodes19 (actors or agents) are connected (through 
arcs or links). According to Purchase and Olaru (2003), researchers define some 
concepts of network structure, such as centrality, clustering, density and average path 
length (or connectivity length). In his work, Purchase and Olaru examined the effects of 
centrality within a business network using mathematical models of connectivity and 
accessibility and centrality applied to transportations networks20.  
 
                                                 
18
 Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) developed a formal framework that established a paradigm for network 
structure. This framework was then adopted by many other authors. The main definitions of this 
framework are presented in Appendix I. 
19
 According to literature (e.g. Csermely, 2006) a node is a network element with more three links. 
However, in this work we use the term node to refer to any firm in a network, independently of the 
number of links connected to it.  
20
 These indicators aims at evaluating the quantitative properties of a network and do not take into 
account other qualitative characteristics. 
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Centrality is one of the issues that are used to determine the position of an agent in a 
network. Central actors or agents are those who are linked directly or indirectly to a 
great number of actors than more peripheral agents (Mizruchi and Pots, 1998). Such 
agents will gain important insights to new advances, scarce resources, and changes 
within network structure, giving them an advantage over other more peripheral network 
agents. There are several methods for calculating the centrality. One of the most 
frequent uses the Adjacency matrix21 (which contains an encapsulation of the most basic 
connective structure of the network) – including the direct links between nodes.  
 
The nodality represents the connectivity of a node and it is computed as the proportion 
between the number of links connected to the agent and the total number of links. Thus, 
the higher the value of nodality, the more central is the agent22.  
 
Clustering is a network property that measures the connectivity inside the network. To 
quantify this property researchers use the clustering coefficient which is the probability 
that two neighbours of a node are connected. It is also known as transitivity.  
 
Network Density is an indicator of the amount of links in a network. It is measured by 
the proportion between the number of links and the square of the number of nodes. 
Sometimes, the number of nodes is used computed to measure the network dimension. 
 
The average path length or connectivity length is the mean number of links that exist in 
the shortest route between two nodes. Like the average path length, the diameter of a 
network is also a measure of the network length. The diameter is the maximum number 
of links in the shortest route between any two nodes of the network (Csermely, 2006).  
 
Gulati et al. (2000) identified these same concepts (such as centrality, density, etc.), and 
added one other key area of research in which there is a potential for incorporating 
strategic networks: structural holes. In Industry they exist when two trading partners are 
                                                 
21
 The Adjacency Matrix (A) is a square symmetric matrix containing as many rows (and columns) as 
agents in which each element aij from A is 1 if there is a link between nodes i and j, and 0 otherwise. 
22
 The centrality of the agent provides information about the importance of an agent within a network. 
However, we must be aware of the simplicity of this indicator, since it does not take into account the 
importance of the relationships inside the network.  
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connected only through the focal industry. Structural holes in an industry’s customer-
supplier network may confer power through control, and ultimately profitability. Based 
on an analysis of input-output tables that define the network of flows among industries, 
Burt (1992) has shown that industries that occupy structural holes enjoy greater returns.  
 
In table Table 2-1 we present a summary of the main network indicators, a description 
of their meanings and a short explanation of how they are measured. Considering the 
element A (a node or an agent representing a firm), we have: 
 L: the number of links connected to A; 
 L: the total number of links in the network 
 n: the number of links between all the neighbours of A 
 N: the number of links that could possibly exist between all the neighbours of A 
(a fully connected network between them) 
 f: the total number of nodes in the network 
 
Network indicator Description How to measure 
Centrality Determines how central in a 
network an node is 
Proportion between the 
number of links connected to 
the agent and the total 
number of links: l/L 
Clustering (Transitivity)  Measures the connectivity inside the network 
Probability that two 
neighbours of a node are 
connected: n/N 
Density  Measures the amount of links in a network 
Proportion between links and 
nodes: f/L 
Average path length Measures the network length 
Mean number of links in the 
shortest path between any 
pair of nodes. 
Diameter Measures the network length 
Maximum number of links in 
the shortest path between 
any pair of nodes 
Table 2-1 - Summary of the main indicators in network theory 
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2.6.2. Small-worlds and Network Structure 
 
 
Some authors study certain properties of the network structure that are interesting to 
analyse. One of them is the small-world effect, which was brought to the field of 
economics by many researchers such as Watts and Strogatz (1997), Csermely (2006), 
Latora and Marchoiri (2003), etc. Watts and Strogatz (1997) have shown that the 
connection topology of some biological, technological and social networks is neither 
completely regular nor completely random but stays somehow in between these two 
extreme cases. This type of networks is named Small Worlds in analogy to the concept 
observed in social systems by Milgram (1967)23.  
 
Small world networks are typically highly clustered like regular matrixes but have low 
path length, like random graphs. These properties are of great importance in economics. 
This topology is considered more efficient because it is proved to maximize the flow of 
transmission within the network (while reducing the costs), when propagating 
information, both at global and local scale (Latora and Marchoiri, 2003).  
 
The work of Leskovec et al. (2005) confirm what was said about the low path length of 
the small-world networks. In their work, graphs densify over time (i.e., the number of 
nodes increase) and at the same time the average distance between nodes decreases. The 
diameter of small-world networks decrease as well along time. 
 
Some of these small-world features are explored again later in the case study presented 
in Chapter 6. In the next section, we will define the topologies that characterize the most 
common processes of network collaboration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 In their famous small-world experiment, Stanley Milgram gave letters to persons who were asked to 
pass them to social contacts (friends, colleagues) known on a first-name basis in order to find an unknown 
distant target (Milgram, 1967). A great number of letters arrived to their destination having gone through 
a small number of contacts.  
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2.6.3. Topologies of collaboration networks 
 
 
Network topology is the study of the arrangement of the elements (links, nodes, etc.) of 
a network. In economics, the number of topologies observed in cooperation networks is 
relatively high, from simple to more complex ones. A general overview of the 
topologies of networks is provided without formal details, the topologies being 
characterized by three main elements: the firms, the cooperating activities (that are 
integrated on firms, in our representation) and the flow of resources, as in the ARA 
model presented above (Hakansson, 1987). Firms and cooperating activities are 
represented as nodes, and resources as links.  
 
In the topologies given in the figures below, cooperation is associated with buyer-
supplier relationships or among buyers or suppliers. In these cases, cooperative 
relationships are developed for many purposes such as technological innovation, 
exchange of products and services, etc. The terms cooperation and collaboration remain 
identical.  
 
We distinguish three main forms that characterize the most common processes of 
cooperation24: linear, star and multipolar networks. 
 
 
Linear  
Within this topology each of the nodes of the network is connected to two other nodes. 
All the flow that is transmitted between nodes in the network travels from one node to 
the next node in a linear manner. The network contains different activities, some of 
which may be managed by different firms. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Several topologies are decribed in literature about collaboration networks. For a more complete 
overview of topologies based on case studies, one can consult CENESTAP, the Portuguese Center for 
Applied Textile Studies; this is an important source containing data and case studies about real inter-firm 
cooperation in Portugal. For the description of topologies in which we based this classification, see 
Wilhite (2006). 
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Figure 2-5 – Example of a linear network  
Note: only some of the flows between nodes are depicted 
 
In this case, the activity A1 is managed by firm a1, activity A2 is managed y a2 and so on. 
No direction of the flows is identified in this graph, although the flow of resources can 
be unidirectional or bidirectional between nodes. Examples of this type of sequential 
networks correspond to the situations where firms collaborate with partners that are 
geographically close instead of searching for other networks that are already in action.  
 
Star 
The star topology corresponds to the type of network topology in which each of the 
nodes of the network is connected to a central node.  Usually, firms rationalize 
resources and optimise activities when they form this configuration. The sharing of new 
technologies from a particular organization and the common benefit of resources are the 
main advantages of the intervenient of these topologies. Here the flows can also be 
bidirectional because the sharing of resources is not centralized, but spread into the 
nodes of the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1a5 A2a2 A3a3 ... 
f1 f2 f(...) Anan 
Legend: 
 
ai: individual agents or 
firms in the network 
(i=1,…n) 
Ai: cooperating activities 
(integrated on firms) 
fi: flow of resources (no 
direction of the flow is 
represented) 
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Figure 2-6 – Example of a star network 
Note: only some of the flows between nodes are depicted 
 
Firms exchance, store or get resources via the central activity A. In many situations new 
firms are created to aggregate the activities of A: in this case, firm a5 contains activity 
A.  
 
One example of networks that follow this topology is the groups of suppliers. In this 
situation, firms are organized around a common client (usually a big dimension client). 
This form of organizational network represents an interesting opportunity for the 
cooperating firms to organize more efficiently their supplies. In such a situation the 
central activity is the goal of the network and constitutes the connection to the final 
client. The complementarities of the firms’ competences are the key for the set of 
relationships that motivates this type of network, which is based on complementary of 
vertical relationships25. Among the several advantages that firms can take from these 
groups of suppliers, we can emphasize cost reduction, access to new markets and risk 
reduction in the development of new products.  
 
Faurecia, a world leading automotive supplier specialized in the design and assembly of 
six majors vehicle modules, can be seen as another example of such topology. Several 
different suppliers sell directly to Faurecia that integrates the several phases of the 
production process and contacts buyers (great automobile brands as BMW, Ford, etc) 
directly. In this case, the network allows for the reduction of costs among suppliers 
                                                 
25
 Firms are said to relate horizontally when cooperating with firms in the same market or vertically when 
cooperating with firms that belong to other markets. 
Legend: 
 
ai: individual agents or 
firms in the network 
(i=1,…n) 
A: cooperating activities 
(integrated on firms) 
fi: flow of resources (no 
direction of the flow is 
represented) 
a1 
a2 a3 
... 
an 
Aa5 
f1 
f2 
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because of the common efforts on technological innovation, exchange of products and 
services, etc. 
 
The topology of star networks is equivalent to another topology named centralized 
networks. Centralized networks emerge usually from entrepreneur’s projects that need a 
centralized structure where resources and activities may be concentrated. Cooperative 
goals are well defined in this case. R&D alliances use this topology of networks because 
they locate R&D activities in the central organization. The goal of this modality is well 
defined and corresponds generally to the reduction of costs and risks. Ho other hand, 
star networks emerge in situations where is not easy to identify the main goals of the 
cooperation, and that is the main difference between the two types of networks, 
although the topologies are similar. 
 
Multipolar networks 
The clustering of several organizations characterizes this topology.  Typically, the 
relationships between organizations belonging to the same cluster are strong, but 
relationships between organizations that belong to different clusters are weak (although 
the relationships in this latter situation are stronger than with any organization that is 
outside the network).  
 
Researchers distinguish two different situations in multipolar networks: multipolar 
polycentric networks and multipolar hierarchical networks. In multipolar polycentric 
networks, vertical relationships exist (although they do not drive communication), but 
horizontal relationships between organizations are very important and communication 
between groups is strong and well organized26. Multipolar hierarchical networks contain 
fragile and fragmented horizontal relationships. Communication is restricted to 
organizations that are vertically connected.  
 
This kind of networks is typical from the automobile manufacturing sector although 
they can also be found in other industries, as for instance in textile and clothing 
industry. Relationships between the cooperating firms from the textile industry and 
                                                 
26
 Horizontally relationships are set up within the same market while vertical relationships with other 
firms are established between firms belonging to different markets. 
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firms from the clothing industry can be established with success in multipolar 
polycentric networks.  
 
 
Figure 2-7 – Example of a multipolar polycentric network  
Note: only some of the flows between nodes are depicted 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7 presents such a network containing relationships between organizations 
belonging to the same cluster, and relationships between organizations that belong to 
different clusters. In this example two activities dominate the entire network and 
constitute the reason for collaboration: A1 (carried out by firm a5) and A2 (carried out by 
firm a9).  
 
In the next chapter, we introduce some techniques that are used later in the empirical 
part of our work. We establish the links between individual and aggregate levels of 
analyses and present the basis of Agent-Based simulation. 
a1 
a2 a3 
... 
a6 
A1a5 
f1 
f2 
a7 
a8 A10 
... 
an 
A2a9 
f6 
f3 
f5 
Legend: 
 
ai: individual agents or 
firms in the network 
(i=1,…n) 
A: cooperating activities 
(integrated on firms) 
fi: flow of resources (no 
direction of the flow is 
represented) 
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3. Interacting individuals and Agent-Based Simulation  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is focused on the links between individual and aggregate levels of 
analyses. The connection between these levels is sometimes referred to as emergence. 
According to Axelrod (1997), the large-effects of complex locally interacting 
individuals endorse the appearance of emergent properties at the level of the population.  
Some of the concepts that have been discussed earlier in Chapter 2 are now going to be 
defined as concepts of agent based simulation. Aggregate behaviour may be produced 
by the interaction of individual agents. Techniques that produce such results are known 
by several names including Agent-Based modelling, bottom-up modelling and artificial 
social systems (Axelrod, 1997), that will be studied in the course of this chapter.  
 
 62 
A different view is offered by this chapter in which the individual is an abstract entity 
standing for a real adaptive person or organization (Section 3.1). In Sections 3.2, and 
3.3, our main goal is to provide a framework for an empirical application and therefore 
discuss the simulation, where individuals become simulated agents.  
 
3.1. General notions  
 
In this section we will analyse the “Individual versus Social” perspective of Schelling 
(1978), the concept of adaptive individuals and adaptive systems presented by Belew 
and Mitchel (1996), and the relation between learning and evolution of Young (1998), 
and Ferber (1999). The investigation of these approaches will facilitate further reading 
and analysis, where the properties of individuals will be configured in order to provide 
an aggregate behaviour of the population. 
 
3.1.1. Individual and aggregate Behaviour 
 
Frequently we try to use what is known about individual actions to predict the social 
aggregate phenomena produced by the group. There are cases in which the aggregate is 
merely an extrapolation from the individual: if we know, for instance that every driver 
turns his lights on at sunset, we can guess that the street could appear illuminated almost 
suddenly. But if most people turn their lights on when some proportion of oncoming 
cars already have their lights on, we would get a different picture. In this latter case, 
drivers would be influencing each others’ behaviour and responding to each others’ 
behaviour. 
 
This example was given by Schelling (1978), who was interested in studying the macro 
behaviour that emerged from micro decisions27. Some of these micro decisions are 
influenced by the system of interaction between those individuals and their 
environment.  
 
                                                 
27
 As we have presented in the introduction of this chapter, the notion of emergence is important since 
emergent behaviour or emergent properties are a consequence of the large-effects of complex locally 
interacting individuals (Axelrod, 1997). 
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The notion of behaviour is an important issue. Belew and Mitchell (1996) describe 
behaviour, as something that “closes the loop” between an organism an its environment. 
The kind of behaviour in Shelling drivers example is contingent, that is, the behaviour 
of some depends on what the others are doing. But this notion of behaviour cannot be 
isolated from another important concept - the purpose. In general, individuals pursue 
goals, try to minimize his/her effort and maximize his/her comfort. The goals, purposes 
or objectives relate directly to other individuals and their behaviour. 
 
According to Schelling (1978) the field of Economics has adapted very well to these 
notions: “Among the social sciences, the one that conforms most to this kind of analysis 
is economics. In economics the individuals are people, families, owners of farms and 
businesses, […]. They are expected to know very little about the whole economy and the 
way it works. They know the prices of the things they buy and sell, […] and something 
about the pertinent alternatives to the ways they are currently earning their living, or 
running their business or spending their money […]. Tens of millions of people are 
making billions of decisions every week about what to buy and what to sell, or where to 
work […]” and the whole system works.  
 
However, the analysis of interactions at the individual level only may lead to 
misunderstandings. Usually, economists assume that the market is in equilibrium and 
that the individual preferences are constant. There are examples where this assumption 
does not hold and the interaction between different levels of analysis is crucial for the 
real understanding of a given situation. Thus, the analysis of mixed levels (individual 
cognitive level and social level) may constitute the answer to some of these problems, 
as we are going to see in Section 3.3. 
 
3.1.2. Adaptive individuals and adaptive systems 
 
Previous paragraphs introduced the issue of individual behaviour and how interactions 
at this micro level could maintain the whole system working. If we see the interactions 
in the system as playing in a game, a question arises on whether the game is played 
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always in the same way. In other words, do individuals evolve their strategies? Are they 
adaptive? Is there any kind of learning behaviour?  
 
The behavioural sciences have focused on the ways in which the behaviour of 
organisms changes over time at different time scales (Todd, 1996): Moment to moment 
decision making, long-term alterations of strategies, lifetime developmental adjustments 
and across life-time changes. These processes are all adaptive, as they involve a change 
in the behaviour of the individual. However, adaptation requires more than a change in 
the behaviour, motivated by the environment or by other individuals.  
 
Adaptation represents the capacity for change and the additional requirement that this 
change signifies an improvement of fit (Belew and Mitchell, 1996). Furthermore, 
changes associated with this improvement of fit (sometimes called fitness) must be 
accumulated and replicated over time (Todd, 1996). The measurement of these 
improvements is a difficult issue, but some proposals about how to resolve this problem 
exist in some sciences, such as Economics or Management.  
 
Holland and Miller (1991), has developed the concept of artificial adaptive agents 
(AAA). According to this author an agent is called adaptive if it satisfies two criteria: (i) 
the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a value representing, for 
instance, performance, utility, payoff or fitness, etc., and (ii) the agent behaves so as to 
increase this value over time. 
 
Adaptation is actually strictly linked to cognitive systems. Herbert Simon (1955) argues 
that adaptation is a sine qua non for any cognitive system and that cognitive science is a 
fundamental set of common concerns shared by different disciplines concerned with 
systems that are adaptive. Later in this work, we will simulate some cognitive properties 
of adaptive agents with the aim of building a Multi-Agent System of organizations. For 
now, we focus on some of the cognitive properties that we can attribute to individual 
agents in the context of economics. 
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Adaptive individuals or agents are not irrational. Young (1998) argues that agents adapt 
but they are not Hyper-rational: “They look around them, they gather information, and 
they act fairly sensibly on the basis of their information most of the time”, Young (1998, 
p. 5).  
 
The rationality of economic agents is a very important question in economic science.  
Simon (1955) developed a behavioural model of rational choice where he replaces the 
global rationality assumed previously in some work in economics by a “kind of rational 
behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and the computational 
capacities that are processed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments 
in which such organisms exist”.  
 
Simon compares the psychological concept of “aspiration level” of the individuals with 
the economic concept of the “opportunity cost” in the payoff values. He also discusses 
the difficulty of humans in being truly rational when all alternatives are evaluated 
before a choice is made28. This approach uses some concepts from Psychology to solve 
the apparent paradox of the economic theory where there is the attempt to deal with 
human behaviour in situations in which that behaviour is at least “intendedly” rational.  
 
The definition of Holland’s artificial adaptive agents discussed earlier was applied to 
economic theory too. Holland and Miller (1991) argues that “economic analysis has 
largely avoided questions about the way which economic agents make choices when 
confronted by a perpetually novel and evolving world”. So, an economy can be viewed 
as an adaptive system, where adaptive agents aggregate. A complex adaptive system, as 
defined by Holland and Miller (1991) is “a complex system that contains adaptive 
agents, networked so that the environment of each adaptive agent includes other agents 
in the system”.  
 
                                                 
28
 Simon, (1955) simplifies what he calls the “classical” concept of rationality where there is some hyper-
rationality involving the computation of all possible payoffs involving all alternatives in a decision 
making process. The author argues that “there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual human choice 
situations of any complexity, these computations can be, or are in fact, performed.” 
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Coming from the fields of Artificial Intelligence and particularly Machine Learning29, 
the theory of complex adaptive systems made it possible to develop well defined and 
flexible models that exhibit emergent behaviour. The work of Holland (2001 [1975]) 
introduced a formal framework for the adaptation process. In this framework, there are 
three associated objects in the centre of the study: the environment, E, an adaptive plan, 
τ (which determines successive structural modifications in response to the 
environment), and µ, a measure of the performance of the structures in the environment. 
 
Many authors used Holland’s and other frameworks to represent their adaptive systems. 
For example, Carley and Hill (2001), Young (1998) examined adaptation in 
organizations of intelligent artificial agents. Holland (2001 [1975]) concludes that 
concurrent learning mechanisms generate the ability to learn strategies which can be 
either adaptive or maladaptive. Therefore, performance and form of organizations 
depend on several characteristics, such as environmental change, agent and structural 
learning, and the emergence of institutionalized strategies. 
 
3.1.3. Adaptive Learning and Evolution 
 
The question of adaptation that we discussed in previous paragraphs is associated with 
the issue of learning. Indeed, individuals adapt their behaviour in response to others’ 
behaviour and to the environment, in an interactive decision making process where 
learning plays an important role.  
 
According to Ferber (1999) we can view the problem of the adaptation of a group of 
agents in two different ways: either as an individual characteristic of the agents – 
learning – or as a collective process bringing reproductive mechanisms into play – 
evolution. It is possible, though, to build an overall view of an adaptation process which 
is simultaneously individual and collective. 
 
                                                 
29
 Machine learning is the study of computer algorithms that improve automatically with experience 
(Mitchell, 1997). Genetic Algorithms (GA) lie among the principal learning techniques. GA’s were first 
developed by Holland (2001 [1975]) as a way of studying adaptation, optimization and learning, based on 
a biological metaphor. 
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The issues connecting adaptation, learning and evolution have been studied by several 
researchers including Darwin (1985 [1859]), Lamarck (1914), Baldwin (1896), Hinton 
and Nowlan (1987) and many others. Their research areas were very different.  
 
Indeed, Psychology and Biology were, latu sensu, the original fields of inspiration of 
those who studied adaptation, but up to date the concepts of adaptive learning and 
evolution have spread into other fields of knowledge and can be found in almost every 
subject, from Chemistry and Physics to Economy, Marketing and Computer Science. 
 
Focusing again in the Economic and Social Sciences, Young (1998) systematizes 
several adaptive mechanisms of learning in the following way: 
 Natural Selection: Individuals that present higher levels of fitness 
(well adapted individuals) are at a reproductive advantage compared 
to individuals that present lower levels of fitness (maladapted 
individuals).   
 Imitation: Individuals copy the behaviour of others, especially 
behaviour that is popular or appears to yield higher payoffs.  
 Reinforcement learning: Individuals tend to adopt actions that 
yielded high payoffs in the past, and avoid actions that have yielded 
low payoffs. This is the standard learning model in behavioural 
psychology and it has gained the attention of economists. As in 
imitative models, payoffs describe choice behaviours but it is “one’s 
own past payoffs that matter, not the payoffs of others” (Young, 
1998).  
 Instance-Based learning: Individuals use actual information about 
the environment and other individuals. When a new action has to be 
adopted by an individual, a set of similar related actions is retrieved 
from memory and used to decide about the new action to adopt.  
 
It is difficult to say what the best model of learning is. It would be desirable to have a 
model of learning that incorporates elements of all these models. Table 3-1 presents a 
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summary of the models of learning mainly used by individuals or agents, their 
advantages and drawbacks. 
 
Models of 
Learning Advantages Drawbacks 
Natural 
selection 
Based on natural rules. 
Seems to work well in several 
fields of science  
Models are based on the idea that rules of 
behaviour are genetically programmed and 
poorly adapted rules die out in the long run 
Imitation It is a good approach to 
acquire effective behaviour 
Imitation does not consider one’s own choice: 
only others count 
Reinforcement 
learning 
It does not require a large 
amount of memory to store all 
data. Individuals just update 
their knowledge in every 
iteration. 
It takes a very limited view of human rationality: 
agents are assumed to respond only to their 
own payoffs; they do not anticipate what others 
are going to do 
Instance based 
learning 
Instead of estimating the 
target function once for the 
entire instance space, these 
methods can estimate it 
locally and differently for each 
new action to be classified 
Main difficulties include the labelling of new 
actions to adopt, and the negative impact of 
irrelevant features on the distance among 
similar actions that were adopted before 
Table 3-1 - Summary of the models of learning mainly used by individuals, their advantages and 
drawbacks. 
 
One can question whether natural selection is indeed a model of learning. According to 
Ferber (1999) and as stated before, if adaptation is seen as a collective process bringing 
reproductive mechanisms into play, then it is closer to evolution than to individual 
learning. However, in this process there is, in fact, a kind of adaptive learning because 
of the subtle relationship between selection and adaptation that can be summarized as 
follows: “Adaptive learning for individuals usually consists of selection among 
behavioural responses”30.  
 
The ecological perspectives presented in section 2.2 are more focused on selection 
while most of the literature on organizations adopted a different view, which Hannan 
and Freeman (1977) called the adaptation perspective. The assumption that acquired 
                                                 
30
 As discussed in the previous chapter, learning here plays a role within the organizational adaptation 
perspective which is closer to the Lamarckian view rather than to the Darwinian one. “To the extent that 
learning about the past helps future adaptation, social change is indeed Lamarckian – it transforms 
rather than selects” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In fact, human actors learn by experience and 
incorporate learning into their repertoires. 
 69 
characteristics are not inherited is often taken to imply that the adaptations that an 
organism learns during its lifetime cannot guide the course of evolution.  
 
However, according to Baldwin (1896) this inference is incorrect31. Hinton and Nowlan 
(1987) hold Baldwins’ proposition demonstrating an effect of learning that makes 
organisms to evolve much faster than their non-learning equivalents during their 
lifetime. The authors used a neural network to simulate this interaction between learning 
and evolution.  
 
The evolutionary search of Hinton and Nowlan (1987) was modelled with a version of a 
genetic algorithm. The authors conclude that some aspects of the environment are 
unpredictable, so it is positively advantageous to leave some decisions to learning rather 
than specifying them genetically. This argument is different from the Baldwin effect 
(Baldwin, 1896), which applies to complex co-adaptations to predictable aspects of the 
environment. 
 
The benefits of individual adaptation or “plasticity” to evolutionary adaptation seem to 
be clear: an individual able to adapt to changes in the environment and in response to 
others’ behaviour during its lifetime is surely more fit than one that cannot.  
 
The interaction between the individual and the social levels of learning was studied by 
Sun (2001). Sun integrated two complementary forms of learning, incorporating two 
complementary sources of knowledge that an agent possesses: individual and social. 
These two forms can interact and the integrated model enables to investigate the 
influence of socio-cultural processes on individuals. 
 
Littman (1996) stated that many of the problems that allow for an adaptive behaviour 
may be classified as being part of evolution (when they correspond to changes in the 
                                                 
31
 The Baldwin effect as it has been termed after J.M Baldwin, has its roots in his paper from 1896 entitled 
“A new factor in evolution”. In this paper, Baldwin determines the influence of organic selection and 
calls it “a new factor for it gives a method of deriving the determinate gains of phylogeny [what is 
observed from the outside] from the adaptations of ontogeny [the genetic information]”. He argues that 
“the ontogentic adaptations are really new […] and they are really reproduced in succeeding 
generations, although not physically inherited” (Baldwin, 1896). This perspective is similar to the 
Lamarckian one and different from the one of Darwin. 
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genome that alter the intrinsic behaviour of the individual) or learning (when they 
correspond to changes in the behaviour as the result of interactions with the 
environment). Littman developed a set of simulations combining evolution and 
learning32. He has defined two levels: an evolutionary level and a learning level. A 
genetic algorithm that maintains a population of individuals identified by their genomes 
defines the evolutionary level.  
 
The learning level takes place during the realization phase of the genomes. For that, a 
simple neural network was considered. This network codifies the genes of the individual 
and interacts with the environment. These interactions may originate changes in the 
individual weights of the neural network and, therefore the network “learns”. The 
changes in the weights die with the individual, but selection occurs at the level of the 
genetic algorithm.  
 
As an example, the experience of Todd and Miller cited in Todd (1996) on Exploring 
Adaptive Agency is used here. Offspring are born in sub aquatic environment where 
there are two kinds of substances, identified by their colours that can be consumed: 
green (food) and red (poison). No information is passed to the new offspring. The goal 
of their work was to show the connection between learning and evolution processes. 
They had succeeded in this domain. 
 
In the next section we will describe different types of interactions between individuals, 
with focus on forms and methods of cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Complexity rises when the interaction between evolution and learning is considered. Littman used 
computer simulations to deal with these interactions.  
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3.2.  Interaction and cooperation  
 
3.2.1. Types of interactions 
 
Interaction is a natural process in the real world, resulting from the relationship between 
an individual and the world where he or she lives33. For this interaction to happen, 
individuals have to be capable of developing communication (not just transmitting 
information), but more importantly, to provoke some specific behaviour in others 
(Ferber, 1999). Those interactions may consist, for instance, of attraction, combat, 
mating, communication, trade, partnership or rivalry (Axelrod, 1997).  
 
Cooperation is the general form of interaction studied most in Multi-Agent Systems, 
although collaboration and competition are also two important types of interaction 
between agents.  
 
Under the Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) viewpoint, the nature of the goals, 
the access to resources, and authority are used to define an initial typology of 
interaction situations: Cooperation is a type of interaction where each party retains its 
own authority and resources. Besides, there is neither a common goal nor a clearly 
defined and shared mission. It is a low committed type of interaction and therefore 
access to resources is not shared and is seen as insufficient.  
 
Cooperation is a mechanism of complex interaction, where agents have to coordinate 
their actions in the search fort synergic advantages of pooled skills (Ferber, 1999). The 
level of commitment is low and there is no sharing of goals. 
 
On the other hand, collaboration requires comprehensive planning, as decision-making, 
authority and resources are shared. The level of commitment is high and there is a 
sharing of goals. These synergistic efforts often result in innovations that benefit all 
participants. 
                                                 
33
 Epstein and Axtell (1996), in their pioneering work called “Growing Artificial Societies”, demonstrated 
how fundamental collective behaviour can emerge from the interaction of individual agents and between 
agents and the environment. 
 72 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen a similar classification of the types of 
collaboration from the organizational theory viewpoint (Winer and Ray, 1994). 
Comparing the organizational theory viewpoint with the present topology of 
interactions from DAI, this classification presents only some small differences that we 
describe in the following tables34:  
 
 
(a) DAI viewpoint 
Type of 
interaction 
Level of 
commitment 
to common 
goals 
Nature of Goals Nature of Resources 
Cooperation Low Compatible Insufficient 
Collaboration High Compatible Sufficient 
Competition35 None Incompatible Insufficient 
 
(b) Organizational Theory viewpoint 
Type of 
interaction 
Level of 
commitment 
to common 
goals 
Sharing of 
Goals Sharing of Resources 
Cooperation Low No No 
Collaboration High Yes Yes 
Competition None No No 
 
Table 3-2(a) and (b) - Classification of the types of interactions between individuals: the DAI and 
the Organizational theory viewpoints.  
 
Under the DAI viewpoint, the nature of the goals can be compatible for the elements 
that interact via cooperation. On the other hand Winer and Ray state that cooperation 
takes place among parties even when they have not a common main goal and without a 
clearly defined and shared mission.  
                                                 
34
 We have ignored the coordination type of interaction from Winer and Ray (1994), as it stands between 
cooperation and collaboration. It will therefore be associated with one of these concepts, depending on 
the type of approach used. 
35
 Within the DAI framework there are several types of competition according to the resources and skills 
existing in the environment and in the agents. This type of competition is the collective conflict over 
resources that combines other types of competition: collective competition and individual conflict over 
resources (Ferber 1999). 
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These two visions are slightly different although this difference does not appear to be 
significant for a common and definite topology of the types of collaboration or 
interaction between individuals, as presented in Chapter 2. However, as we have 
pointed out, this classification will sometimes be ignored.  
 
3.2.2.  Forms and methods of cooperation 
 
The reason why cooperation appears in individual interaction has been studied by many 
scientists. Axelrod (1997) recalls the pessimism of some politicians who argued that 
before governments existed, the state of nature was dominated by selfish individuals 
and that cooperation could not develop without a central authority. We know that this is 
not true today since nations interact without a central authority.  
 
Research in cooperation issues is based upon an investigation of individuals who pursue 
their own self interest without the aid of a central authority and are forced to cooperate 
with each other. One of the first simulated experiments dealing with cooperation was 
the prisoners’ dilemma, as it was proposed by Axelrod (1984). In this game there are 
two players. Each has two choices, namely cooperate or defect and each must take the 
decision without knowing the others’ decision.  
 
No matter what the other does, defection always takes a higher payoff (to the player that 
defects) than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both 
had cooperated, as shown in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-3 – Example of players’ payoffs in the prisoners’ dilemma. 
Note: A player takes a decision before knowing the decision of the other player. 
It is proved that the payoff is higher when they both cooperate. 
 Player B 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate A=3; B=3 A=0; B=5 
Player A 
Defect A=5; B=0 A=1; B=1 
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This dilemma is an abstract formulation of some general rules which determine when it 
is best for each individual to go for mutual defection, or mutual cooperation. Axelrod 
(1984) presents a strategy for playing this game known as TIT FOR TAT. In this policy, 
players cooperate in the first move. In the following moves, they just do whatever the 
other player does in the previous move. This strategy was proved to be the more 
successful in computer tournaments when compared to other strategies, because on 
average it gives higher payoffs to the players. 
 
This example illustrates how the study of a simple game can contribute to a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of cooperation. As Axelrod (1984, p. 5) said “When 
the goal is to deepen our understanding of some fundamental process [as cooperation], 
then simplicity of the assumptions is important, and realistic representation of all the 
details of a particular setting is not.” 
 
Cooperation can be studied from different points of view and under varying conditions. 
Inspired by the ideas of Ferber (1999) and focusing on the organizational perspective, 
we have categorized the main objectives for using cooperation - increasing survival 
capacity, improving performance and resolving conflicts. Besides, we have identified 
the main methods of cooperation, defining the means that are necessary for the 
realization of the cooperation. These are shown in Table 3-4. 
 
According to Ferber (1999), the main methods for reaching cooperation are grouping, 
communication, specialization, arbitration, and negotiation. The grouping method is 
one of the main methods of cooperation. In this case individuals form a more or less 
homogenous unit in space or in a virtual network of agents. Agglomeration theories 
(Location and Urbanization theories) use this method as it is a very important means for 
organizations to attain shared goals in a physical/virtual delimited space.  
 
Communication means the change of information, while specialization is similar to 
being complementary, as it represents the degree of complementariness that exists in the 
elements of a group. Arbitration and negotiation are methods by which the conflict 
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between groups may be solved. In human societies, for instance, the justice system acts 
as an organ of arbitration.  
 
Main objective for 
using cooperation is… 
Description 
Main methods for reaching 
cooperation 
Increasing survival 
capacity 
Cooperation improves collective 
survival which corresponds to the 
maintenance of the group 
Grouping 
Communication 
Specialization 
Improving performance 
Cooperation contributes for the 
improvement of performance 
indicators that translate intrinsic 
characteristics of the group 
Grouping 
Specialization 
Communication 
Resolving conflicts 
Situations of conflict within a group 
can be solved through cooperation 
(e.g.: neighbouring organizations 
living in the same cluster) 
Arbitration 
Negotiation 
Communication 
 
Table 3-4 – Main objectives and methods for reaching cooperation. 
 
3.2.3. Some related works 
 
Axelrod and Benett (1997) use a landscape theory of aggregation to predict how 
aggregation will lead to alignments among organizations whose leaders are myopic in 
their assessments. Authors computed and used distance, frustration and energy 
measures applied to seventeen European nations in the Second World War. Predicted 
configurations of nations are based on the efforts of actors to minimize their frustration 
based upon their pairwise tendencies to align with some nations and oppose others.  
 
The previous work of Axelrod and Benett (1997) can be adapted to cover economic 
applications, namely formation of business alliances. After that, Axelrod (1997) 
presented a general model for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop 
and sponsor technical standards.  
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In their example, the authors started with two simple assumptions: (1) a firm will join a 
large alliance if it increases the profitability of successfully sponsoring a compatibility 
standard and (2) the firm will avoid forming alliance with rivals if it is more beneficial 
to exploit existing compatibility standards. The concept of utility was used instead of 
profit maximization and showed that the Nash equilibrium is the local minimum of an 
energy function.  
 
This work is of importance because it combines the integration of a firm in a business 
alliance with individual utility of that firm, which depends on the presence of rivals and 
on the size of the coalition. Illustration of the effectiveness of this methodology was 
made by applying it to the 1998 efforts to create and sponsor UNIX operating systems 
standards (computers and workstations). 
  
In the next section we introduce simulation and Multi-Agent Systems as these are 
effective tools to model the interaction among individuals. 
 
 
3.3. Simulation and Multi-Agent Systems 
 
3.3.1. Simulation as a method  
 
Simulation is a particular type of modelling. A model is a simplification of the world, 
and a well-recognized way of understanding it. As in a regression equation, simulations 
also have inputs entered by the researcher and provide outputs. When a child is playing 
with her dolls, she is simulating a relationship between a mother and a daughter. 
Although entertainment may be one of the uses of simulation, there are many other 
reasons to use this type of modelling. Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999) describe several 
applications of simulation (some of them overlap) as follows: 
 
 Better understating of the world – Simulation is a model of some reality and 
therefore can be used to better understand this reality; 
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 Prediction – If we develop a model that reproduces the dynamics of some 
behaviour, we can then simulate the passing of time and thus use the model 
to predict the future; 
 Provide tools to substitute for human capabilities - Expert systems have 
been constructed to simulate the expertise of professionals such as 
geologists, chemists, and doctors. These systems can subsequently be used 
by non-experts to predict certain features of the soil or water or to carry-out 
diagnoses; 
 Training – Flight or car simulators can be used to train pilots and novice 
car-drivers; simulation of a national economy may be used to train 
economists in order to value the impact of changing certain macroeconomic 
variables; 
 Entertainment – Games, as flight simulators, are used not only for training, 
but also for entertainment. Some of these simulations as SimCity or Simlife 
are close to social simulations.  
 
In this work we use computer simulation as a method of socio-economic research. This 
method can be associated with the three first reasons defined above. Computer 
simulation will be used to obtain a better understating of the world, to predict the future, 
and to provide tools to substitute for human capabilities.  
 
The methodology of simulation assumes that there is some real world phenomenon 
which the researcher is interested in, called the target (Doran and Gilbert, 1994). The 
idea is to produce a model of this target because it is simpler to study than the target 
itself. This target is a dynamic entity, changing over time and reacting to its 
environment.  
 
Methodologically, computer simulations can be described in the following way: 
i) The researcher identifies the world phenomenon that he/she is interested in – 
the target; 
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ii) Model development: a model that can be implemented in the form of a 
computer program is developed based on processes identified in i);  
iii) This model is run and its behaviour is recorded; 
iv) Evaluation/validation: simulated data produced by the simulation is 
compared with real data to check whether the model generates outcomes that 
are compatible to those observed in real world. If the quality of the output 
would not reach satisfactory level, the process would return to step ii). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 - The logic of simulation as a method (adapted from Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 16)  
 
 
Figure 3-1 identifies the main stages of computer simulation-based research. Afterwards 
we will explore some aspects of this schema, namely the evaluation/validation stage, 
since the comparison of the similarity between real and simulated data is an important 
issue in this work. 
 
Target 
Model 
development 
Simulated 
Data 
Collected 
Data 
Abstract 
Modelling  
Data 
gathering 
Phenomenon 
identification 
Simulation 
Evaluation/ 
validation 
Real 
World 
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Many simulation approaches36 use the schema of simulation presented in Figure 3-1, 
although some of them do not explicitly incorporate evaluation using data comparison. 
In some studies the outcome generated by the simulated model can be assessed directly 
by the model builder. Simulated outputs are classified according to a degree of 
coherence and the model builder accepts the results that maximize the coherence 
between simulation and real world. 
 
So, it is up to the researcher to choose how the modelling is made. In the following we 
give an overview of some different approaches to modelling:  
 
• System dynamics – This model exploits differential equations. The target is 
described using a system of equations which permits to derive the state of the 
system at time t+1 from the system state at time t. System dynamics is restricted 
to the macro level in that it models a part of the reality (the target system) as a 
whole. One application of system dynamics is WORLD2 (Forrester, 1971) 
implemented in a software called Dynamo37. This application is a world model 
where pollution, population, natural resources and the capital stock sector can all 
be modelled. 
 Queuing models – These models are discrete event models. Events are 
scheduled using an agenda and events can be predetermined to start at a 
given time. There are different kinds of objects in queuing models, namely 
servers, customers, queues and the agenda. One of the applications of 
queuing model was implemented in SimLab38 and aims at simulating an 
airport. It includes costumers (aircraft, passengers), servers (gates, 
runways), etc.  
 Micro-simulation - Modelling is produced at the individual level. A set of 
rules (transition probabilities) are then applied to these units leading to 
                                                 
36
 Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999) present a detailed analysis of the main simulation techniques used in 
social sciences. 
37
 The simulation language Dynamo (DYNAmic MOdels), was developed in the late 1950s by a group 
working with Jay Forrester at MIT (http://web.mit.edu/sdg/www/). 
38
 SimLab is the multidisciplinary research unit at Helsinki University of Technology, Computer Science 
and Engineering, Information Networks Study Programme. The core of SimLab is a virtual collaborative 
learning environment for business processes. 
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simulated changes in state and behaviour. These rules may be deterministic 
or stochastic. Stochastic micro-models are opposed to the (usually 
deterministic) macro model of the system dynamics approach. This type of 
simulation is used, for example, to model the social security system of some 
country, by modelling the evolution of the attributes of individuals such as 
births, deaths, age, retirement, etc. (Davies and Favreault, 2003).  
 Cellular automata39 - Cellular automata are cells located in a regular grid 
where the behaviour of an individual cell is determined by a set of rules 
which specify how that state depends on the previous state of that cell and 
the states of its neighbours. The Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner, 1970) 
was implemented with this simulation technique. The rules are simple: a cell 
can only survive if there are either two or three other living cells in its 
immediate neighbourhood (the eight cells surrounding it). If these 
conditions are not satisfied it will die either from the effect of overcrowding 
(if it has too many living neighbours) or from loneliness (if it has too few 
living neighbours). 
 Multi-Agent Systems – Although there is not a general consensus about what 
an agent is, the term is usually used to describe self-contained programs 
which can control their own actions based on their perceptions of their 
operating environment (Huhns and Singh, 1998). There are several 
applications of Multi-Agent Systems in social and economic sciences. For 
instance, Carley and Hill (2001) created Construct-O, a Multi-Agent model 
of social and individual change resulting from the diffusion of information 
among adaptive and communicative individuals. In this model, each agent 
has a certain position in the social network, together with a mental model or 
knowledge. When individuals interact, they communicate a piece of their 
knowledge so information diffuses. 
 
                                                 
39
 Cellular automata are - by definition - dynamical systems which are discrete in space and time - and are 
characterised by "local" interactions. Cellular automata are an extension of a concept often used in 
Artificial Intelligence: automata. The, Automata theory is the study of abstract machines and problems 
they are able to solve. A single automaton is a mathematical model for a finite state machine (FSM), 
which is a machine that, given an input of symbols, jumps through a series of states according to a 
transition function (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979).  
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The following table compares these simulation techniques according to some of their 
features, namely communication, complexity, advantages and drawbacks. 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
techniques 
Communication 
between agents 
Complexity 
of agents 
Some Advantages Some Drawbacks 
 
System 
Dynamics  
 
No  
 
Low  
 
Clear formulation of the 
problem; analytical 
solutions may exist 
 
Difficult to change  
attributes during the 
simulation 
  
Queuing 
models 
  
No 
  
Low 
Focuses in the notion of 
the event  
Customers do not 
change the behaviour 
during the simulation 
  
Micro-
simulation 
  
  
No 
  
High 
Stochastic simulation 
with possibility of 
changing of individual 
attributes  
Few levels of analysis. 
Individuals have no 
autonomy  
  
Cellular 
automata 
  
Yes 
  
Low 
Introduces 
communication between 
agents 
Agents are very 
limited in their 
behaviour and 
intelligence 
 
Multi-Agent 
Systems 
 
Yes 
 
High 
 
Agents are given the 
expression of human or 
organizational activity 
 
--- 
Table 3-5 – Main social simulation techniques and some of their features 
 
We did not find any general disadvantage in Multi-Agent Systems except that in most 
part of the cases no analytical solutions exist. We could point out that Multi-Agent 
Systems may be quite complex and this may complicate the understanding of the 
output. Besides, Multi-Agent programming can answer some questions that arise in the 
fields of economics and game theory. Some scientists, nowadays known as the founders 
of computer science, such as Von Neumann and Alan Turing, were interested in the 
formal study of games. It may be that this interest (that ultimately led them to write their 
classical papers) is seen as the foundation of Artificial Intelligence (Wooldridge, 2002).  
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In addition, simulation using Multi-Agent Systems has turned out to be a very useful 
technique and is rapidly becoming important in every scientific field because of their 
simplicity and efficiency when run on existing computers. Agent software has been 
much influenced by the work of Artificial Intelligence, (AI) especially the subfield 
called Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) (Bond and Grasser, 1988). DAI is very 
important to social simulation, because it pays attention to building networks of 
intelligent agents and investigating their properties.  
 
Multi-Agent Systems have many designations as Agent-Based modelling, Bottom-up 
modelling and Artifical Social Systems (Axelrod, 1997); all aim at analysing the 
aggregate behaviour (and to understand complex properties) arising from the interaction 
of the simulation among the individual agents.  
 
Other authors use different terminology. Holland (2001 [1975]) introduced the concept 
of Artificial Adaptive Agents (AAA).  According to Holland (1991) AAA models show 
some characteristics that are not available in traditional modelling techniques […]. 
Mathematical models lose flexibility but gain a consistent structure and general 
solution techniques. […] The resulting [AAA] models are dynamic and are 
“executable” in the sense that the unfolding behaviour of the model can be observed 
step-by-step. This makes it possible to check the plausibility of the behaviour implied by 
the assumptions of the model. 
 
Axelrod (1997) argues that Multi-Agent Systems are an intuitive method that contrasts 
with the standard methods of induction and deduction: “Agent-based modelling is a 
third way of making science. Like deduction it starts with a set of explicit assumptions. 
But unlike deduction it does not prove theorems. Instead, an Agent-Based model 
generates simulated data that can be analyzed inductively. Unlike typical intuition, 
however, the simulated data come from a rigorously specified set of rules rather than a 
direct measurement of the world. Whereas the purpose of induction is to find patterns in 
data and that of deduction is to find consequences of assumptions, the purpose of agent-
based modelling is to aid intuition.” (Axelrod, 1997, pp. 3-4). This intuition referred to 
by Axelrod (1997) in often linked to emergence. 
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As other simulation techniques, Agent-Based modelling is a way to do experiments. But 
“agent based modelling is particularly useful when the population is heterogeneous, 
when interactions among agents are complex and nonlinear, and when the space is 
crucial” (Epstein, 2003). The large-effects of complex locally interacting agents are 
called emergent properties. Epstein and Axtell (1996), in their pioneering work, 
demonstrated how fundamental collective behaviour can emerge from the interaction of 
individual agents.  
 
In the view of Holland (2001 [1975]) and Holland and Miller (1991), emergence is one 
of the effects of complex systems. The author argues that Multi-Agent organizations are 
complex systems, and many economic systems can be classified as complex adaptive 
systems. Such a system is complex in a special sense, because: 
(i) it consists of a network of interacting agents (processes, 
elements); 
(ii) it exhibits a dynamic aggregate behaviour that emerges from the 
individual activities of the agents; 
(iii) its aggregate behaviour can be described without a detailed 
knowledge of the individual agents. 
 
In the next sections we examine Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) in more detail. We 
analyse the characteristics of agents and MAS, including their cognitive aspects, and 
discuss some applications, as well as the problem of validation. 
 
 
3.3.2. Multi-Agent Systems  
 
Let us clarify and systematize the concepts that have been introduced in the previous 
sections: 
 Interaction - An interaction occurs when two or more agents are brought into a 
dynamic relationship through a set of reciprocal actions; 
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 Behaviour - characterizes all the properties that the agent manifests itself in its 
environment; 
 Environment - is the place where agents “live”: it can be a centralized 
environment, or a distributed environment; 
 Communication: is the basis for interactions and social organization; it is 
expressed as a form of interaction in which the dynamic relationship between 
agents is expressed through the intermediary of mediators or signals, which 
once interpreted, will affect the other agents. 
 
In the next section the characteristics of agents, as well as Multi-Agent Systems and 
examples that can be modelled by the means of MAS are discussed in more detail. 
 
3.3.2.1. Characteristics and Modelling of Agents   
 
In the Multi-Agent Systems’ literature, an agent is usually seen as an entity that lives in 
an environment and that is capable of interacting with other agents. Agents are 
frequently characterized as having the following characteristics (Ferber, 1999): 
 Action and interaction – Agents interact with other individuals and with the 
environment. Action modifies the agents’ environment, and thus future decision 
making; 
 Communication with other agents – the main way in which agents interact; 
 Individual goals and Autonomy - agents are not directed by commands coming 
from a user or another agent, but by a set of “tendencies” which can take the 
form of individual goals or satisfaction or survival functions that agents try to 
maximize; 
 (Limited ) Perception – agents have only a limited or partial representation of 
the environment where they live in. In other words, they have no overall 
perception of everything that is happening around them. It is often assumed that 
 85 
they have “bounded rationality” in the sense that they use limited computational 
resources to derive the consequences of what has been perceived40. 
 
Wooldridge (2002) and Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999) have defined a different, 
somewhat complementary classification of agents’ characteristics which include 
reactivity, proactiveness, social capability and autonomy (Gilbert and and Troitzsch, 
1999). In the following we will examine the issue of reactivity. Regarding the other 
issues the reader can consult the references given. 
 
According to Ferber (1999) there are two schools of thought based in two concepts: 
cognitive and reactive agents. In the school that includes cognitive agents, a Multi-
Agent System contains a small number of agents in which each agent’s knowledge is 
represented in the form of a separate knowledge base. 
 
The Reactive school asserts that for the system to demonstrate overall intelligent 
behaviour, it is not necessary for individuals to be individually intelligent. Societies of 
ants (Corbara et al. 1993) offer examples of organizations of this type. All the ants 
maintain the colony without having cognitive capacities.  
 
In the following we will focus our attention on cognitive agents that are used later in our 
simulations. 
 
3.3.2.2. Representing mental attitudes of Agents: BDI architecture 
 
According to Tecuci (1998), an intelligent agent is a knowledge-based system that 
perceives its environment, rationalizes, draws inferences, solves problems, determines 
actions, and acts upon that environment to realize a set of goals or tasks.  
 
The behaviour of the agent is based on a correspondence between certain aspects of the 
environment (domain) and its internal model. This internal model includes a set of 
                                                 
40
 As presented above in Chapter 2, Herbert Simon developed a behavioural model of rational choice 
(Simon, 1955) in which he considers a “kind of rational behaviour that is compatible with the access to 
information and the computational capacities that are processed by organisms”. 
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desires, beliefs and intentions, a reasoning component, containing a knowledge base, a 
learning engine and an inference engine.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 – Architecture of a cognitive agent with emphasis in the learning aspects, based in 
Tecuci (1998) 
 
Figure 3-2 represents the model of a learning agent, interacting with the environment 
(that contains other agents). In this model the aspects of agent cognition are very 
simplified. In fact, mental configuration involves many types of concepts, including 
beliefs, intentions and desires; but there are others as percepts, emotions etc.  
 
This configuration of an agent follows the so-called BDI architecture (Beliefs-Desires-
Intentions), developed by Rao and Georgeff (1991). Beliefs correspond to a component 
of an agent that embodies the information (states of the system41) and which is updated 
appropriately after each action of the agent.  
 
Desires are goals or objectives (i.e. what the agent desires as the final state of the 
system) corresponding to the motivation of the agent 42 . Intentions represent the 
currently chosen course of actions intended to be taken to achieve the desires. In other 
words, intentions can be seen as a sequence of actions that the agent takes in order to 
                                                 
41
 If we take the environment as a system, the term state describes any overall configuration of a system. 
This concept will be used later on this work together with Multi-Agent Systems. 
42
 Rao and Georgeff (1991) distinguish desires from goals. Desires may be associated with some instant 
of time and may be incompatible, while goals are usually permanent and unique in a certain period of 
time.  
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achieve its desires. Intentions play an important role in practical reasoning and can not 
be reduced to beliefs and desires. Desires capture the deliberative component of the 
agent (Rao and Georgeff, 1991). So, the BDI architecture views an agent as someone 
that is rational and has some certain mental attitudes of Belief, Desire and Intention 
representing, respectively, the informational, motivational and deliberative conditions of 
the agent.  
 
This architecture has been criticised by many researchers, including Rao and Georgeff 
(1995). Some say that it is very reductive: sociologists and scientists from Distributed 
Artificial Intelligence argue that there are other cognitive aspects that should be 
introduced in the model. On the other hand, classical decision theorists question the 
necessity of having all these three attitudes. Other authors argue that it is hard to find a 
mechanism that permits an efficient implementation of the mental attitudes: beliefs, 
desires and intentions.  
 
Anyhow, the BDI-architecture has been used in many applications and it seems to be 
adequate in dealing with many situations. Furthermore, the concepts of beliefs, desires 
and intentions are easy to understand and the BDI–architecture has the advantage that it 
is intuitive and relatively simple to identify the process of decision-making and how to 
perform it (Corchado et al. 2004) 
 
In Figure 3-2, the agent is endowed with to the ability to learn as it contains a learning 
engine that is capable of creating and updating the data structures in the knowledge 
base. Learning agents will be therefore considered as agents that are able by themselves 
to acquire and maintain the knowledge (Tecuci, 1998).  
 
Adaptation of an individual depends on the way it gets and assimilates the information 
from the environment, as we saw in Section 3.1. Information is subject to error and, 
also, it is the result of the agent’s perception of the environment. Agents having this 
capacity of being able to call into question a fact develop the basis of our cognitive 
adaptation and therefore the accommodating of our cognitive system to a world of 
perpetual evolution (Ferber, 1999). 
 88 
 
Leaning is an important aspect in the agent architecture. From a philosophical point of 
view, according to Ferber (1999), all learning relates to beliefs. “It is always a matter of 
information obtained from something else or someone else” Ferber (1999, p. 245). The 
model that is shown in Figure 3-2 includes a learning engine, a knowledge base and an 
inference engine.  
 
In this model the way learning works is shaped by the beliefs and desires. In fact this 
kind of influence happens in most of the learning situations. Learning in human beings 
depends on beliefs and desires. For instance, if the user knows that some barometer 
indicates the opposite air pressure (and not the real one), the user will conclude that it 
will be a nice day, when low pressure is shown. So, the user took his representation of 
information (a kind of a belief) to interpret the barometer. 
 
BDI-architectures have been used in many applications. For instance Corchado et al. 
(2004), used it in an agent-based application of a wireless tourist guide combining the 
BDI approach with the learning capabilities of case-based reasoning. 
 
3.3.2.3. Characteristics and Modelling of Multi-Agent Systems  
 
The term Multi-Agent System (MAS) is applied to a system exhibiting an architecture 
containing the following elements (Ferber, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002): 
(i) An environment E; 
(ii) A set of objects, O situated in E; 
(iii)  A set of specific objects, called agents, A such that  A⊆O; 
(iv)  An assembly of relations, R that links objects to each other; 
(v) An assembly of actions, Op, making it possible for the agents of A to 
perceive, produce, consume, transform and manipulate objects from 
O; 
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(vi)  Operators (or functions) with the aim of representing the application 
of the operations (action and behaviour). 
 
 
Here we distinguished architecture from the behaviour of agents: (i) the architecture 
deals with the question of agent integration in the MAS; (ii) the behaviour deals with 
what an agent does and how he interacts with other agents and/or with the environment.  
 
Multi-Agents are implemented using computers, so a set of types of languages have 
been defined to design a MAS.  According to Ferber (1999) there are five types of 
languages in the MAS design43:  
 L1  - used for the implementation of a MAS – e.g. JAVA, C++;  
 L2  - communication languages as ACL and KQML44;  
 L3  - languages for describing actions and behaviours and the laws of the 
environment;  
 L4  - Languages for representing knowledge which are important when 
agents are very complex; e.g. blackboard-based languages45; 
 L5  - Formalization and specification languages at the most abstract level 
dealing with cognitive aspects as beliefs, intentions, etc.  
 
This classification is organized from the lowest level (implementation) to the highest 
one (abstraction). This representation has been defined in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence (Ferber, 1999) where states and actions are represented with the help of 
                                                 
43
 Although these types of languages do not need to be alike, they must necessarily be compatible with the 
same implementation type. 
44
 KQML is the acronym for Knowledge Query and Communications Language, a standard high level 
communication language (from DARPA Research Project – U.S.) based on speech acts to allow cognitive 
agents to cooperate. ACL (Agent communication language) is another standard funded by FIPA 
(Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) to face some of the existent drawbacks of KQML as the 
ambiguity and imprecision due to the natural language descriptions.  
45
 Blackboard-based languages are the most widely used symbolic cognitive architecture for Multi-Agent 
Systems. They are based on three elements: Knowledge Sources (modules that are used to share data), a 
Shared Base, and a Control device that manages conflicts between the Knowledge Sources. Engelmore 
and Morgan (1988) offer a deeper explanation of these Blackboard-based languages. 
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interconnected components. An overview of this framework is presented in Appendix 
II.  
 
In a different perspective, based on empirical validation, Fagiolo et al. (2005) define 
that the minimal structure of a MAS shall contain the following elements: 
 Time (t = 0, 1, 2, …): e.g. quarters, years, etc.; 
 Set of Agents (A1, A2, …, An) ; e.g. consumers, firms, etc.; 
 Micro Decision Rules, Ri,t ;e.g. production rules, microeconomic rules, etc.; 
 A set of variables X that measure the behaviour of Agents (X1, X2, …, Xk); e.g. 
agent’s Profit, Marginal cost, etc.; 
 Vectors of Micro-States, Xi,t (individual variable with time); e.g. profit of agent 
(Xk) at time t (Xk,1, Xk,2, …, Xk,N); 
 Aggregate Variables at time t, Xkt = f ( Xk,1,t , …, Xk,N,t ), (aggregate values of 
variable Xk at time t); e.g. profit of all agents at time t; birth rate of a population of 
firms, etc.; 
 Vectors of Micro-Parameters, θi ; e.g. number of initial firms in the beginning of the 
simulation; 
 Vector of Macro-Parameters, Θ; e.g. number of total firms in the simulation; 
 Interaction Structures, Gt ; e.g. networks.  
 
In studying MAS, Fagiolo et al. (2005) found out that the micro and macro variables are 
governed by complicated processes which can hardly be analyzed analytically because 
of the non-linearities and randomness that emerge in individual behaviours and 
interaction networks. According to the authors, that is why many Agent-Based models 
are generated by the means of computer simulations  
 
The question of the empirical validation of MAS deals with some of the elements 
referred to above. We will come to this issue again later in Section 3.3.3 and in Chapter 
4. 
3.3.2.4. Integrating Cognitive and Social levels in Modelling  
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Several researchers studied the role of cognitive models in social simulation. Gilbert 
(2005) suggested that “it is possible to distinguish at least a biological, a cognitive and 
a social level [of analysis], in which the characteristics of phenomena at one level are 
emergent from the behaviour of phenomena at levels below”.   
 
It is important to note that different levels of analysis need not be present in the study. 
Some social simulation models were elaborated and these did not include the cognitive 
level. However, there can be important interactions between levels which should not be 
ignored. Consider, for instance, a cognitive level and a social level that can be used to 
increase the coordination of the agent’s actions. That is what happens, for instance, in 
case of flocking birds, when this aggregate behaviour can be the result of the interaction 
of individual and social factors.  
 
Reynolds (1987) and Heppner and Grenander (1990) presented simulations of various 
movements in a bird flock or fish shoal. Both studies had the insight that local processes 
might underlie the unpredictable group dynamics of bird social behaviour. One motive 
for developing such simulations was to extend this model to human social behaviour. 
However, humans adjust not only physical movement (as the individuals in flocking 
birds do), but cognitive or experimental variables as well (Kennedy and Eberhart, 
1995). Humans tend to adjust their beliefs and attitudes to conform to their social peers. 
 
There are optimization methods based on the simulation of these social models of bird 
flocking and fish shoaling, such as the so-called Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
developed by Kennedy and Eberhart (1995), and improved by Hu et al. (2004). PSO is a 
well known method used for optimization of continuous linear functions incorporating 
some aspects of genetic algorithms and evolutionary programming. PSO is initialized 
with a group of random particles (solutions) and then searches for optima by updating 
each generation. Each particle, in every generation is updated by following the two 
“best” values (the values with best fitness).  
 
Another model that explores the interaction of individuals in a social system is the Ant 
Colony System. In this approach, the “ants” are agents with very simple basic 
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capabilities which mimic the behaviour of real ants. In real world the moving ants lay 
specific pheromones (a medium used to communicate among animals) on the ground, 
thus marking the path by a trail of this substance. This can be simulated in a simulated 
world. An isolated ant moves essentially at random, but an ant that encounters a 
previously laid trail can detect it and decide with high probability to follow it, thus 
reinforcing the trail with its own pheromone (Dorigo et al. 1996). The collective 
behaviour emerging in this process has the following characteristic: the more ants 
follow a trail, the more attractive that trail becomes for others. The process is 
characterized by a loop where the probability with which an ant (agent) chooses a path 
increases with the number of ants that previously chose that path. 
 
The use of individual and social cognitive models has been helpful in developing better 
models of aggregate processes in social and economic theories. Concerning cognition, 
Sun (2001) identifies two sources of knowledge that an agent possesses based on their 
origins: individual and social46. Sun developed his Clarion Model, consisting of two 
levels: the top level - conceptual - and the bottom level – behaviour oriented. These two 
levels interact by: (i) cooperating in actions, through a combination of the action 
recommendations from the two levels; (ii) cooperating in learning through a bottom-up 
and a top-down process. The author used a learning plan where at the top level 
knowledge is captured in a simple rule form, while at the bottom level reinforcement 
learning appears in different stages with the implementation of Q-learning algorithm.  
 
According to Sun (2001), cooperation in learning through a bottom-up and a top-down 
process, is just the combination of assimilating social structures and relates learning by 
being told (Michaslki, 1983) to top-level learning, and autonomous learning, to the 
bottom level of the reinforcement learning. 
 
3.3.2.5. Networked Agents  
 
                                                 
46
 According to the author, these are extreme cases because there are many situations in which knowledge 
involves both sources. 
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Many Multi-Agent applications use networks as a support for their activities. Agents 
can be viewed as the nodes of the network with the arcs or links indicating some kind of 
relationship between the agents. In the previous chapter, networks have been studied 
within an organizational perspective: networks are systems of relationships based on a 
division of work in the network.  
 
The study of networks has improved considerably with the help of Agent-Based 
simulation. According to Purchase and Olaru (2003), simulation has been a favourite 
approach in the study of networks due to its capacity of exploring emergent behaviour 
as a result of the interactions within the network.  
 
Simulation is a useful tool for the analysis of the dynamical behaviour of networks 
(mainly used for creation and deletion of links). There are many examples of network 
applications developed with the use of agent-based simulation: Pujol et al. (2005), 
Wilkinson et al. (2001), Gans et al. (2004), Ormerod et al. (2002), Newman (2000), 
Axelrod (1997), Epstein and Axtell, (1996), etc.  
   
 
3.3.2.6.  Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) 
 
Multi-Agent Systems are often used to model economies and organizations. According 
to Tesfatsion (2006), there are several reasons why economies should be modelled by 
MAS: economies are complicated systems encompassing micro behaviours, interaction 
patterns, and global regularities. The MAS allows a “two-way feedback between 
microstructure and macro regularities mediated by agent interactions”. 
 
Whether partial or general in scope, studies of economic systems should consider how 
to handle difficult real-world aspects such as asymmetric information, imperfect 
competition, strategic interaction, collective learning and possibility of multiple 
equilibria.  
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One of the most important aspects in modelling in economics is the way how the system 
is conceptualized and then implemented by the modeller. According to Tesfatsion 
(2006), the modeller constructs a virtual economic world populated by various agent 
types (economic, social, biological, physical) and sets the initial world conditions. Next, 
he/she steps back to observe how the virtual world develops over time. The events in 
this virtual world are driven by agent interactions. 
 
Tesfatsion also identifies the key characteristics of an organizational agent, what she 
calls the “firm” agent. It should contain the following characteristics:  
• Profit-seeking agent with strategic reasoning and learning capability; 
• Profit gains by producing and selling products; 
• Can adjust production and price levels in every trading period; 
• Can also invest profits to expand its production capacity. 
 
Multi-Agent Systems are a way of “growing economies from the bottom up”. The so-
called new field of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) is inspired, includes 
or may be complementary to other fields such as: Experimental Economics, Complex 
Adaptive Systems, Computational Modelling of Social Dynamics, Network Economics, 
Agent Modelling in Economics and Finance, etc. 
 
There are many applications of Multi-agents in the Economics and Social Sciences. 
Typical applications of MAS are the modelling of populations of organizations in the 
managerial sciences, social simulation, including socioeconomic modelling, more 
specific problems of strategic management and economics of networks, etc.   
 
Examples of the use of MAS that model cooperative behaviour include the work of Ant 
Colonies, as that of Dorigo et al. (1996), and some specialized topics such as the work 
of Andras et al. (2006) who studied the mixed effects of uncertainty and cooperation. 
Uncertainty is an important factor that influences social evolution in natural and 
artificial environments; environmental uncertainty permits to capture the variance of the 
resources in the environment. Authors conclude that cooperation can protect against the 
unfavourable effects of uncertainty for the individual. 
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3.3.2.7. Virtual breeding environments and MAS  
 
As introduced in section 2.5.5, virtual breeding environments (VBE’s) are long-term 
networked structures, presenting the adequate base environment for the establishment of 
cooperation agreements in computer networks. VBE’s are real examples of MAS’ 
applications. As pointed out by Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2004), there is 
actually an analogy between Multi-Agent Systems and virtual enterprises. Among other 
aspects, this similarity includes the following aspects: 
 Each organization can be considered as an autonomous unit, as an agent; 
 The creation of a VE (Virtual Enterprises = temporary alliance of 
enterprises) is analogous to the creation of networks or coalitions under the 
perspective of a MAS. 
 The processes of VE creation are based on negotiation rules and scenarios 
similar to the protocols existing in the MAS domain. 
 
Furthermore, the use of MAS in virtual breeding environments has many advantages 
including the possibility of predicting the behaviour of the VE and linking directly the 
simulation with real emergent processes. 
 
In Chapter 6 we describe a Multi-Agent System that has been inspired by real examples 
as e-marketplaces that we can consider as a particular case of a Virtual Enterprise.  
 
3.3.3. Questions of validation in MAS  
 
The comparison of real and simulated data can be regarded as an evaluation stage. It is 
an important step that helps to validate the simulation. Computer programs can produce 
erroneous results and validation is needed to determine whether the output is of any 
value. 
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Empirical validation of Agent-Based (AB) models is the main concern for researchers 
that use simulation models in social sciences. In the last two decades researchers have 
improved the quality of simulations, namely in economical modelling by extending 
their modelling framework to incorporate certain aspects that have been missing until 
then: agent heterogeneity, bounded rationality of the agents (not hyper rationality), 
learning and technological change (Windrum et al. 2007).  
 
The need for empirical validation is, nowadays, essential in model’s evaluation. In 
economics (and in other sciences), the basic methodology to built AB simulation 
models consists in isolating some features of a particular phenomenon in order to 
understand it and to predict its future states under new conditions. 
 
Fagiolo et al. (2005) have identified different methods of empirically validating Agent-
Based models:  
 Replication of Stylized-Facts: in this case, empirical validation is done at the 
aggregate  - macroeconomic – level, and parameters and initial conditions are 
not restricted a priori; validation requires joint reproduction of a set of “stylized 
facts”. The authors refer to this method as indirect calibration;  
 Empirical Calibration of ABMs: this method deals with the space of initial 
conditions and micro/macro parameters and uses empirical knowledge to 
calibrate initial conditions and micro/macro parameters; 
 History-Friendly Industry Models: models built upon detailed empirical 
historical knowledge of phenomenon under study and employed to replicate its 
precise (qualitative) history; the goal is to empirically validate the model by 
comparing “simulated trace histories” with “actual history” of an industry. 
 
The historic-friendly approach is strongly quantitative and mainly focuses on micro-
economic transients of industrial paths of development. It implies detailed historical 
paths corresponding to the data being analysed. The second approach (Empirical 
Calibration of ABMs) requires a good empirical knowledge of the initial conditions and 
micro/macro parameters.  
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The Replication of Stylized-Facts requires a set of summarized evidences that can be 
used to calibrate the model. Sometimes these evidences are formalized in a specific 
objective function that can be used to optimize the model. That is the case of Rogers 
and Tessin (2004), which used an Agent-Based model of a financial market and 
calibrated it using a multi-objective genetic algorithm. 
 
The analysis presented so far permits us to define the research questions that we have 
set out to investigate. In the next chapter, we define the main questions and the strategy 
adopted for our work. 
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4. Research Questions and Methodology  
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we define the main research questions and the strategy adopted for our 
work. First, in Section 4.1, we identify the problem and the main research questions. So 
far, we have presented several different perspectives to deal with the problem of the 
adaptation and survival of the firms. As these different approaches are complementary, 
we will benefit from the cross-fertilization that exists among them and exploit them to 
answer to the main questions proposed in this chapter. 
 
In Section 4.2, we introduce the general research strategy. These issues are discussed in 
the following chapters and then tailored for each of the studied applications. The 
approach adopted is then evaluated. The aspects of the original contributions of our 
work are presented in Section 4.3. An overview of the state of the art in the resolution of 
similar problems and related works are given in Section 4.4., and finally in Section 4.5 
we present some empirical evidences of collaboration that support the specific 
hypothesis that will be tested in each of the studies presented later in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. 
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4.1. Problem Definition and Main research questions 
 
Important aspects to retain from literature 
 
Organizations interact with the environment and with other organizations. To overcome 
the problems that they face through their existence, organizations must adopt survival 
strategies, either individually or in group. Some questions arise at this moment: 
 Can organizations be viewed as adapting individuals? 
 Can organizations join together in networks and adapt as a group? 
 Can this aggregation (a new form of organization) avoid survival problems? 
 
Our aim is to answer these questions. So far we have introduced different, though 
compatible perspectives of the interaction between organizations and between the 
organizations and the environment47:  
 an ecological perspective, (Sections 2.2, 2.3), derived from the work of 
Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984, 1989), Carroll and 
Hannan (2000), etc.; 
 an inter-organizational network perspective, (Section 2.4), based on the work in 
the field of business-to-business marketing and purchasing: Williamson (1991), 
Mattson (1997), Hakansson et al. (1999), Ritter (1999), Gulati et al. (1998), Solé 
and Valls (1991), Ratti (1991), among others. 
 
In addition, we have complemented these perspectives with the view from the field of 
industrial economics, (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). 
 
The ecological perspective allowed us to face organizations as units in a population and 
to study them as a whole. The population is therefore seen as a class of organizations 
relatively homogeneous (the “representative ones”) in terms of environmental 
susceptibility, as stated by Hannan and Freeman (1977). Consequently, some concepts 
                                                 
47
 Although the environment may be seen as something that is “outside” the organization, it is frequently 
assumed to include also other organizations, as in Agent Theory: environment = landscape + other 
agents 
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were introduced: specialism, niche, legitimation, competition, etc. They embody 
important ideas about evolution of the population and process of adaptation and 
selection.  
 
The Density dependence permitted to study how a population can evolve: As Freeman 
(1982) observed, “density dependence is important because it generates homeostatic 
processes in populations, that is, it generates equilibrium levels towards which 
population sizes adjust, usually at decelerating rates”. 
 
Then, as organizations do not live isolated in their environment, we have introduced the 
study of inter-organizational networks. Networks incorporate a system of relationships 
based on a division of work and are good metaphors showing how entities in space are 
connected.  
 
As we saw before, Hakansson and Snehota (1995) say that cohesion of the network is 
determined by certain specific forces. These forces are very important for the survival 
of the network and can be understood as the mechanism of the relationships that rule the 
network: the interdependence among agents; a structure of power; a structure of 
knowledge; a temporary (historic development) structure, and a spatial structure. 
 
The issues of evolution and adaptation were referred to many times in previous 
chapters. Either we can see the problem of the adaptation of a group of agents as an 
individual characteristic of the agents – learning – or as a collective process bringing 
reproductive mechanisms into play – evolution. This perspective is in line with Hannan 
and Freeman (1977) who state that adaptive learning of individuals consists of selection 
among behavioural responses. Concerning organizational theory, Hannan and Freeman 
(1977) clearly recognize that leaders of organizations prepare strategies and so 
organizations adjust to the environment.  
 
So, we maintain that the answer to the first question posed above - whether 
organizations can be viewed as individuals - is yes. That is what the ecological 
perspective has demonstrated. Existing members of organizational population adapt to 
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environmental pressures by replacing less favoured competences with more favoured 
ones. Simultaneously, at the population level, organizational population changes, as 
new members holding more favoured competences compete and drive out into failure 
members holding less favoured competences.  
 
Now, to answer the other two questions related to how networks adapt and survive, we 
need to recall some details about inter-organizational networks. 
 
Inspirations emerging from the cross-fertilization of different research areas 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the study of inter-organizational networks, a recent topic in 
organization studies, may contribute significantly to the analysis of firm’s performance. 
In fact, inter-organizational networks improve the chances of survival of the firms in the 
network, as survival is linked to firm’s performance.  
 
According to Venkatamaran and Ven (1998), the survival and growth of an organization 
depends on its capacity to maintain and extend its network of inter-firm relationships. 
But what is the impact of networking? Are networks adaptive as a group? Why do firms 
aggregate in the form of networks? How can the adaptation perspective be analysed in a 
network context? Do they learn collectively? How does individual learning contribute 
to the whole network learning?  
 
In our view, networks can be regarded as new forms of organizations. Indeed, perhaps, 
they are new forms of populations, but we need to analyse more deeply some previous 
research to develop our proposal.  
 
The work of Venkataraman and Ven (1998) explored the relationship between the 
evolution of networks and the existence of environmental shocks, as presented in 
Chapter 2. The authors analysed the set of relationships during the lifetime of a network 
and concluded that there exists a kind of “liability of newness” in network relationships.  
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The importance of learning in networks has been studied by Hakansson et al. (1999), 
who argued that inter-organizational networking represents a cost-efficient way of 
gaining access to crucial know-how that can neither be made available internally nor 
be easily transferred by licensing. One important aspect that is related to know-how is 
innovation. Innovation induces learning, as stated by Hakansson et al. (1999). 
Furthermore, business relationships are very important in the diffusion of acquired 
knowledge through a network, as presented in chapter 2.  
 
Models of learning agents are not sufficient to answer our questions on their own. 
Neither do Organizational Ecology, Industrial Economics or Business-to-Business 
Marketing.  
 
Organizational Ecology does not focus on the relationships between organizations, 
namely in the cognitive aspects; instead, it analyses organizations as a whole, in which 
the analysis of the characteristics of organizations and their evolution is the heart of the 
study.  
 
Business-to-business marketing does not allow for a study of the evolution of 
populations of organizations. This approach is focused on the firm itself and on the 
relationships that firms maintain with the environment and with other firms. Cognitive 
aspects are important within this approach as they determine the behaviour of firms, 
activities and, consequently, what happens on the market. In mainstream economics, it 
is assumed that the profit maximization is the main goal of the firms. 
 
The knowledge that is necessary for the analyses of the network adaptation and of 
networks benefits from the combination of the three perspectives mentioned above:  
 The Organizational Ecology perspective provides a way for analysing 
legitimation and competition that arise with the new forms of populations; 
 The Marketing perspective brings up the cognitive approach to deal with the 
issues of individual learning and adaptation; 
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 Industrial Economics offers the framework for modelling the microeconomic 
aspects and the market: profit, demand, supply. 
 
Our conviction is that networks can be adaptive and that they can be viewed as new 
forms of populations. But we face one problem: lack of information to build the proper 
model and answer our research questions. 
 
We also believe that cooperation plays a very important role in the formation of 
networks as it induces firms to enter in inter-organizational networks with the purpose 
of increasing their revenue and reducing their costs (Ebers, 1997). Therefore one of our 
aims is to test the effect of cooperation on the survival of firms (in an inter-
organizational perspective).  
 
As we have seen before in Chapter 2, from the technological point of view (De Woot, 
1987) cooperation may be used to acquire a technology to overcome the problems of a 
company which has lost some of his competitiveness. As technology, knowledge and 
innovation can be seen as an expression of the capital of organizations, we intend to 
study these aspects in the scope of network modelling. 
 
Finally, and linked to the ecological aspects of density dependence, we include space 
and location in our study. We know that firms adapt to birth and death of surrounding 
firms and properties of the space play an important role in this. 
 
Considering the summary presented above and the research questions formulated 
before, we can define a set of questions (see Table 4-1).  
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General questions 
G1: What are the effects of organizational density on the survival of 
organizations? 
G2: What are the effects of network density on the survival of networks? 
G3: What are the effects of organizational density on the survival of networks? 
G4: How does cooperation motivate the formation of networks? 
G5: What is the effect of individual learning on the formation of networks?  
G6: Has the shape of the network some kind of influence on its performance? 
G7: Does duration of relationships matter? 
G8: What is the impact of the distance between the constituents of a network? 
G9: How does knowledge disseminate through networks? 
G10: How do cognitive capabilities of the organizations intervene in the 
formation and success of networks? 
Table 4-1 - General questions of the research 
 
Some of these questions have already been studied by other authors. The reader can 
consult Table 4-3 that summarizes for many studies their most important aspects, 
identify their controlled variables and the variables of the model, the main research 
questions and hypothesis, estimation techniques, data, and main conclusions. We also 
associate each of these works to the general questions listed above  
 
However, we propose a new approach that combines different perspectives of analyses: 
the ecological perspective, the relational one (that deals with relationships among firms 
and makes the bridge with the cognitive approach), and a view from Industrial 
Economics, with its apparatus of microeconomic modelling. 
 
This combined approach allows us to: 
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 Analyse the evolution of organizations in what concerns their adaptation to the 
environment and their survival; adaptation and survival can be measured by 
usual economic indicators, such as profit, marginal cost, etc.; 
 Study the evolution of relationships that emerge among organizations and how 
these pool of relationships, and their type, can change the course of the survival 
of a network or a particular organization; 
 Determine whether cognition (characterized under the form of beliefs, intentions 
and desires) plays a role in the success of organizations and networks.  
 
In the following sections, we will use these general questions to formulate (one or more) 
research hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested using data coming from the empirical 
studies of two industry-based applications presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
4.2. General Research Methodology 
 
The questions proposed in the previous section introduce the problem that we intend to 
study in this work. Data will be needed in order to support our general questions. 
However, there is no available information to answer all the questions posed above: 
 It is possible to know how many firms are born and die every year according to 
the number of firms that exist in the same year. Therefore it is possible to 
compute the organizational density and measure its impact on actual 
organizational birth and death (contemporaneous density).   
 Nevertheless it is very difficult to analyse the impact of the founding density 
(the density at the time of founding) for a particular firm. For that, we should 
have real time-series for which we could capture information for every firm. 
That way we could follow firms during their lifetime. Information should 
contain several time periods for the same firm and it should also cover many 
observations, corresponding to different firms. 
 The formation of networks also requires much information. Surveys can be 
implemented, in which we could collect data about the type of relationships and 
the reasons that force firms to link to networks. Yet to analyse the evolution of 
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the network, several time points would be needed and therefore several 
interviews should be made. The shape of networks is also very dynamic and 
reality would be difficult to measure by the mean of surveys.  
 It is also important to introduce different scenarios concerning the economic 
situation to analyse its impact in the evolution of firms and networks. 
 
For the reasons presented above, we have chosen to use simulation. As explained in 
Chapter 3, simulation is a simplification of the world, and a well-recognized way of 
understanding it. It provides tools to substitute for human capabilities, as the possibility 
of implementing different scenarios by constructing a virtual economic world. Then, the 
world is populated by agents through parameter initialization and the world events are 
driven by agent interactions.  Emergent behaviour of aggregate variables is then 
captured and the parameters can be reformulated in order to simulate different scenarios 
coming from different socio-economic perspectives. 
 
We used computer programs to produce simulation and validated our models through 
initialization and comparison with available real data. Thus, we gain access to important 
aspects in simulation, such as control of some conditions, definition of different 
scenarios and prediction. We added new variables, some of them very difficult to 
gather, as cognition, learning, etc. 
 
The basic methodology is similar to that we have presented in Figure 3-1 (the logic of 
simulation as a method). Our iterative methodology is illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
(I)    The initial conditions are defined and introduced in the simulation 
under the form of a set of parameters (vectors of micro-parameters, in 
the Fagiolo et al. (2005) methodology48).  
(II)   Simulation runs 
(III) After the running of the simulation, the corresponding output is 
compared with reality (the output is a summary of some aggregate 
variables: the stilyzed facts) 
                                                 
48
 An example of a such a parameter is the number of firms in the beginning of the simulation, as defined 
in the Fagiolo et al.(2005) methodology 
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(IV) This comparison permits to control the evolution of the simulation and 
to adjust the initial parameters. The simulation can therefore be run 
again and results are recursively compared with reality. In this way, we 
can improve the quality of the model by validating the results. This 
iterative process ends when a predefined threshold concerning the 
distance between real and simulated output is reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 - The basic research methodology in a diagramatic form 
 
 
In our work we use two main forms to adjust the parameters in order to improve the 
quality of the model:  
a. We adjust the parameters by means of optimization algorithms like 
Genetic Algorithms using an appropriate metaphor of selection, 
crossover and mutation from Biology, based on simulated evolution 
(Holland, 2001 [1975]; Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1997; Dumitrescu 
et al. 2000).  
b. Alternatively, we can adjust the parameters using other techniques in 
which there is no explicit optimization for the parameters. Instead, it is up to the 
Parameters Simulation Ouput 
Adjustment 
Reality 
I II III 
IV 
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modeller to change the parameters in order to obtain values that seem more 
consistent with reality. Some of these techniques are called historic-friendly 
because they use particular historical traces in order to calibrate a model. The 
historic-friendly approach is strongly quantitative and mainly focuses on 
microeconomic transients of industrial paths of development, Malerba et al 
(2001). 
 
Two studies have been developed in this work: CASOS and NetOrg. Our main 
objective with CASOS – Cellular Automata 49  System for Organizational Survival, 
presented in Chapter 5 - is to analyse the effects of certain parameters in the founding 
and in the mortality of organizations. A simulation, based on a Cellular Automata 
approach embedded with a Genetic Algorithm to calibrate the parameters permits to 
validate the final solution with real data coming from the Portuguese Industry. 
Figure 4-2 - Diagram for the research methodology focusing on cellular automata and genetic 
algorithms. 
                                                 
49
 As defined in Chapter 3, cellular automata are cells located in a regular grid where the behaviour of an 
individual cell is determined by a set of rules that depend on that cell and on its neighbours. 
Parameters 
from the GA 
Cellular 
Automata 
Ouput 
Genetic 
Algorithm 
Reality 
Maximize 
fitness function 
New optimized  
parameter values 
I II III 
IV 
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A population of hypothesis is created in which each element of the population contains 
codified combination of parameters represented as genes (I). These parameters are 
introduced in the simulation and the simulation runs (II). Then, the corresponding 
output is compared with reality (III), and (IV) the Genetic Algorithm searches for the 
hypotheses that maximize the fitness value by minimizing the distance between real and 
simulated output data. The whole iterative process repeats until the distance between the 
output of the cellular automata and reality reaches a small predefined threshold.  
 
The second case study is NetOrg -Adaptive Networks of Organizations – a Multi-Agent 
framework that aims at analysing the dynamics of cooperation networks. Firms can 
decide to cooperate with other firms, based on cognitive and microeconomic variables. 
To validate our modelling approach, we have considered some evidence from the real 
world and decided to focus our analysis on facts that are observed in the areas of 
Automobile manufacturing, Textile Industry, and e-Marketplaces.  
 
In a first stage, the parameters of the Multi-Agent System are initialized with coherent 
values in such a way that there is some stability in the simulation outputs. No 
optimization techniques are used in this case to adjust the parameters, because there is 
no real available data to be compared with. Therefore, the goal of this step is to tune the 
parameters just by analysing the admissibility of the outputs produced by the 
simulation. Admissibility is a somewhat subjective concept, but the idea here is to 
construct intervals of tolerance for the parameters in such a way that the results 
produced by the parameters belonging to those intervals are realistic enough to be 
preserved.  
 
In a second stage, we have used these parameters to run the model for different 
strategies of cooperation. Here the aim is to analyse the consistency between simulation 
outputs and empirical studies.  
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Figure 4-3 - Diagram for the research methodology using a two stage methodology. 
 
These two case studies are developed in Chapters 5 and 6. For CASOS (Chapter 5), data 
from the number of existing firms as well as the number of firms’ births and deaths in a 
particular region for a short time-series has been collected. Data needed for NetOrg 
(presented at the end of this Chapter) includes some personal interviews, information of 
cooperation in some industrial sectors and other data from the demography of firms. 
 
The hypotheses that are tested in these two case studies are specifications of the general 
questions given above in Table 4-1. In this table, the association between the general 
questions and the specific hypotheses is established.  
 
Empirical 
studies 
Multi-Agent 
Simulation 
Ouput 
Adjustment 
Empirical 
studies 
Parameters Multi-Agent 
Simulation 
Ouput 
Stage 2 – Running of the model for different cooperation strategies. 
Cooperation 
Strategies 
 
Stage 1 – Initialization of the parameters 
Parameters 
Empirical 
studies 
Consistency 
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General 
question Description 
Specific 
hypotheses 
G1 What are the effects of organizational density in the survival of 
organizations? 
H1.1, H1.2, H2.4, 
H2.5 
G2 What are the effects of network density in the survival of 
networks? 
H2.6, H2.7 
G3 What are the effects of organizational density on the survival of 
networks? 
H2.10 , H2.11 
G4 How does collaboration motivate the formation of networks? H2.2 
G5 What is the effect of individual learning in the formation of networks?  
G6 Does form matter? In other words, has the shape of the network 
some kind of influence in its performance? 
 
G7 Does duration of relationships matters? H2.8 
G8 What is the impact of the distance in the type of relationship (vertical/ 
horizontal) in a network? H2.9 
G9 How does knowledge disseminate through networks?  
G10 How do cognitive capabilities that are available in the organizations 
intervene in the formation and success of the networks? 
 
Table 4-2 – Association between the general questions and the specific hypotheses of the two case 
studies (H1.1 and H1.2. are tested in Chapter 5 using CASOS, while H2.1 to H2.9 are tested in Chapter 
6 with NetOrg). 
 
Some of the general questions have no corresponding specific hypothesis in the context 
of the studies developed here. However, statistical indicators and tests have been 
computed and some conclusions drawn regarding them. Besides, we define some 
specific hypotheses with no corresponding general questions. In such particular cases, 
the hypotheses are justified by the existence of the data. 
 
 
4.3. Main contributions of the work 
 
Within these possibilities of analysis, we hope to make original contributions to the way 
how the survival of firms has been studied. This contribution focuses in the following 
aspects: 
 The cognitive perspective, with its characteristics (as the BDI architecture) is 
unexplored in the literature of Organizational Ecology. This view offers two 
main advantages: 
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o It facilitates the individual modelling of the firm; 
o It offers a good way to understand firm behaviour; 
o It makes possible the cross fertilization of Organizational Ecology 
with cognitive aspects, in which the survival of firms can be viewed 
simultaneously as an individual and a collective issue. In fact, the 
collective behaviour can be analysed as the sum of the individual 
decisions that are modelled according to cognitive aspects. 
 
 Examples of literature on firm survival that relates density dependence with 
the development of relationships are few or inexistent. The complexity in 
analysing the setting up and evolution of networks is maybe one of the 
aspects that make this issue difficult.  
 
 The bottom-up analysis, typical from Multi-Agent simulation is applied to a 
network-based approach in an economical context. This situation is original 
in what concerns the use of networked MAS in an industry-based 
application. 
 
 
4.4. Related work 
 
Some work that is close to the general questions asked in the last paragraphs have 
already been introduced in previous sections. In Sections 2.2 and 3.3, the most 
important models related to the density dependence have been introduced in detail. In 
the next tables we give a summary of the main studies and their most important aspects, 
including the main research questions and hypothesis, and estimation techniques. A 
specific table concerning a summary of density dependence models using simulation 
techniques is provided separately.  
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Authors  Controlled  
variables 
Variables of the 
model 
Research Questions and  
Hypothesis 
Estimation 
Techniques and data  
Main conclusions 
 
Wissen 
(2000) 
 
 
Birth, death, migration 
and growth of business 
establishments.  
Primary attributes of the 
simulation model are Age, 
Economic activity, size and 
geographical location 
 
How can we simulate the 
development in size of the 
populations of firms, as well as its 
composition and spatial distribution 
over time? 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
Cohort component model in a 
micro-simulation context called 
SIMFIRMS. The author makes a 
comparison between simulated 
and real data based on two 
official sources from The 
Netherlands. 
Traditional demographic variables 
are simply not sufficient to get a 
hold on the dynamic behaviour of 
the population of firms. 
 
Lomi and 
Larsen  
(1998) 
 
 
Survival and Mortality of 
firms. 
The model uses the density of 
organizations in the 
neighbourhood of a particular 
organization as the main 
attribute to control firm’s life 
and death.  
What are the effects of density at 
the time of founding on firms death, 
growth and decline? 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
A Cellular Automata simulation 
model (similar to the Conways’ 
Game of Life) is used to 
produce synthetic data. A 
Gompertz-Makeham function is 
then applied to measure 
organization’s force of mortality. 
Function’s parameters are 
estimated using the method of 
maximum likelihood, each 
parameter being associated with 
an effect in the model. The 
authors measure the impact of 
meaningful combinations of the 
founding and survival bands in 
estimated parameters. 
Organizations founded under 
adverse conditions (defined in terms 
of relatively higher population 
density) have higher initial mortality 
rates than organizations founded in 
lower-density environments. 
 
Barron 
(2001) 
 
 
Population density and 
mass (total amount of 
activity). 
Founding, failure and 
growth/decline as well as 
population density and mass 
which are also viewed as 
explanatory variables. 
The goal is to compare three 
dynamic models of organizational 
populations:  (i) Barnett's Model 
(where large organizations 
generate stronger competitive 
forces); (ii) Hannan's Model (where 
density becomes "decoupled" from 
legitimacy and competition as a 
population matures); (iii) Barrons' 
Model (where the rate of entry is 
not the same as the models of exit 
and growth).   (G1) 
Monte-Carlo micro-simulations 
have been used to compare 
three dynamic models of 
organizational populations. The 
vital rates (founding, failure, 
growth/decline) have been 
modelled as stochastic 
processes within a regression 
model for each vital rate. 
The author compares the results of 
these models and concludes about 
their complementarity (not 
competition) of these models, 
because they share common 
features. All three models have a 
variable that keeps the rate of entry 
low as the population ages, 
although density is declining, so that 
simulations reproduce the important 
empirical regularity in the trajectory 
of density. As a population matures, 
its demography seems to be 
increasingly determined by barriers 
to entry. 
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(cont.) 
Authors Controlled  
variables 
Variables of the 
model 
Research Questions 
and  Hypothesis 
Estimation Techniques and data  Main conclusions 
Baum and 
Singh (1994) 
 
 
Organizational 
Mortality 
Independent variables 
- Overlap density 
- Nonoverlap density 
- Local disaggregation 
- Diffuse disaggregation 
 
Control variables 
(examples): 
-Organizational age 
-Organizational size 
-Profit orientation  
-Total number of similar 
firms 
- Demand for child care 
services 
-Number of childhood 
education graduates 
How Organizational niches within 
populations influence patterns of 
competition and mutualism? 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
 
The authors use a density dependence model 
focusing on the dynamics of competition 
(organizations diminishing each other’s fates) 
and mutualism (organizations enhancing each 
other’s fates) to describe the evolution of 
organizational populations. The following 
hazard function has been estimated 
hjk= [ ])t(Xbexp jk , where hjk is the 
instantaneous rate of transition from state j 
(alive) to state k (failed), X(t) is a vector of 
covariate values at time t (as age, size, 
profit orientation, total number of similar 
firms,  demand for child care services, 
number of childhood education graduates) 
and bjk is a vector of parameter estimates. 
Overlap density increased 
mortality rates while 
nonoverlap density lowered 
mortality rates. Results also 
demonstrate that mutualism 
and competition were stronger 
among organizations located 
in the same city. “Increases in 
the number of population 
members with differential 
organizational niches can lead 
to the emergence of an 
organizational system 
comprising organizations that 
work together because they 
are different in complementary 
ways”. 
Carrol and 
Hannan 
(1989) 
 
 
 
Organizational 
Mortality 
-Density  at the time of 
founding 
-Density at present time. 
- Organization age 
 
Does density (the number of 
organizations in a population) 
affects rates of organizational 
founding and mortality?  
Is there any contemporaneous 
effect of density? 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
The authors proposed a generic model for µ(a), 
the mortality of the organization with age a: 
)nnnexp()a(
if
2
a2a1 φ+θ+θ=µ , with 
(θ1<0; θ2>0; Φ>0).  To estimate the mortality 
rate for each of the types of industries, a 
Gompertz form has been used for newspapers 
and breweries:  
)aX'nnnexp( iaf12q2a1ia i Ψ+Π+Φ+θ+θ=µ , and a 
Weibull form for labour unions: 
1p
iaf1
2
q2a1ia a)X'nnnexp( i −Π+Φ+θ+θ=µ  , with a 0, 1, 
…, Ai. na denotes density at age a, and nfi denotes 
density at time of founding of the ith organization. 
The authors used Maximum Likelihood 
techniques to estimate the model parameters. 
In the formalization that Carroll 
and Hannan proposed, the 
mortality rate of the 
organization is modelled 
assuming that density at the 
time of founding has a positive 
effect on the age-specific 
mortality (and this effect 
persists over time) and that 
density has a nonmonotonic 
effect in mortality in the way 
that it reflects different patterns 
at all ages. The authors 
conclude that “it remains to be 
seen whether the delayed 
effect of density at time of 
founding is best explained by 
resource scarcity or niche 
packing”. 
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(cont.) 
-Authors Controlled  
variables 
Variables of the 
model 
Research Questions and  
Hypothesis 
Estimation 
Techniques and 
data  
Main conclusions 
 
Zhang (2003) 
 
Formation of high-tech 
industrial clusters such 
as those in Silicon 
Valley 
Firm’s capital, Human capital, 
density, as well as other 
variables as R&D, 
technological innovation and 
imitation. 
 
How do high-tech industrial clusters 
emerge in a landscape in which no 
firms existed before? 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
Multi-Agent System 
based on a Nelson.-
Winter model from 
evolutionary economics  
The model showed that there is a contagion 
of entrepreneurship through peer effects that 
is responsible for the emergence of clusters 
and highlighted the importance of pioneering 
entrepreneurs for an emerging industrial 
cluster. 
 
Mata and 
Portugal 
(1994) 
 
Firm survival rates Start-up size ; ownership 
(Number of plants); industry 
growth rate; entry (Log of the 
number of new firms in the 
industry); entrant’s size; 
Industry’s size; MES (Log of 
one half of the average size of 
the firms that, on average, 
operate 1.5 plants); proportion 
of industry employment in 
firms smaller than Minimum 
Efficient Scale); concentration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is related with the 
general question (G1) 
Duration models like the 
proportional Hazards 
Model (Con [1972]). 
Data were obtained 
from a yearly survey 
conducted by the 
Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment. 
Larger entrants and firms that have entered 
with multiple establishments are more likely 
to stay in the market for more periods. The 
industries in which the expected duration of 
new firms is likely to be greater are those 
that are growing fast. A novel result is the 
effect of the entry rates on firm’s duration 
which seems to be of particular importance 
in analysing the effect of entry on market 
performance. 
Carayol and 
Roux (2003)  
  Is innovation a collective and 
interactive process that generates 
the formation of networks of 
organizations?  
This work is related with the 
general questions (G4 and G9) 
Agent-Based Simulation In this phenomenon that some call 
“collective invention”, social interactions 
generate knowledge disclosure between 
agents belonging to competing firms which 
in turn stimulates innovation. 
Wersching 
(2005)  
Technological 
development, economic 
performance of firms 
and evolution of 
agglomerations in 
differentiated industry 
 Relation between innovation and 
agglomeration 
This work is related with the 
general questions (G4 and G4) 
Agent-Based simulation The author concluded that there is an 
incentive to agglomerate in young industries 
and that the geographical distance between 
them enhances innovation. Moreover, 
innovation and cooperation networks, and, 
generally, the topic of firms’ dynamics have 
been recently studied with the help of Multi-
Agent Simulation models. 
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(cont.) 
Table 4-3 – Summary of related works, presenting the Variables of the model, Research Questions and  Hypothesis, Estimation Techniques and data and Main 
conclusions 
 
Authors Controlled  
variables 
Variables of the 
model 
Research Questions and  
Hypothesis 
Estimation 
Techniques and 
data  
Main conclusions 
Purchase, 
and Olaru 
(2003)  
 Relationships  in a B2B 
environment, namely Actor 
bonds, Activity links and 
resource ties 
Is Centrality an important issue in 
network strategy? 
This work is related with the 
general questions (G6, G7 and G9) 
Networked Simulation  Loosing the ability to maximize opportunities 
due to poor network position will limit future 
company growth and ability to the 
advantages of new knowledge that may 
pass through the network. 
In order to maintain the pole position within 
the network, organizations must ensure that 
their immediate actor bonds to other 
organizations in pole position are strong. 
Wilkinson et 
al. (2001) 
 Relationships between 
networks 
What are the processes by which 
institutional and network structures 
evolve? What factors drive those 
processes? What is the impact of 
environmental conditions ? What 
are the ways in which the evolution 
of better performing institutional 
and network structures may be 
encouraged? 
 
This work is related with the 
general questions (G6 and G7) 
NK Boolean models 
(developed by Stuart 
Kauffman)  
Firms are operating in complex adaptive 
systems in which control is distributed 
through the system. No actor or entity 
coordinates or directs the behaviour of the 
network. Firms jointly create both their 
destiny an the destiny of others; they come 
to see themselves as parts of business 
ecosystems in which cooperative and 
competitive processes act to shape the 
dynamics and evolution of the ecosystem. 
Epstein and 
Axtell, (1996)  
 Food, Birth, Death, Culture, 
Conflict, etc. 
Is it possible to build a civilization 
from the bottom-up? 
 
This work is related with the 
general questions (G1, G4 and 
G10) 
Agent Based simulation Sugarscape is a reference Agent Based 
model where social structures and group 
behaviour arise from the interaction of 
individuals. Fundamental collective 
behaviours such as group formation, cultural 
transmission , combat, and trade are seen to 
emerge from the interaction of individual 
agents following a few simple rules  
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Table 4-4 – Summary of the main aspects of some density-dependence models that use simulation 
techniques 
Author(s) Population 
Generation 
Method 
Initialization Procedures used for 
founding, death and 
growth 
Models for vital rates Number 
of 
iterations 
Barron 
(2001) 
Monte Carlo 
micro-
simulation 
A single 
“pioneer” 
organization 
is created to 
begin the 
simulation 
 
 
 
Predicted founding, death 
and growth rates are 
estimated using empirical 
data by means of Weibull 
structure regression 
models 
Barron compares three models 
(in which Ψt represents the 
rates of entry, growth or exit, 
depending on the signal of the 
involved parameters and Nt 
represents density at time t).
  
100 
Lomi and 
Larsen 
(1998) 
 
 
Cellular 
automata  
 
(maximum 
number of 
potential 
organizations 
is 8100)  
Five cells 
are 
considered 
active in the 
instant t=0 
Founding and death of 
organizations depend on 
the number of current 
organizations living  in 
the neighbourhood (the 
authors consider a 
founding and a survival 
bands that they control to 
produce their simulated 
results):  
∑ ∑
+
−=
+
−=
−
=α
ki
kii
kj
kjj
1t
j,i
t
j,i a
 In this 
expression, t j,iα  represents 
the number of cells alive in 
a k-neighbourhood around a 
cell aij at time t, and 1t j,ia −  
defines the state of cell (i,j) 
at time t-1. 
Transition rate (which 
represents a hazard or 
mortality rate) is a Gompertz-
Makeham age-dependence 
model used to make the 
estimates comparable to those 
reported in the most recent 
empirical research)  
 
100  
 
(from 
reported 
examples) 
Hannan et 
al. (1991) 
 
Monte Carlo 
micro-
simulation 
A “pioneer” 
organization 
is created at 
the start 
A predicted mean 
founding rate for each 
period is built, using an 
empirically estimated 
model of founding rates. 
The same applies to the 
death rates. Maximum 
Likelihood techniques 
have been used to 
estimate functions 
parameters 
Mean founding rate: 
)'xexp()Nexp()N(
)Y(E
pt
2
tt
tt
τ+piγϕ=
=φ=
))))
)
where Nt is the density at start 
of the year t, )N( tϕ
)
 is the 
functional form of the 
legitimation function that fits 
best for each population (as 
reported in chapter 4), pi)t'x  
contains the effects of 
covariates including previous 
foundings, and pτ
)
is a set of 
period effects. 
Hazard of mortality 
ρτ+pi×
×θ+θ+θ=
=µ
))
)))
)
a)ˆ'x(exp
)NNNexp(
)f,t(
pit
fi3
2
t2t1
i
 
where a is the age of 
organization and ρ)  is the 
estimate of the parameter 
indexing age dependence in 
mortality rates 
 150 a 300 
(according 
to 
reported 
examples) 
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The work of Lomi and Larsen (1998) uses Cellular Automata in which founding and 
death of organizations depend on the number of current organizations that live in the 
neighbourhood. This is actually very similar to what we propose in the present work, 
but we are more interested in observing the impact of some covariates (that is, 
independent variables) in the survival of organizations. 
  
Another relevant work is that of Rogers and Tessin (2004) which has also calibrated 
Agent-Based models. It is important to note that the task of parameter calibration is 
often made difficult by the proliferation of model parameters with non linear iterations. 
Rogers and Tessin use an Agent-Based model of a financial market as an example and 
calibrate the model using a multi-objective genetic algorithm50. 
 
In the next section we give empirical data of collaboration networks (to be used in 
Chapter 6) in three types of industries: automobile, textile, and e-Marketplaces. 
 
 
4.5. The data: some empirical evidences of collaboration  
 
To validate our model we need empirical data from the real world. In this section we 
present a summary of the conclusions considering the data we have analysed. The main 
sources of information we have consulted include official data from National Agencies, 
Statistical Office and Eurostat, and other sources such as industrial associations, and 
existing case studies. 
 
In Chapter 5 we use real data to calibrate the simulation and therefore validate the 
model. Some important indicators of the Northern region of Portugal including firm 
births and deaths and other indicator created by the author are presented later in Chapter 
5. 
 
                                                 
50
 According to those authors, the approach that consists in building models from the bottom up, allow us 
to concentrate more on the working of the entire system and not only on the in and out flow of data. 
However, this leads to a concentration of the modelling efforts on the internal mechanisms of the various 
agents and, thus, a proliferation of model parameters which interact in an extremely complex manner. 
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Concerning the collaboration networks analysed in Chapter 6, we are particularly 
interested in analysing the collaboration networks that emerge from the need of creating 
and diffusing knowledge concerning R&D activities. Recent data shows that there has 
been a general increase in the number of collaboration networks with R&D purposes51. 
 
We have decided to focus our analysis on real life examples from Automobile 
manufacturing, Textile Industry and Electronic markets. The reason why we have 
chosen these three sectors is that they constitute examples of sectors in which 
innovation is processed by firms in different ways. Pavitt (1984) presented a tipology of 
sectors according to the processing of innovation.  
 
The Automobile sector is associated with production intensive firms with the increasing 
division of labour, reduction of costs, use of machinery and great dimension.  
Innovation aims at reducing the costs and improving the quality of the product. This 
sector is undergoing significant restructuring in recent decades, thanks to company 
reorganisation initiatives and the introduction of new technologies and organisational 
models. Consequently, there has been an increase in mergers and acquisitions, and the 
establishment of R&D partnership agreements between automotive firms52. In many 
cases these agreements take the form of networks that involve constructors (car makers) 
and suppliers of components.  
 
Textile industry is a traditional supplier dominated sector of manufacturing. Supplier 
dominated firms make only a minor contribution to their product technology, and 
therefore most innovations come from suppliers. The aim of innovation is to reduce 
costs or to differentiate the products. In general, innovations concern the production 
process or the design of the product. 
 
E-Marketplaces are a particular type of e-business, which is a term often used to 
identify businesses that are made through electronic means, generally the Internet. 
                                                 
51
 To support this evidence, we can state that during 2003 in Portugal, the total number of collaboration 
networks concerning R&D projects in the area of information technology is ten times greater than it was 
in 1997. In the automobile manufacturing sector, the corresponding number is four times superior for the 
same period (source: OCES, 2005). 
52
 See EIRO – The European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line in 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/12/study/ 
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Electronic inter-organizational information systems enhance the way how buyers and 
sellers exchange information about prices and product offerings (Oppel et al. 2001).  
 
The importance of the e-Marketplaces for our study is that it is related formation of 
networks, although in this case the geographical distance between firms has less 
importance than in “traditional” business.  
 
In the following sections, we present the main conclusions concerning collaboration 
networks supported by available data and put forward hypotheses that are analysed 
further in Chapter 6 in order to validate our simulation. A brief synthesis of the main 
hypotheses is presented. Details concerning the data presented in this section are 
described in Appendix IV.  
 
4.5.1. Automobile Manufacturing  
 
The work of Swaminathan, et al., Selada, et al. (1999) and Dimara et al. (2003), among 
others, are of great importance in terms of providing good source of information 
concerning automobile manufacturing. The main conclusions that we can take from 
these works to support our hypotheses are the following (author identification and 
number of hypotheses to be presented and tested later on are in brackets):  
 
 Automobile constructors promote both a concentration process of component 
suppliers and room for creating important collaboration networks (EMCC, 
2004); (H21) 
 Migration of constructors to emergent markets of Asia and South America as a 
way to rationalize production (Selada, et al. 1999); (H23) 
 Contemporaneous density has a negative impact on the mortality of 
organizations (Carrol and Hannan, 1989); (H12 and H24) 
 Density at founding has a positive impact on the mortality of organizations 
(Carrol and Hannan, 1989); (H11 and H25) 
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 If the distance between two firms is short, they have a higher probability to 
cooperate horizontally; if the distance between two firms is high, they have a 
higher probability to cooperate vertically (Dimara et al 2003); (H29). 
 Stable and long term links improve supplier’s probability of survival 
(Swaminathan, et al. 2002); (H28) 
 
 
4.5.2. Textile Industry  
 
We gathered some case studies from the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian markets that 
have been made in the context of “Rede Têxtil” (CENESTAP53, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 
2000d, 2000e, 2001), a project supported by the Portuguese Government whose aim 
was to improve and promote inter-firm cooperation. In the following, we present a 
summary of the results obtained in those case studies that brings important details about 
cooperation and formation of networks. 
 Networks explore the complementarity associated with the firms’ specificities.  
 With cooperation among firms, the time of the order satisfaction to the 
customers is minimized as well as production costs, and the productive capacity 
of the network is increased; (H22) 
 Profitable networks indicate that one of the reasons for their success is a clear 
definition of the services to develop in cooperation, including, for instance, a 
common structure with juridical autonomy. New functions are available for 
some firms (as publicity and advertising) because they are accessible to all the 
firms in the network.  
 In some cases there are signs of rivalry, when the distribution of the orders 
through the network is not compatible with the goals of some particular firms. 
There are situations of opportunistic behaviour and asymmetric benefits. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 CENESTAP is the Portuguese Center for Applied Textile Studies.  
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4.5.3. e-Marketplaces  
 
We based our evidences in the studies of Wang and Archer (2004), Oppel et al. (2001), 
Osterle et al. (2001) and Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2004). The main 
conclusions are the following: 
 Horizontal and vertical cooperation deals with large networks. 
 The links are based in long-term relationships. 
 The physical distance between the elements of the network has relatively low 
importance. 
 Transaction and search costs are reduced. The electronic search and comparison 
of products is one of the most important advantages of EMs. (H22) 
 
These evidences will be used later in this work. In particular, the low importance of 
physical distance in e-Markets is considered in the definition of a specific strategy of 
collaboration given in Chapter 6. 
 
In the following Chapters (5 and 6), the two applications (CASOS and NetOrg) will be 
presented. The modelling approach and results are considered and the research 
hypotheses will be defined and discussed more specifically in each of the situations. 
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5. Density dependence and Niche Size: a cellular automata-
based approach  
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The characteristics that assure the survival and growth of organizations are a topic of 
concern for managers and economists that search for answers to several questions such 
as: Why organizations get born and die? What are the determinants of their survival? 
What is the effect of the location in their births and deaths? 
 
Although these questions may be answered from different perspectives, we will adopt 
an ecological point of view here, as space is an important component for the study of 
the organizational survival. Environments have spatial components that affect the 
evolutionary dynamics of organizational populations. Each population of organizations 
occupies a different space (that we call organizational niche54) and the size of the niche 
is determinant for the survival of organizations. As referred to, back in Chapter 2, a 
niche includes all the combinations of resources at which the population can survive and 
reproduce itself (Baum and Singh, 1994). 
                                                 
54
 More precisely, in Ecology, the total requirements of a species (resources and physical conditions) 
determine the space where it can live, and its success. These requirements are termed abstractly the 
ecological niche. 
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Due to its relevance for organizational survival, we have concentrated our analysis in 
the dimension of the niche. We consider that the niche dimension can be measured by 
its number of firms, that is to say, the organizational density55. Following on previous 
work (Lomi and Larsen, 1998), we assume that if the density value is inside the limits 
of a certain survival interval, the firm will stay alive. The same applies to the birth 
process (founding) of a new firm: if the density is within a founding interval, a new firm 
will be born. This approach is based on the Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner, 1970) 
and the whole process is explained later in more detail. 
 
To reproduce this game, we have built a cellular automata-based simulation named 
CASOS – Cellular Automata System for Organizational Survival - in which the survival 
and founding interval limits, as well as other variables are introduced as input 
parameters which we call micro-parameters. Then, in order to validate the quality of the 
simulation, the output of the cellular automata (birth and death rates of the population) 
is compared with birth and death rates observed in a real economy. This comparison 
allows the adjustment of input the micro-parameters of the simulation (the interval 
limits). To make this adjustment of the micro-parameters, we have used a Genetic 
Algorithm.  
 
The whole process has been presented in the previous chapter as the research 
methodology (Figure 4-1). A generic outline of CASOS is now synthesized in the 
following: 
(I) Definition of micro-parameters (input parameters): some parameters are 
defined as input parameters of the cellular automata: 
a. the upper and lower limits of the survival interval [DSl ; DSu]; 
b. the upper and lower limits of the founding interval [DBl ; DBu];  
c. The size of the firm (S);  
d. The age of the firm (A). 
                                                 
55
 As introduced in Chapter 2, organizational density is defined as the number of organizations in the 
organizational population. 
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(II) Running of cellular automata: depending on some rules (to be explained 
in the following sections), each firm can stay alive or die, and new firms 
can be born; 
(III) Validation (comparison between the output of the cellular automata and 
reality): after running the cellular automata a certain number of iterations, 
we obtain birth and death rates as the output: these values are compared 
with real values for several periods of time obtained in empirical studies. A 
fitness function is built as a measure of distance between simulated and 
real rates. 
(IV) Adjustment of micro-parameters through a genetic algorithm: with a 
genetic algorithm that uses micro-parameters as hypotheses and the fitness 
function, we adjust the micro-parameters to the real output. Several periods 
of time are considered. 
The process is repeated until a threshold is attained or a pre-specified maximum number 
of iterations is reached.  
 
We aim at determining the limits of the niche density interval that influence the survival 
and the founding of firms within. At the same time, our objective in this application is 
to evaluate the effects of contemporaneous and founding density on the mortality of 
organizations56 
 
We note that there is a distinction between births and deaths in terms of the level of 
analysis where they are produced. Births depend on the overall density of a territorial 
unit, while deaths depend on the density level of a particular kind of firms. 
 
In the next sections, we specify the modelling approach (5.2) and the technical aspects 
that are related to the creation of the Cellular Automata (5.3 to 5.5). Results are given in 
section 5.6. 
 
                                                 
56
 The concepts of contemporaneous and founding (or delayed) density were studied by Carroll and 
Hannan (1989), as presented in Chapter 2. The main concern of the authors was whether density at the 
time of founding might change the mortality rate of adult organizations. Carroll and Hannan have called 
this phenomenon of postponement between the cause (density at founding) and the effect (contemporary 
death), the delayed density model. They have concluded that density at time of founding had a positive 
effect on mortality rates in all the populations that have been studied. 
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5.2. The Modelling Approach 
 
Since one of our aims in this application is to determine the density interval limits of the 
niche that influence the survival and the founding of firms, we need to use a set of 
techniques that allow us to: 
 simulate the interaction between firms in a locally distributed system; 
 determine the values of internal initial micro-parameters, such as density values 
that are determinant for the survival of organizations. 
 
In order to achieve the first goal, we have used a cellular automata system. As we have 
explained in Chapter 3, cellular automata are cells located in a regular grid where the 
behaviour of an individual cell is determined by a set of rules which specify how the 
state of the cell depends on the previous state and the states of its neighbours. This is a 
characteristic of so called automata (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979) in Computer Science. 
Cellular automata (CA) represent an appropriate technique when the location of the 
individuals is important. By using CA as a simulation technique, we expect to analyse 
the effects of these locally interacting automata57 by simulating the states of the cells 
that live around them.  
 
The process of adjusting the simulation micro-parameters so that some variables in the 
simulation would follow similar trends as real data is referred to as calibration. To 
calibrate the simulation we use a genetic algorithm. Genetic Algorithms (GA’s) 
represent adaptive algorithms based on simulated evolution (Holland, 2001 [1975]; 
Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1997; Dumitrescu et al. 2000) that use an appropriate 
metaphor of selection, crossover and mutation from Biology, as presented in Chapter 3.  
 
The GA approach involves a population of hypotheses in which each element (a single 
hypothesis) contains a codified combination of the micro-parameters represented as 
genes. In our case, the micro-parameters are the density interval limits that we want to 
evaluate as the limits that are acceptable for the niche to survive and evolve.  Then the 
                                                 
57
 When the effects of these locally interacting automata are seen as a whole, we may say that we are 
analysing the emergent properties of the system. 
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GA will try to search for hypotheses that maximize the fitness value, by minimizing the 
distance between real and simulated output data in the several periods of time. 
 
GA’s generate successor hypothesis by repeatedly mutating and recombining parts of 
the best current hypothesis (Mitchell, 1997), until the stopping criteria is met. In each 
step, every hypothesis of the current population is evaluated according to a fitness 
measure (Dumitrescu et al. 2000; Mitchell, 1997) and the hypotheses with high fitness 
are probabilistically selected to be the seeds for production in the next generation. A 
prototype of a GA is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
The goal of GA’s is to search in a space of candidate hypotheses in order to find the 
hypothesis that fits best the data, that is, the one that optimizes particular criteria, 
evaluated by the fitness measure. The best hypothesis found by the program is given as 
output.  
 
The genetic algorithm is just one of the steps in the whole iterative process that we have 
created in this study. As stated before, the goal of this study is to obtain the best 
combination of the micro-parameters (codified in the hypotheses) that characterize the 
size of a niche. Therefore, a population of micro-parameters is created and the cellular 
automata simulation starts having those micro-parameters as an input. The output of the 
simulation has the form of vital rates (birth and death rates) that are compared with 
“real” ones. The fitness function is computed as the distance between simulated and real 
vital rates. 
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Prototype of a Genetic Algorithm 
Fitness: function that is assigned to the score of a hypothesis 
Fitness_threshold: threshold that specifies and ending criteria 
η: number of hypotheses in the population of hypothesis H 
ρ: proportion of the population that is going to be replaced through crossover in every iteration 
µ: mutation rate 
γ: number of genes that form a hypothesis 
1) Initialize the population: H←randomly generate η hypotheses (h1, h2, …, hη) 
2) Evaluate: for each hi in H, compute the corresponding fitness, Fitness(hi) 
3) Repeat while [maxh Fitness(hi)]<Fitness_threshold , (i=1, 2, …, η) 
Create a new generation Hs 
(I) Select: Probabilistically select  (1-ρ) η members of H to add to Hs 
P(hi) is the probability for the hypothesis hi of H to be selected: 
∑
η
=
=
1j
i
i
i
)h(Fitness
)h(Fitness)h(P  
(II) Crossover: Probabilistically select two members h1 and h2 from the ρη  members of the 
population H, according to P(hi) .  
For each pair (h1, h2) produce two offspring applying the crossover 
operator. Add new members to the generation Hs. 
(III) Mutation: select the proportion µ of members of Hs and apply the mutation. This 
mutation can be the swap of some of the γ genes. 
(IV) Update: H←Hs 
(V) Evaluate: for each member hi of H, (i=1, 2, …, η), compute Fitness(hi) 
4) Return the most fitted hypothesis from H. 
 
Figure 5-1– Prototype of a Genetic Algorithm - adapted from Mitchell, (1997) 
  
Based on the fitness of each hypothesis, the genetic algorithm calibrates the solution 
and introduces new hypotheses in the cellular automata simulation. The process is 
repeated until a threshold or a maximum number of iterations is reached.  
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Now we take a deeper look into the details of the four steps of CASOS that were 
introduced in the previous section: 
 – Micro-parameters: six parameters are defined:  
a. the upper and lower limits of the survival interval [DSl ; DSu]; 
b. the upper and lower limits of the founding interval [DBl ; DBu];  
c. The size of the firm (S); 
d. The age of the firm (A) 
In terms of the Genetic Algorithm, each parameter is considered a gene 
(represented as g) and the whole set of six parameters is considered a 
hypothesis. Generically we have η hypothesis each containing γ genes. In 
our case we consider γ=6 and η =20. 
Formally, the first hypothesis is represented as  
<g1,1, g2,1, g3,1, g4,1, g5,1, g6,1>;  
the second hypothesis is represented as <g1,2, g2,2, g3,2,g4,2, g5,2, g6,2>;  
and then last one is <g1,20, g2,20, g3,20, g4,20, g5,20, g6,20>.  
 Running of cellular automata. Each cell in the cellular automata represents 
a firm. 
 Validation: we compare birth and death rates for several periods of time 
between simulation and real outputs. Birth and death rates are the variables 
to be compared. Variables are represented by Vij (i=1, 2, …, n and j=1, 2, 
…, p), n being the number of time periods (t1, t2, …, tn) and p the number 
of variables to be compared. Since we have only two variables (birth rate 
and death rate), then p=2. For each variable, we take seven periods of time, 
so n=7. 
 Genetic Algorithm  - adjustment of micro-parameters through genetic 
algorithm 
 
The connection between the simulation and the calibration processes is based on the 
research methodology illustrated in Figure 4-1 and in Figure 4-2 and can be represented 
as follows: 
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Figure 5-2- Overall architecture of the simulation with calibration of the micro-parameters58 
 
The micro-parameters (I), represented as <g1,20, …, g6, 20>, are an example of the input 
of the cellular automata application (II). Simulated outputs are then compared with real 
data using a fitness function that measures the distance between both (III). The higher 
the similarity between simulated and real data, the better. The task of the genetic 
algorithm (IV) is to optimize the micro parameters in order to obtain the best output 
considering fitness.  
 
This process is repeated until the distance between the output of the cellular automata 
and reality reaches a small predefined threshold. The whole process corresponds to one 
run of CASOS.  The main steps of CASOS are explained later in this chapter. 
 
Next, we are going to present the components of the model that include the micro-
parameters, a decisive element in this simulation.  
 
 
                                                 
58
 In the overall model, we consider that the population of Hypotheses of the Genetic Algorithm contains 
η hypothesis with γ genes in each; for the comparison of the output through the fitness function, p is the 
number of variables and n is the number of time periods.  
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5.3. Model components  
 
Representation of the space 
CASOS - Cellular Automata System for Organizational Survival - contains a landscape 
or space, cellular automata, and a rule. The space is represented by a graph that 
interconnects the places where firms can be located. We focused our environment on a 
particular space of four regions. Here we have chosen to study the North-West of 
Portugal, where textile industry is concentrated. The corresponding graph is shown in 
Figure 5-3. One of those regions, Ave, is often referred to as an Industrial District and is 
the focus of our study.  
 
Regions from 
North-West of 
Portugal  
1- Ave 
2- Cávado 
3- Grande Porto 
4- Minho-Lima 
4 
2 
1 
3 
 
 
Figure 5-3 - North-western region of Portugal represented as a graph where arrows connect 
contiguous areas representing the four regions of the study. 
 
 
Cellular automata are located in different grids, each being associated with a region, as 
illustrated in Figure 5-4: 
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Figure 5-4 – Representation of cellular automata in the four regular grids (1 to 4) corresponding to 
the regions in the study. White cells in the grid represent “active “ (or living) firms, while dark cells 
represent dead firms.  
Note: The dimension of each grid is merely indicative. In practice, regions are associated with grids of 
different dimension. 
 
The following table provides information about the state of the economical activity of 
Ave and nearby regions in 2001. 
  
Firms Area Density Number of 
employers 
Newborn 
firms Failing firms  
  Nr. km2 nr. firms /Km2 Nr nr Nr 
Ave 2093 1237.8 16.91 80802 164 6 
Cavado 942 1242.6 7.58 28777 68 7 
Grande Porto 1348 817.4 16.49 43501 75 23 
Minho-Lima 130 2210.3 0.59 3886 14 4 
Table 5-1 – Real data for textile industry concerning the four regions of the study relative to 2001 
(Source: INE and author) 
Note: the column Density was multiplied by 10 
 
 
We have chosen the region of Ave as the centre of our analysis. Ave has also been 
frequently studied in the last decade, due to problems of competition related to emergent 
textile markets in Asia. Therefore, statistical information of many important economical 
Grande Porto 
 (3) 
Ave 
(1) 
Cávado  
(2) 
Minho-Lima  
(4) 
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indicators including firm creation and extinction exists and will certainly be needed to 
calibrate our simulation59.  
 
In the next paragraphs the modelling is explained with more detail, and we focus on the 
aspects of the cellular automata and on the rules related to the density, birth, death, size, 
and age. 
 
In the cellular automata approach, each firm is represented by a cell with a set of 
attributes: location, age and size. There is one rule in CASOS that connects the cell 
(firm) and the environment, which is responsible for the determination of the firms’ 
birth and death processes. To determine the birth and death of a firm, we have adopted a 
variant of the density dependence model.  
 
We based our model on the basic model presented in Chapter 2, the density dependence 
model, in which vital rates of birth and death of firms are dependent on the population 
density. This process is modelled by the S-shaped logistic growth curve in which the 
growth of the population is limited to K (the carrying capacity), as seen earlier in the 
differential equation for population growth: 
 
Density dependence = 




 −
=
K
NK
rN
dt
dN
.     Equation 2-6 
 
In this equation, N represents population size, t represents time and r defines the 
constant growth rate of the population. It has been proved that the solution of this 
differential equation is K, the carrying capacity, that is to say, the maximum size a 
population can attain under the conditions of the current environment. A specific 
interpretation of this model is that the survival of a firm depends on the number of firms 
that are located in its neighbourhood. We have implemented a variant of this model, 
using cellular automata, as explained subsequently. 
 
                                                 
59
 When no real data could be found for some periods, the data was substituted by hypothetical data. For 
example, some values have been estimated in Table 5.1, since there is no information for textile industry 
at this geographic level of analysis. Therefore, according to the weight of textile industry in the North of 
the Portugal (measured by the number of textile firms over the total of firms), we estimated some of the 
values in this table.  
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According to our variant, in every region, a firm can be born or die, depending on a 
function which is based on the number of firms that are located in its neighbourhood. 
For that purpose, we have calculated the density, tjD , involving a particular region, j, at 
time t, as the average number of firms per square kilometre in region j and in the nearest 
neighbour regions, at time t:  
 
∑
=
=
jK
1i i
t
it
j Area
fD                               Equation 5-1 
 
Density has a spatial dimension here, as it is computed as the ratio between the number 
of firms and the area where they are located. In this equation Kj represents the number 
of regions that belong to the neighbourhood60 of region j; Areai is the area of the regions 
involving j, measured in square kilometres, and tif  corresponds to the number of firms at 
time t (i=1, 2, …, Kj) that are alive. The latter value is computed as follows: 
∑
=
δ=
iN
1j
t
ij
t
if ,                                      Equation 5-2 
 
where Ni represents the total number of firms in the region i and tijδ  is the state (dead -  
coded as 0 - or alive – coded as 1) of the jth firm of the region i at time t. For example, 
let us consider that Ave (region 1) contains 107 “active” firms at time 2. If the 
neighbourhood of Ave comprises Cávado (region 2, containing 41 “active” firms), and 
Grande Porto (region 3, containing 87 “active” firms), then the number of firms around 
a particular firm in the region of Ave is given by 21f  = 235. The value 21f  is simply the 
sum of the number of firms that are alive in the neighbourhood of region 1. In this case 
we have counted all the firms of Grande Porto, Cávado and Ave. 
 
The concept of neighbourhood is important to identify the firms that are close to a 
particular firm. So, we defined the level of neighbourhood of a particular region j, as the 
maximum distance that a region can be from region j, otherwise it is not considered a 
neighbour of region j. For instance: if the neighbourhood is 30 kilometres, then only 
                                                 
60
 The number of regions that are considered in the neighbourhood of a particular region is computed 
according to the distance between regions (presented later in table Table 5-3).  
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regions that distance no more than 30 kilometres from region j are considered its 
neighbours.  
 
In our simulation, density will affect the processes of founding and failure in the 
following manner: if the number of living organizations in the neighbourhood of a 
specific firm belongs to the survival interval [DSl ; DSu], then the organization will 
have a higher probability to stay alive. Otherwise, it will have a higher probability to die 
either due to “overcrowding” or to “solitude”, depending on whether the number is 
greater than DSu or lower than DSl (where DSl and DSu are, respectively, the lower 
and upper bounds of the density survival interval).  
 
The same idea applies to the process of founding, where DBl and DBu are, respectively, 
the lower and upper bounds of the density founding interval. Moreover, considering 
what was said about the association between density and legitimation, DSu may give us 
an idea about the maximum levels of legitimation for a particular type of industry.  
 
We also assume that age and size affect the firm’s survival. Following Mata, Portugal, 
and Guimarães (1995), size is an important determinant of the chances of survival and it 
exerts a negative effect on the failure rate. So, we will consider that larger firms have 
more chances to survive. Size will be measured by the number of employees. Also, 
experimental studies have shown that infant firms are more exposed to death (Carroll 
and Hannan, 1989). Thus, we will define Sl and Al as the lower size and age thresholds, 
respectively, above which an organization is more likely to survive.  
 
Logical formulation 
Therefore, as a logical formulation of what has been said before, we state that tijδ , the 
state of firm i, from region j, at time t will be defined as: 
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where tiS  represents the size of firm i at time t, and Sl is the size threshold; tiA  is the 
age of firm i at time t and Al is the age threshold. This can be seen as the rule of the 
system. 
 
Since firm size and age affect survival, they influence the state of each firm (dead or 
alive), which depends also on the number of neighbours (density) and on the firm’s own 
state in the previous period.  
 
We have introduced another variant in the original density dependence model since 
firms are condemned to death just if they are below the interval limits, specifically, 
when they are very small ( tiS < Sl) or very young ( tiA <Al). 
 
Probabilistic formulation  
Therefore, assuming independence among density, size, and age, the probability that a 
firm remains at state 1, i.e., the survival probability for the firm i in the region j at time 
t, denoted P( tijδ =1), can be formulated as :  
 
P( tijδ =1) =  P( 1tij−δ =1 | tjD , tiS , tiA ) =P( 1tij−δ =1 | tjD ) x P( 1tij−δ =1 | tiS )  x P( 1tij−δ =1 | tiA ).   
          Equation 5-4   
 
For that reason, we have considered piece-wise linear functions normally used in fuzzy 
logics for each of the firm attributes - density, size, and age – for which a probability of 
survival was computed. Figure 5-5 shows that the probability of survival depends on the 
value of each of the independent variables (density, size and age). 
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Figure 5-5: Probability of survival and interval limits for Density (a), Size (b) and Age (c) and 
illustrative values for Di, Si and Ai (at time t). 
 
This figure illustrates how the survival probability evolves with each of the independent 
variables. If DSl<Di<DSu, then, the more Di moves towards the centre of the interval 
[DSl; DSu] the higher the probability of survival (see Figure 5-5 a). The nearer Si and 
Ai are to the corresponding limits for size and age, the higher the survival probability 
(see Figure 5-5 b) and c) respectively).  
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The micro parameters of the simulation (DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, and Al) need to be 
determined. They will be initialized by a random process and optimized by the genetic 
algorithm.  
 
 
5.4. Model adjustment and evaluation 
 
5.4.1. Generic issues concerning parameter adjustment  
 
 
The calibration process 
The calibration process uses a Genetic Algorithm (GA). A population of hypotheses is 
created in which each element of the population (hypothesis) contains the combination 
of parameters DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, and Al which are represented as genes in the 
hypothesis hi, as seen earlier in this chapter. The GA then tries to search for the 
hypothesis that maximizes the fitness function value, that is minimize the distance 
between real and simulated output data.  
 
The fitness function is associated with the measure of the distance between the values of 
the vital rates produced from synthetic data and real observed data. Here we have 
chosen to use the Manhattan distance. The target function is therefore a pooled 
Manhattan distance d, between two curves xk and xi (one for real values and the other for 
simulated values), spanning across the n-dimensional space -  the number of compared 
periods - , defined by: 
∑
=
−=
n
1j
ijkjikb xx)x,x(d .     Equation 5-5 
 
The Manhattan distance is similar to the Euclidean distance 61 , in what concerns 
measuring the distance of two points in a n-dimensional space. However, it has the 
advantage of reducing higher differences between paired values because they are not 
squared differences as in Euclidean Distance. 
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 The equivalent formula of the Euclidean distance between xk and xi is ∑
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We recall that we use n=7 periods of time. Since we make two comparisons between 
real and simulated values (one for birth rates and another for death rates of the region of 
Ave for the n periods of analysis), we need to combine the two distances concerning 
these two types of rates. The pooled distance d (between two points, xk and xi, 
corresponding to the hypothesis hi) is computed as given in Equation 5-6, where db is 
the distance for birth rates, and dd the distance for death rates. 
 
2
)x,x(d)x,x(d)x,x(d)h( ikdikbiki
+
==ϕ     Equation 5-6 
 
After running CASOS for over 100 times, we noticed that the values of distance d 
ranged from 0 to 1000, in all cases. For that reason, we have defined that the Fitness 
function for the hypothesis hi should have the form:  
 
Fitness(hi) = 1000-ϕ(hi).      Equation 5-7 
 
Therefore, higher values of the fitness function correspond to lower values of the 
distance function. 
 
5.4.2. Structure and specifications of the genetic algorithm 
 
An initial hypothesis corresponding to a vector of dimension γ (number of involved 
genes or micro-parameters), taken from the population of micro-parameters, is used to 
initiate the cellular automata (CA) simulation. An example of such hypothesis could be 
the vector of values62: 
 
<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al)> =  <2, 9, 5, 17, 1, 2>.  Equation 5-8 
 
Every time we run the CA associated with a particular hypothesis, the output values 
(birth and death rates) produced by the simulation are compared with real data of birth 
                                                 
62
 With DSl≤DSu, and DBl ≤ DBu, 
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and death rates. These rates are those that have been measured in the last seven years 
(n=7). Therefore, the fitness value associated with that hypothesis is computed using the 
Manhattan distance. At the end of each population of η hypotheses, the following 
procedure, the core of the genetic algorithm, is repeated:  
 
1) Compute Fitness (hi)=1000-φ(hi), (for i=1, 2, …m). 
2) For all population of hi (i=1,2,…,m),  
repeat while Fitness(hi) < Fitness_threshold 
a. SELECTION: Select the α hypotheses with the highest fitness (α=η/2), 
among the total number η of hypotheses. The second half of hypotheses 
(η/2) is generated by crossover.  
b. CROSSOVER: The crossover consists of finding a new population of α 
members (offsprings) by swapping the halves of the genes of the 
remaining α hypotheses. So, the proportion of the population that will be 
replaced through crossover, ρ is 1/2. Every new offspring contains half 
of the parameters of each parent (the parents chosen randomly among the 
remaining α). The new set of η/2 hypotheses is selected to the enter in 
the new set. 
c. MUTATION: Apply random mutations to a certain proportion (µ), of 
existing hypothesis. The process of mutation consists in randomly 
selecting a gene of the individual and then increase (or decrease) its 
value by one unit (the probability of increasing being equal to 0.5). A 
mechanism of preventing values from being null was implemented. 
d. EVALUATION: Calculate, for each hypothesis, hi (i=1, 2, …η) the 
value of its fitness. 
3) The best hypothesis - the one with highest value of the function Fitness(hi) -  
corresponds to the smallest distance between real and simulated values and it is 
considered the solution of the optimization problem. The corresponding 
parameters that produced that solution represent the best fit for our problem. The 
“real” data that was used to make this comparison with simulated results is 
presented later on in this section. 
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5.5. Initializations of the simulation algorithm  
 
Definition of the model parameters 
 
The parameters involved in this system are the following63: 
 
Table 5-2– CASOS parameters: Cellular Automata and Genetic Algorithm parameters 
*Note: in the case of interval limits, one value is chosen at random from the corresponding interval 
 
                                                 
63
 The choices of the values for parameters (initial values and intervals) are based on simulation 
behaviour. We tested CASOS for different numbers of firms and generations, the results not being 
surprisingly different. The only drawback was the duration of the runs, which could take more than three 
hours, if a great number of firms (more than 2000) or generations (more than 50) were considered. It was 
difficult to deal with such a situation, as we needed to repeat the simulation for different runs in order to 
test the results. So we took 1000 firms and 30 generations as initial values for these parameters. 
Concerning density and ecological parameters, as well as the parameters of the genetic algorithm, our 
choice was based in large intervals (in order to allow parameters to be chosen at random) and in the 
coherence of the values involved. 
Parameters of the Cellular Automata Values 
Number of firms at the beginning of 
the simulation  1000 
Steps in evolution  30 
Density and ecological Interval Limits 
    
Survival*  lower limit (DSl): [1; 5]; upper limit (DSu):  [6, 30] 
Birth*  lower limit (DBl): [1; 5]; upper limit (DBu):  [6, 30] 
Size*  Sl: [1,5] 
Age*  Al: [1,2] 
Birth Rate 20% 
Neighbourhood Distance 70 Km 
Parameters of the Genetic Algorithm 
 
Values 
N. of Hypotheses (η)  20 
Iterations  10 
N. of hypoth. for Selection (η/2)  10 
N. of hypoth. for Crossover ( ρ=1/2) 10 
Mutation rate (µ) 10% 
Fitness threshold  0,5 
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The initial location of firms in the beginning of the simulation is made according to an 
attraction level defined later on in this section. The interval limits of Survival, Birth, 
Size and Age were defined in such a way that the output results could show some 
coherence. Values outside those intervals would produce irregularities on the simulation 
(as total extinction of firms). 
 
Although the birth rate is set to 20%, the death rate is not predefined explicitly in this 
simulation. The reason for that to happen is related to the way how birth and death 
processes are modelled in Organizational Ecology literature. As explained above, births 
depend on the overall density of a territorial unit. So, a fixed rate of 20% is multiplied 
by the existing firms in that territorial unit to obtain the number of newborn firms.  
 
On the other hand, the death process is assumed to be related to every individual firm.  
It depends on the density level of a particular kind of firms. Therefore, the death process 
is modelled according to the probability of survival presented Equation 5-4, that is, the 
survival of individual depends on the values of Density, Age and Size. 
 
The Data 
 
We have introduced real data in the simulation. A distance matrix was defined so that it 
would be possible to compute the number of neighbours in every region (the neighbours 
are those regions that share contiguous borders). The distances between the main cities 
of each region are given in Table 5-3. 
 
 Ave Cávado G. Porto M. Lima 
Ave 0 35 70 50 
Cavado 35 0 50 40 
G. Porto 70 50 0 75 
M. Lima 50 40 75 0 
Table 5-3 – Distance matrix between the regions of the study 
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To compute the density at every instant t, tjD , involving a particular region, j, we need 
the area of every neighbour region, as shown in Equation 5.2. Therefore, we have 
considered the column “Area” from Table 5-1 that contains the areas, in square 
kilometres, for the four regions in the study.  
 
Following Hannan and Carroll (1992) we assume that some regions are more favourable 
(more attractive) to founding. These are the regions that have, for instance, more roads 
and transportation conditions as these enable the flow of resources. Therefore, we have 
also defined a level of attractiveness for each of the regions in the study. This 
attractiveness is the consequence of externalities 64  that emerge in some industrial 
clusters and are related to the space and to the niche. Hannan and Carroll (1992, pp. 98) 
refer to this as the “effect of interaction between subpopulations”. They suggest that the 
effects of growth in some kind of populations improve the life chances for other 
populations by stimulating, for instance, the flow resources into a system. In fact, they 
refer that “interdependence among subpopulations has considerable interest and 
importance when their fundamental niches intersect substantially”.  
 
Consequently, we have based our estimate of the region attractiveness in the 
combination of some variables as: education level, number of roads, population density, 
etc. Table 5-4 provides the attraction level that was computed for each one of the 
regions65: 
 
                                                 
64
 An externality is an effect from one activity which has consequences for another activity but is not 
reflected in market prices. An externality occurs, for instance, when a firm builds a new road in order to 
transport its products faster and this decision causes benefits to other firms in the neighbourhood. 
Externalities can be either positive, when an external benefit is generated, or negative, when an external 
cost is generated. 
65
 The attraction level was computed in the following manner: for each region, a rank between 1 and 10 
was defined, taking into account the price of land (PRICE), the number of roads (ROADS), the 
educational level (EDUC) and population density (POP). The attraction level was defined as a function, 
with the form: 0.2xPRICE+0.3xROADS+0.3xEDUC+0.2xPOP. After obtaining a real value for each 
region, an integer rank was defined (between 1 and 10) and assigned to the corresponding region. Then, 
the attraction percentage of a region i was computed as the proportion between the attraction levels of the 
region i and the sum of all the attraction levels of all the regions. 
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Table 5-4– Attraction level of the regions in the study. 
 
After computing a pooled combination of the variables, we built an index of 
attractiveness for every region and converted it into a percentage (attraction 
percentage). Then we made a correspondence between this attraction percentage and a 
level, the attraction level. Therefore, firms’ initial location is made according to this 
level. For example, in a population of 200 firms we expect to have 82 firms in Ave, 48 
in Cávado, 58 in Grande Porto and 12 in Minho-Lima. 
 
Finally, to make proper comparisons between “real” and simulated data, we have 
collected the birth and death rates for the firms of the region of Ave in the last seven 
years (the number of time periods was defined before n=7). The following table 
contains this data: 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Birth Rate 78.36 92.71 70.05 59.14 63.74 84.38 44.95 
Death Rate 2.87 10.66 4.04 3.64 3.26 5.18 10.67 
Table 5-5– Evolution of real birth and death rates of firms in the region of Ave (%0) 
Source: data is based on INE (2002 to 2004) 
 
The fitness function compares simulated data with this real data. Since a distance-type 
measure was used (Manhattan distance), lower values in the distance function 
correspond to situations where the simulated values are closer to the real values. As an 
illustration, let us assume that the GA returned the following best hypothesis:  
 
<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al> = <2, 15, 5, 24, 1, 2>.  Equation 5-9  
 
 
Attraction 
level 
Attraction 
percentage 
Ave 7 0.41 
Cávado 4 0.24 
Grande Porto 5 0.29 
Minho-Lima 1 0.06 
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In CASOS, after running the simulation, this set of parameters produced the following 
simulated birth and death rates: 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Birth Rate 68.81 86.54 121.75 25.27 75.16 73.48 17.87 
Death Rate 51.05 70.80 53.17 21.83 17.88 6.89 12.41 
Table 5-6– example of values for birth and death rates of firms produced by CASOS 
 
Therefore, according to what has been said before, the value of the fitness function is 
computed combining the Manhattan distance between the real and simulated values for 
birth and death rates. In this example, the distance for “births” is computed as follows:  
 
71,15087,1795,4448,7338,8416,7574,63
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The Manhattan distance for death rates is computed in the same way:  
72,19341,1267,1089,618,588,1726,3
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The final pooled distance is the simple average of these distances: 
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72,19371,150
2
)x,x(d)x,x(d)x,x(d)hi( ikdikbik =
+
=
+
==ϕ    
          Equation 5-12 
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Hypotheses to be tested 
 
The hypotheses of the GA that, to some extent, validate the model presented in this 
section reproduce the effects of density at founding and contemporaneous density on the 
mortality of organizations. As it was analysed in Section 2.3, density at founding has 
substantial implications on the survival of organizations while contemporaneous density 
(the number of firms existing at the moment of the death) has a corresponding negative 
effect. The effect of the size on firm survival is also negative. 
 
Therefore, in the Table 5-7 we have identified three hypotheses to be tested with 
survival analysis and the corresponding links (if they exist) with the questions proposed 
in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Specific 
Hypothesis 
 
Empirical evidence 
 
Methodology 
 
Correspondence 
with general 
questions 
H11 Density at the time of a firm 
founding has a positive impact on the 
mortality of organizations 
Survival Analysis  G1 
H12 Contemporaneous density has a 
negative effect on the mortality of 
organizations 
Survival Analysis G1 
H13 Size has a negative effect on the 
mortality of organizations 
Survival Analysis  
Table 5-7 - Hypotheses to be tested in CASOS. 
 
 
Main steps of the simulation  
As we saw earlier in Figure 5-2, the CASOS simulation algorithm uses four steps 
(numbered I to IV). Now, we give the pseudo-code version of CASOS making the 
proper correspondence with the four steps presented back in Figure 5-2. As CASOS 
runs in cycles, we must distinguish the first iteration from the following. Each run of 
CASOS corresponds to ten iterations of twenty hypotheses each. 
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Figure 5-6 – Pseudo-code of CASOS. 
 
 
    Pseudo-code of CASOS 
 In the first iteration 
- Start-up: define a fixed number of initial firms that are randomly distributed 
among the cells of the different grids in the regions, taking into consideration the 
attraction level of each region. Those cells are considered active (or alive) firms at 
the instant t=0.  
- (I) Define the micro-parameters of the model (upper and lower boundaries for 
survival and founding, and lower limits for age and size). In the first run of CASOS 
these parameters are defined randomly within their corresponding interval limits. 
Each set of micro-parameters corresponds to a hypothesis for the GA. 
 Repeat for all iterations 
 - Repeat the micro-parameter adjustment process using GA and evolution.  Repeat 
until a predetermined threshold for the best fitted hypothesis has been reached or a 
pre-specified number of iterations has been attained, whichever happens first. 
 (II)Repeat the evolution of firms (using the parameters of a specific 
hypothesis); repeat (II) as many times as the number of different hypotheses (since 
each hypothesis contains a combination of the micro-parameters  to be tested) 
- Produce details for N periods of time; Determine in which 
‘regions’ a new firm will be born; Determine which firms will die; 
Firms that survive can grow (increment their size);  
 - (III) Compare vital rates (birth, death) of the population of firms 
based on the simulated data (at the region aggregate level) with those 
from real data and calculate the fitness function value to obtain the best 
hypothesis (using the distances discussed later in this section).    
  (IV) Apply Selection, Crossover and Mutation for the set of η 
hypotheses, and produce a new generation of η hypotheses. 
 Return the best hypothesis 
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5.6. Experimental results 
5.6.1. Evolution of the data 
 
After running CASOS for more than hundred times (each run of CASOS corresponding 
to ten iterations of twenty hypotheses each), a final set of parameters is selected, 
constituting the optimized solution (i.e. a hypothesis) for the problem. However, there 
does not seem to be a unique solution, since different runs of CASOS produce slight 
variations in the final solution. The next table contains five solutions or hypotheses 
(identified in the first column) for different runs of CASOS. For every solution, the 
corresponding distance was computed. 
 
hi DSl DSu DBl DBu Sl Al 
Distance 
ϕ(hi) 
Fitness (hi)= 
=1000-ϕ(hi) 
1 4 9 4 24 3 2 136.64 863.36 
2 3 15 1 23 2 2 148.7 851.3 
3 3 10 4 25 3 1 153.04 846.96 
4 3 11 3 25 3 2 163.67 836.33 
5 4 12 5 24 4 2 197.03 802.97 
Table 5-8 – Simulated solutions of the calibration process in CASOS: density interval limits (DS 
and DB, multiplied by 10) and Age and Size limits. 
 
Each solution corresponds to a value of the distance function ϕ (the pooled Manhattan 
distance) which establishes a value of the proximity between the simulated and the real 
death and birth rates. The following figures give an idea about how different solutions 
presented in this table correspond to different outputs, i.e. death and birth rates. 
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       (a)           (b) 
Figure 5-7– Simulated birth (a) and death rates (b) from the solution h1: 
h1= <DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al> = <4, 9, 4, 24, 3, 2>  
‰ ‰ 
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       (a)           (b) 
Figure 5-8 – Simulated birth (a) and death rates (b) from the solution h6: 
h6=<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<4, 10, 3, 23, 4, 2> 
 
 
The two solutions presented here h1=<4, 9, 4, 24, 3, 2> and h6=<4, 10, 3, 23, 4, 2> are 
quite similar, but lead to differences in terms of the birth and death rates that they have 
produced in the simulation. Their distance from real values is also different: h1 has a 
higher fitness value, Fitness(h1)=863,36, while the fit ness value for h6 is much 
lower, Fitness(h6)= 774,05 (the maximum of the fitness is 1000).  
 
To help understanding the value of the fitness associated to the solutions represented in 
these figures, let us depict the real values of the birth and death rates that were presented 
in Table 5-5. 
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Figure 5-9– Real birth (a) and death rates (b) of Ave between 1997 and 2003 (source: INE) 
 
The shape of the birth rate for the firms in Ave shows two peaks during this six-year 
period, but it seems to be decreasing after 2002. The death rate, which is very much 
lower than the birth rate, attained a top in 1998, and it has been increasing strongly after 
2001.  
‰ 
‰ 
‰ ‰ 
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As we can see from the analysis of Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8, and Figure 5-9, the value of 
the fitness can be used as a measure of comparison between real and simulated rates. 
Besides, for more similar shapes, the fitness tends to increase. However, the Manhattan 
distance does not take into account the order of the values (that are associated with the 
years) of the vectors being compared.  
 
Modified Method of Computing Distances using Growth Distances 
 
We have decided to consider the order of the values (real and simulated) with the aim of 
validating the final fitness value. Only the region of Ave has been considered in order to 
get more focused view of this problem. We created a new distance function to compare 
the corresponding values of the simulated and real growth. In this way it is possible to 
compare the evolution of the shapes between the real and simulated curves. For each 
period of time, t (each period corresponding to one year), a difference ∆t (with t=1, 
2,…, 7) has been computed separately for death and birth rates at instants t and t+i (i=1, 
…6), as shown in Figure 5-10.  
 
 
Figure 5-10 – Representation of the differences of consecutive values in the evolution of birth or 
death rate. 
 
In this figure, ∆1 represents the difference of the considered rate (birth or death rate) 
between instants t and t+1; ∆2 represents the difference between instants t+1 and t+2, 
etc. Then, we used a distance to compare these differences in real and simulated values. 
This growth distance is described in equation 5.13: 
t       t+1       t+2      t+3     t+4    … 
∆1 
∆2 
∆3 
∆4 
time 
(…) 
Birth (or) 
Death rates 
(% ) 
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where ∆k and ∆i represent two curves of dimension 6 (one with real and other with 
simulated values) each containing the differences explained above. We use this function 
to compute the distance between the curves xk and xi, through the Euclidean distances of 
the correspondent differences of consecutive values. The reason to use the Euclidean 
distance is that we respect the order of each of the values in the curves xk and xi. As we 
did before (see Equation 5.6), we compute two distances
 
corresponding to Equation 
5.13: one for the birth rate and the other for the death rate. The final pooled distance is 
defined by: 
 
2
)x,x(d)x,x(d)x,x(d ikdikbik ∆∆∆ += ,    Equation 5-14 
 
in which d∆b represents the growth distance between birth rates (real e simulated) and 
d∆d represents the growth distance between death rates (real e simulated). To 
complement the analysis we have also calculated the Euclidean distance between the 
curves: 
( )∑
=
−=
n
1j
2
ijkjike xx)x,x(d      Equation 5-15 
 
We also considered a pooled distance (combining the birth and death rates), as in 
equation 5.14. We used the new target function with the Growth distance as fitness 
function66 and ran CASOS again. The following table presents a comparison, for a 
particular run, between the values of the fitness obtained with the Growth distance 
functions and the other two (Manhattan, and Euclidean)67:  
 
                                                 
66
 The corresponding fitness function has been computed as in equation 5.7. Fitness(hi)=1000-ϕ(hi), 
where ϕ(hi) is the the pooled distance similar to equation 5.14 
67
 We recall that that the fitness of the hypothesis hi is obtained from the distance ϕ(hi), as follows: 
Fitness(hi) = 1000-ϕ(hi) 
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# Growth Euclidean Manhattan 
(1) 927.0 902.6 774.9 
(2) 956.2 880.5 784.5 
(3) 942.2 911.2 774.8 
Table 5-9 - Comparison between the fitnesses of the Manhattan, Growth, and Euclidean distances 
in three different solutions in which the Growth distance has been used as Fitness function.  
 
The values presented in Table 5-9 are the final fitness corresponding to particular 
solutions68  of CASOS. During the simulation process several values of fitness are 
produced in each iteration, as presented before in Figure 5-6 (step III), and the 
optimization process (via GA) leads to the one that minimizes the distance between real 
and simulated data. 
Figure 5-11 illustrates the evolution of the simulated birth rates corresponding to the 
fitness values of the Growth distance presented in Table 5-9.  
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Figure 5-11 – Evolution of the simulated birth rates of Ave corresponding to the Fitness values of 
the Growth distance presented in table 5.9 
 
                                                 
68
 These solutions are the final of particular runs of CASOS, but they constitute a set of illustrative 
examples, the best solutions being presented later in this section (we needed to run CASOS for many 
times to obtain higher fitness). The solutions that produce the fitness presented in Table 5-9 are the 
following:  
 <DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<3,13,3,16,3,1>; 
 <DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<5,24,4,14,1,1>; 
 <DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<3,13,3,16,3,1> 
(1) (2) 
(3) 
‰ ‰ 
‰ 
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Comparing these graphs with the graph of Figure 5.9 (a), we can observe that these 
shapes are more similar to real values than those in Figure 5-8. Nevertheless, we can 
observe other differences (in scale), that arise because we are comparing the shapes. In 
fact, we are comparing the differences (growths) in every step of evolution in both 
curves and do not take into account the values themselves. Consequently we decided to 
combine those functions by using a measure that takes in consideration both the 
evolution of the shapes and the values.  
 
Combining the Two Approaches of Calculating Distances 
 
In order to improve the form of the fitness function we decided to combine the two 
approaches. One possible key for the problem was to pool the distances taking into 
consideration the relationships between them. Therefore, we obtained the distances 
(Growth, Manhattan and Euclidean) for different runs of CASOS and calculated the 
Pearson correlations between them (Table 5-10). 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-10 – Spearman correlation coefficients between the three types of distances used in the 
curve’s comparison  
 
We observe that there is almost no linear association between the Growth and Euclidean 
distances, since the absolute value of the correspoding correlation (0.097) is very small. 
It is interesting to notice that the relationship between Growth and Manhattan is -0.25.  
For those reasons, we decide to create a new combined distance by pooling the Growth 
and Euclidean distances (conferring a higher weight to the growth distance), as follows: 
 
dcomb = 0.6 d∆+ 0.4 de      Equation 5-16 
 
 where dcomb is the new combined distance function that will be used as the fitness 
function in CASOS algorithm, d∆ represents the Growth distance and de represents the 
Euclidean distance. Next, we present the best results of the comparisons between real 
and simulated values using this combined distance function: 
  Growth Euclidean Manhattan 
Growth 1   
Euclidean -0.09724 1  
Manhattan -0.2548 0.776442 1 
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Table 5-11 - Comparison between the fitnesses of the Manhattan, Growth, Euclidean and 
Combined distances of five solutions hi, (i=1, 2, …5) in which the Combined distance has been used 
as the Fitness function.  
 
We note some heterogeneity in the solutions, namely in the values of DSu. The best 
fitness we obtained using the Combined fitness function was 934.8, corresponding to 
the solution: 
 
<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al> = <5, 28, 2, 20, 2, 1>   Equation 5-17 
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       (a)           (b) 
Figure 5-12 - Simulated birth (a) and death rates (b) from the solution h6: 
h6=<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<5, 28, 2, 20, 2, 1> 
 
The evolution of simulated birth rates is similar to the evolution of the real ones (see 
Figure 5-9). However, simulated and real death rates show different evolutionary paths.  
 
 
Fitness(hi) = 1000-ϕ(hi) Solutions hi 
  Growth Euclidean Manhattan Combined DSl DSu DBl DBu Sl Al 
1 943.2 922.1 817.9 934.8 5 28 2 20 2 1 
2 942.2 911.2 774.8 929.8 3 13 3 16 3 1 
3 943.2 900.4 761.7 926.1 5 28 2 20 2 1 
4 956.2 880.5 784.5 925.9 5 24 4 14 1 1 
5 950.9 886.7 814.5 925.2 4 10 3 25 4 1 
‰ ‰ 
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Comparison Between Simulated and Real Data 
 
We used a Wilcoxon test for paired samples (Conover, 1999) in order to compare 
simulated birth and death rates with real ones. Starting with birth rates, we considered 
that the set of hypotheses to be tested is: 
 H0: µs= µr  
 H1: µs≠ µr,  
 
in which µs and µr represent, respectively, the simulated and real birth rates means69. We 
concluded that the hypothesis H0 tends not to be rejected (p-value>20%), confirming the 
similarity between and real birth rates70. Considering the death rates, we tested an 
identical set of hypothesis (in which µs and µr represent now, respectively, the simulated 
and real death rates), but the similarity between simulated and real paths was not 
confirmed since the corresponding hypothesis H0 was rejected (p-value<1%). 
  
We found a relationship between simulated and real curves in the majority of the 
solutions, concerning the birth rates. Besides, the differences in the absolute number of 
firms per region are similar if we compare real data with simulated data: Ave registers 
the highest number of textile firms, and Minho-Lima the lowest71.  
 
Although the similarity between the real and simulated rates may represent a validation 
of the simulation model in a certain way (and can be used as a validation form in the 
context of the evolutionary path of industry in these regions as we have presented in 
Section 3.3.3), we are more interested in analyzing further aspects of the survival of 
organizations that can be estimated from the simulation, rather than searching for a 
                                                 
69
 The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test aims at studying the position or ranking of data from two related 
samples (defined by 1 and 2). The null hypothesis (Ho) for this type of test is: µ1=µ2, which states that 
there is no difference between the samples 1 and 2, µ1 and µ2, representing respectively the medians (or 
means in the case where the samples are both symmetric) of the samples 1 and 2. Usually, the alternative 
hypothesis H1 is bilateral (µ1≠µ2) meaning that there is a difference the two samples.  
70
 We used the same test to analyse the similarity between birth rates (simulated and real ones) 
considering the 22 most fit solutions, and did not reject the hypothesis H0 in fourteen of them. 
71
 In order to test if real and simulated data were similar in what concerns the total number of firms, we 
used a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for paired samples in the four regions of the study. Considering that 
the hypotheses to be tested are H0: µi= µj versus H1: µi≠ µj, in which µi and µj represent, respectively, the 
simulated and real means of the absolute number of firms in each region (i and j, with i≠j), we concluded 
that the hypothesis H0 was not rejected for Minho-Lima and Cávado (p-value>5%) and was rejected for 
Ave and Grande Porto (p-value<1%), meaning that the similarity between the paths is significant in the 
latter case.  
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perfect fit between simulation and reality. In any case we need to be aware of the 
problem of overfitting the data.  
 
In the next section, we perform the survival analysis to measure the impact of other 
variables in the survival of the firms. 
 
5.6.2. Survival Analysis 
 
To validate some properties72 of the model and to measure the impact of the variables in 
the survival of the firms, we have used a technique called survival analysis. Generally, 
survival analysis is seen as a collection of statistical methods where the outcome 
variable is the time until an event occurs (time-till-event). Like in linear regression, 
there is a model of the relationship between predictor variables and time-till-the-event. 
One of the reasons to use a survival analysis technique such as Cox regression (Cox and 
Oakes, 1984), instead of linear regression is that we may have the so called censored 
data in our sample, that is, some of the cases may have not have resulted in the terminal 
event (i.e., firms may be not dead at the end of simulation)73.  
 
The Cox Regression is useful for modelling the time to a specified event, based upon 
the values of given predictors (also called covariates). The basic model offered by the 
Cox Regression is the proportional hazards (PH) model (Cox and Oakes, 1984), a very 
popular model in survival analysis. One of the reasons why the PH model is so popular 
is that the distribution of the survival time variable need not be specified. However, if it 
is believed that survival time follows a particular distribution, then that information can 
be used in a parametric modelling of survival data, as the Weibull model (Kleinbaum 
and Klein, 2005).   
 
                                                 
72
 The validation consists in comparing the effects of independent variables obtained by survival analysis 
with the corresponding effects described in existing literature. 
73
 Survival Analysis (or Failure Time Analysis) was primarily developed in the medical and biological 
sciences, although it is also widely used in the social and economic sciences, as well as in engineering 
(reliability and failure time analysis). In economics we may study the "survival" of new businesses. In 
this case, a censored observation may occur if a firm is still alive by the end of the study period.  
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In our case, as we do not assign any distribution to the survival time, we will use the PH 
nonparametric model. The PH model assumes that the time to event and the covariates 
(or predictors) are related through the following equations. 
h(t,X) =h0(t) eβ0+ β1x1+...+ βp xp    = 
∑
=
=
β
p
1i
iix
0 e)t(h)X,t(h   Equation 5-18  
 
where: 
h(t,X) is the hazard rate at time t;  
h0(t)  is the baseline hazard at time t;  
p  is the number of covariates; 
βj  is the value of the ith regression coefficient; 
xi  is the value of the ith covariate. 
The hazard function h(t,X) is a measure of the potential for the event (failure, death) to 
occur at a particular time t, given that the event has not occurred yet (Kleinbaum and 
Klein, 2005, Cox and Oakes, 1984). It is also known as the failure rate, hazard rate, or 
force of mortality, etc. 
The Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model is usually defined in terms of the hazard 
model (Equation 5.18) expressing the hazard at time t for an individual i with a given 
specification of a set of explanatory, independent variables (also called covariates or 
predictors) denoted by X.  The Cox model formulae involves a baseline hazard function, 
h0(t), which is a function of time t, but does not involve the covariates X’s (that are 
time-independent variables). In contrast, the exponential expression involves the X’s 
but does not involve t. This is indeed one of the advantages of the model. 
The goal of the so called PH assumption is to evaluate if the hazard rate is constant over 
time, or equivalently, if the hazard for one individual is proportional to the hazard for 
any other individual, where the proportionality is constant over time (Kleinbaum and 
Klein, 2005; Cox and Oakes, 1984).  
It is possible, however, to consider covariates that consider the time t. If those time-
dependent covariates exist in the Cox regression model, the model will no longer satisfy 
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the PH assumption and an extended Cox Model should be adopted. This extended 
model will consider simultaneously time-independent, Xi, (with coefficients β0, β1,…, 
βp1), and time-dependent covariates, Xi (t), (with coefficients δ0, δ1,…, δp2) as follows:. 
==
δ++δ+δβ++β+β + )t(X...)t(XXp...X
0
2p2p11011p110e)t(h)X,t(h ∑∑= ==
δ+β
2p
1i
ii
1p
1i
ii )t(xx
0 e)t(h)X,t(h   
Equation 5-19 
 
Therefore, we have analysed the regression coefficients from a Cox extended model to 
estimate the impact of the covariates on the survival of organizations in our simulation. 
The cohort of firms 74  that has been considered was produced by the most fitted 
hypothesis in this simulation: we have gathered the results of 545 firms produced by 
CASOS simulation. We have used SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences), 
version 15.0, (SPSS for Windows, 2007) to obtain the results that are presented in the 
subsequent analysis. We analysed the following covariates: 
 Size; 
 DensCont: contemporaneous density (number of firms at the time of a 
firms’ death); 
 DensFound: density at founding (number of firms at the time of a firms’ 
birth). 
 
Table 5-12 presents a summary of the data before processing the survival analysis. 360 
cases were censored corresponding to the organizations that were still alive (state=1) at 
the end of the simulation. 
 
  
Number of 
cases Percent 
Event 185 33.8% 
Censored 360 66.1% 
Cases available in 
analysis 
Total 544 99.8% 
Total 545 100.0% 
Table 5-12 - Case Processing Summary 
                                                 
74
 A cohort of firms is a group of firms who share a common characteristic or experience within a defined 
time period. In our study, firms within the cohort have in common the characteristic that they were all 
produced by the most fitted hypothesis in our simulation.  
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To proceed with our analysis, we test the Proportional Hazard assumption by 
calculating the correlations between the Schoenfeld partial residuals (obtained for each 
covariate) and the ranked order of survival time (Age) for not-censored observations75. 
If the correlations obtained with this process are significantly different from zero, it will 
mean that covariates are time-dependent and an extended Cox Model must be 
computed. 
The partial residuals are quite symmetrically distributed, although we have confirmed 
that they were not normally distributed. Consequently, we have computed the Spearman 
correlations (more adequate for this kind of data) between the rank of age (the covariate 
that indicates the time of survival) and each covariate76. The first line of Table 5-13 
shows the values of the Spearman correlation between the Shoenfeld partial residuals 
and the ranked order of survival time for non-censored observations.  
 
   
Rank of Age 
Partial 
residual for 
Size 
Partial 
residual for 
DensCont 
Partial 
residual for 
DensFound 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 -.650(**) .106 -.045 
Rank of Age 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. .000 .152 .546 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.650(**) 1.000 -.148(*) .022 
Partial residual for 
Size 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 . .045 .766 
Correlation 
Coefficient .106 -.148(*) 1.000 -.447(**) 
Partial residual for 
DensCont 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
.152 .045 . .000 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.045 .022 -.447(**) 1.000 
Partial residual for 
DensFound 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
.546 .766 .000 . 
  N 184 184 184 184 
Table 5-13 - Spearman correlations between the Shoenfeld partial residuals and the ranked order 
of survival time for non-censored observations 
                                                 
75
 The Schoenfeld residuals are computed for each covariate and for every case that are not censored. The 
value of the Schoenfeld residuals is the covariate value Xik (where k indicates the covariate and i indicates 
the case) minus the expected value of the covariate for the risk set at t. This expected value is in fact a 
weighted average of the covariate, weighted by each individual’s likelihood of dying at time t. 
Considering a set with J covariates, the partial residual for the case i, (PRi), may be written as: 
∑
=
−=
J
i
jkjiki pxxPR
1
 
 
76
 Instead of computing these correlations, we may analyse the plots of Schoenfeld partial residuals 
against time (rank of age) for each covariate to evaluate the Proportional Hazard assumption. In the case 
where there is a linear trend between Schoenfeld residuals and time, it indicates that the PH assumption is 
violated for that covariate.  
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Notes: **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(2-tailed). 
 
The p-values for the correlation test are the p-values for the PH test in which the null 
hypothesis is that the PH assumption is not violated, as follows.  
 
H0: the PH assumption is not violated; 
H1: the PH assumption is violated. 
 
The correlations are strong for size, since the p-value is lower than 1% (as indicated in 
the line called Sig(2-tailed)). It indicates that the PH assumption is violated for this 
covariates, since there is a significant association between the Age and the covariate. 
The covariate depends on the time and the Proportional Hazard Assumption is not 
supported for that covariate. An Extended Cox Model must be used and time-dependent 
variables will be created. We have considered two choices among the most usual forms 
for defining time-dependent covariates: (Kleinbaun and Klein, 2005) 
 the product between the time and the covariate, TimexCovariate; 
 the product between the natural logarithm of time and the covariate, 
ln(Time)xCovariate. 
We tested both forms and concluded that there are no differences in the conclusions 
drawn from the results77. Therefore the time-dependent covariate corresponding to size 
is the product between the time the covariate: Size (t) = Size x T 
Table 5-14 shows the omnibus tests of model coefficients (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005; 
Cox and Oakes, 1984). This test allows for an overall evaluation of the model:  
 
Overall (score) 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 Chi-square df p-value. 
1734,394 30.813 3 .000 
Table 5-14 - Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients in Cox Regression 
 
                                                 
77
 The simplest construct to build a time-dependent covariate is just the product between the time, T, and 
the covariate (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). We have used this construct in further time-dependent 
covariates. Comparisons between the results of the forms of constructs, made especially for the problem 
of Chapter 6 are presented in Appendix V 
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The likelihood ratio, the same as -2Log(Likelihood), and chi-square statistics given in 
Table 5-14 are asymptotically equivalent tests of the omnibus null hypothesis that all 
the coefficients β’s are zero. In this case the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, (p-
value<1%) indicating that there are covariates with a significant impact on the survival 
of organizations. 
 
Table 5-15 shows the estimated coefficients of the covariates, βˆ , and the corresponding 
standard errors, represented as SE( βˆ ). The Wald statistic is computed through the 
quotient between the coefficient β and its standard error SE(β), and then taking the 
Normal (0,1) distribution for computing the corresponding value. The column df stands 
for the degrees of freedom involved in the test of hypothesis.  
 
The exponentials Exp(βˆ ) measure the impact of the variables on the hazard of the firms. 
In fact, Exp(βˆ ) is the predicted change in the hazard for a unit increase in the predictor. 
The column named p-value shows the significance of the predictor concerning the test: 
H0: β=0 versus H1: β≠0. 
 
  
 Covariates βˆ  SE( βˆ ) Wald df p-value Exp( βˆ ) 
DensFound 
-.089 .102 .772 1 .380 .915 
DensCont 
-.023 .025 .849 1 .357 .977 
Size(t) 
-.255 .045 32.637 1 .000 .775 
Table 5-15 – Summary of covariates statistics of the extended Cox Regression Equation model78 
 
According to these coefficients the extended Cox model, containing time dependent and 
time independent covariates, can be written as follows: 
 
hˆ (t,X)= hˆ 0(t)e-0.023DensCont-0.089DensFound-0.255Size(t)    Equation 5-20 
                                                 
78
 The Wald statistic presented in this table (and in others, later on) is calculated for each covariate in the 
model in order to measure the significance of the covariate on hazard rate. The Wald statistic for the 
covariate Xj is defined by [ βˆ j/SE ( βˆ )]2, in which βˆ j is the coefficient estimate of covariate Xj and 
SE( βˆ j) stands for its standard error. Then, it is assumed that this quantity follows approximately a 
standard Normal distribution. For categorical covariates, a single significance is computed for the Wald 
statistic, taking into account the overall effect of all modalities of the covariate. 
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We have compared the sign of the coefficients we habe obtained with those obtained in 
other work (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mata et al. 1995; Carroll and Hannan, 1989; 
Carroll and Hannan, 1992). The second column in Table 5-16 shows the predicted signs 
(obtained from literature; the same signs have been predicted in all studies) of the 
association between firm survival and the covariates.  
 
Covariate Predicted Sign Obtained Sign  
Density at Founding (DensFound) + - 
Contemporaneous Density 
(DensCont) 
- 
- 
Size - - 
Table 5-16 – Predicted signs of coefficients obtained in literature and signs of the coefficients of the 
covariates obtained in the Cox regression extended model 
 
Only Size has a significant impact on the hazard rate, which can be seen from the p-
values. Carroll and Hannan (1989) explain that the density at founding has a positive 
impact on the mortality of organizations, and consequently on the hazard rate hˆ (t,X). In 
this case, the estimate of coefficient β for density at founding is negative. Concerning 
the other covariates, their impact is the same as previewed in literature, although the 
effect of contemporaneous density is not significant. 
 
So, we can conclude that contemporaneous density (the number of firms existing at the 
moment of the death) has a negative, though not significant, effect on the mortality of 
organizations. As expected, the effect of the size on firm’s mortality is also negative 
(and significant, in this case), confirming what was said before and helping to validate 
the simulation model.  
 
Taking the column Exp(βˆ ) as the predicted change in the hazard for a unit increase in 
the predictor, we can state that, for instance, the value of Exp(βˆ ) for Size, whose value 
is 0,775, means that an increase of one unit on size decreases the failure hazard in 0,775 
times, that is 22.5%. 
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5.6.3. Discussion: interpretation of simulation results and questions of 
validation 
 
The performance of the system is rather consistent when compared to reality. We have 
observed similar tendencies between simulated and real data that represent the evolution 
of the number of industries in this region79. This provides an argument for model 
adequacy.  
 
Furthermore, the signs of the covariates obtained with the survival analysis also confirm 
the capability of the model to reproduce the reality: the effect of the size on firm’s 
mortality is negative and statistically significant, confirming what was said in literature. 
The sign of the covariate contemporaneous density (DensCont) is also negative as in 
literature, but with no significance. 
 
In order to estimate the parameters of the density intervals, we have analysed the 
outputs of several runs of the simulation and retained some of the hypotheses that 
constitute the best solutions of the calibration process. The fitness that was used to 
determine the optimized solution is a combination of Manhathan and Growth distances 
(comparing simulated with real birth and death rates), as presented in Table 5-11.  
 
These solutions of CASOS cannot be confirmed because there is no available data for 
this kind of analysis covering Portuguese industry. So, a question arises whether this set 
of parameters is unique and stable or, alternatively, whether there is more than one 
solution. Having analysed our results, we can affirm that the solution is not unique since 
there is some variation in the combined fitness for different solutions, as showed in 
Table 5-11. We saw that the fittest solutions are contained in the following integer 
intervals for the survival and founding densities, age and size80: 
 
                                                 
79
 This similarity was confirmed for birth rates and for the total number of firms in some of the regions. 
We could not confirm the similarity between the simulated and real death rates. 
80
 We recall that DSl and DSu are respectively the lower and upper bounds of the density survival interval 
and DBl and DBu are respectively the lower and upper bounds of the founding (or birth) interval. Al and 
Sl are the size, and age lower thresholds. 
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DSl={3:5}; DSu={10:28};  DBl={2:4}; DBu={14:25}; Sl={1:4}; Al={1}   Equation 5-21 
 
These solutions define the hypothetical limits of the survival and founding intervals, age 
and size for this industrial region concerning the seven-year period between 1997 and 
200381. New firms are almost always accepted (because density birth interval is wide), 
but only some of them will survive: infant firms are most likely to fail almost when they 
born (the Age limit is 1) and firms that attain the age of 1 will prevail. The size limit is 
more tolerant: the lower limit Sl stands between 1 and 4 meaning that firms whose size 
is greater than 4 are more likely to survive in this region. The density survival (DS) 
levels lay between 3 and 28. These values constitute a legitimation limit established for 
the region.  
 
Analysing the real situation in what concerns the density (number of firms per square 
kilometrex10) in the recent past, we can observe that the real DSl limit is a little higher, 
but the DSu is within the interval (see Figure 5-13).  
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Figure 5-13 – Real evolution of density (firmsx10/Km2) in the four regions of the study (DSl and 
DSu limits are showed up for the region of AVE) 
 
All the regions of the study face a decrease in the organizational density, after a peak in 
2002 and the value that corresponds to the top of the legitimation level for the region of 
Ave (between 2001 and 2002) is equal to 25.  
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 All values of the density interval limits (DS and DB) were multiplied by ten. 
DSl DSu 
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5.6.4. Conclusions and progress 
 
Our aim with CASOS is to estimate the parameters of the density intervals that 
characterize the niche dimension for a particular industry. The outputs of several runs of 
the simulation were analysed and the hypotheses that constitute the best solutions of the 
calibration process were retained.  
 
An exact final solution has not been found, since some slight variations exist in the 
parameters as we saw in Equation 5.23. The complexity of the interactions among 
cellular automata generates differences in the final fitness and it is not possible to prove 
that a particular solution is always associated with the same fitness. We faced another 
problem: the simulated death rates that intervene in the Fitness function of the 
calibration process differ much from the real ones. 
 
Nevertheless, we obtained a range of solutions that are corresponding to reality: the 
solution of the DSu (density survival upper limit) that establishes the legitimation limit 
is within the real interval that was observed in last years. This limit has a particular 
interpretation in the light of organizational ecology theories presented in Chapter 2. 
According to the theory, after reaching a certain level of growth, the maximum level of 
legitimation is reached, and competition between firms starts to increase fast. 
Consequently, the growth rate decreases fast to zero and the density falls down to very 
low values. We think that this limit has been reached in the region of Ave, and therefore 
the density will decrease fast.  
 
For public and managerial policies this conclusion can help in the definition of political 
measures to stimulate the birth of new firms in the region, and to avoid others from  
disappearing.   
 
Some model improvements can be made in the future. For example, an alternative for 
the calculation of the fitness of the hypotheses (to avoid the great divergence between 
simulated and real death rates) can be achieved by minimizing the maximum of error 
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between rates. Therefore, instead of minimizing the half sum of the distances, as we saw 
in Equation 5-6, we could minimize the maximum of the distances:  
 
 { }dbi ddMinMaxh ,)( =ϕ     Equation 5-22 
 
 
This is actually a common method of Minimax to prevent aberrant values (namely in 
what concerns the death rates produced by the simulation) and can be used as an 
alternative to the computation of the distances that was used above. 
 
In the next chapter we present the second study, NetOrg, a more detailed Multi-Agent 
framework to analyse the dynamics of organizational survival in collaboration 
networks. 
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6. A Multi-Agent System for collaboration networks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, we propose a Multi-Agent framework to analyse the dynamics of 
organizational survival in cooperation networks. This approach uses microeconomic 
formalization and Multi-Agent systems. 
 
One of our aims is to study the effect of different collaboration82 strategies on the 
survival of firms. As we saw in the previous chapters, firms may share some resources 
and develop a cooperative behaviour in what concerns, for instance, research and 
development activities that relates with innovation. Innovation capabilities and 
                                                 
82
 The term collaboration is used to describe the main motivation for the association between firms. 
Sometimes cooperation and collaboration are used indistinctively, both indicating a certain type of 
assotiation between firms, although there is a clear difference between the two concepts, as it was 
introduced above in Chapter 3. The distinction between the two concepts is explored again later in 
Section 6.9. 
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technological sophistication are crucial in strategic alliances, so the connection between 
innovation and networking is of great importance83. 
 
In this chapter, we assume that firms may cooperate horizontally (in the same market) 
or vertically (with firms from other markets that may belong to the same supply chain). 
Cooperation decisions are based on cognitive and economic variables. A variant of the 
density dependence model has also been exploited here. To validate our model, we have 
used data obtained in previous studies presented in Chapter 4, and tested some 
hypotheses assotiated to realistic assumptions.  
 
We have observed that firms and networks proliferate in the regions with lower 
marginal costs, but new networks keep appearing and disappearing in regions with 
higher marginal costs. Simulatenously, we concluded that the diameter of networks 
decreases along time and transitiviy (the clustering coefficient of networks) tends to 
increase strongly in the inital life of neworks and decreases slowly in the end. 
 
In the following sections (6.1 to 6.8) we introduce the modelling approach, that is, the 
model components and their function as well as technical aspects of the simulation 
algorithm, namely the configuration of model parameters and implementation. We 
introduce the issues concerning the development and validation of the Multi-Agent 
System (MAS). The results and concluding remarks are given in Sections 6.9 and 6.10. 
 
6.1. The Modelling Approach  
 
According to evolutionary economics, firms innovate in order to increase their chances 
of survival. In fact, and as Schumpeter (1996 [1942]) emphasizes, innovation is a 
powerful vehicle for new firms to successfully enter the market and undermine the 
established firms. As well, established organizations need innovating to maintain their 
competitive position in the face of new and emerging or ‘disruptive’ technologies. Also, 
Baumol (2002) states that under capitalism, innovative activity becomes mandatory, a 
life-and-death matter for the firm and innovation has replaced price as the name of the 
game in a number of important industries. 
                                                 
83
 As introduced in Chapter 2, networks of knowledge, innovation and technology (KIT) are examples of 
networks that allow firms to have access to technological knowledge and innovation. 
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Some authors have related the process of innovation with the creation of networks of 
firms, using simulated environments: Carayol and Roux (2003) study innovation as a 
collective and interactive process that generates the formation of networks of 
organizations 84 . Wersching (2005) uses an Agent-Based model to study the 
technological development, the economic performance of firms and the evolution of 
agglomerations in differentiated industry85.  
 
In this work, we adopt the approach of Agent-Based computational economics 
(Tesfatsion, 2006), by assuming that the computational study of the economic processes 
is modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Alternatively, these problems 
could be partially solved by optimization, as it is currently done in mainstream 
economics.  
 
Using a MAS framework, where firms (the agents) may cooperate, we propose to 
analyse the dynamics of collective innovation. This framework is appropriate because 
we can simulate agents that can be configured to be autonomous, enabling to capture the 
dynamics (and the survival) in network formation through cooperation. 
 
Therefore, we have developed NetOrg, the Multi-Agent framework where the agents 
interact and constitute organizational networks for the purposes of innovation. This 
framework includes a microeconomic modelling, several strategies for cooperation, a 
cognitive model and a process of decision making.  
 
6.2. Model components 
 
6.2.1. The environment 
 
The environment includes a SxS grid where the firms are located (each firm in this grid 
has two coordinates). We have defined that S, the dimension of the square grid, is equal 
                                                 
84
 However, the approach from Carayol and Roux (2003) does not include many aspects as cognitive 
modelling and learning as we are going to implement in this essay. 
85
 We could mention some other works, as Zhang (2003), Gilbert et al. (2001), Cowan et al. (2004), 
Andras et al. (2006), Cortés and Sheremetov (2002), just to get a good overview of the application of 
those models. For studies on modelling the network structure, see Purchase and Olaru (2003). 
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to ten times the number of firms at the beginning of the simulation. Therefore, there will 
be enough room for the creation of new firms in the organizational environment. As we 
will see later, the number of initial firms is endogenous in the Multi-Agent System, 
being dependent on other parameters. The grid is divided in two regions: one with 
higher marginal costs, Region 1, and another with lower marginal costs, Region 2 (see  
 
Figure 6-1). Firms get born and die according to the levels of density and other 
parameters that are defined further in this section. Firms can also migrate between the 
two regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 – Space of NetOrg represented by a SxS grid 
Note: the dotted line divides two regions: one with higher marginal costs, Region 1, and another with 
lower marginal costs, Region 2 
 
6.2.2. The agents 
 
We considered three markets (X, Y1 and Y2). X is the final good market and Y1 and Y2 
are the intermediate good markets. The market X contains n firms, while markets Y1 
and Y2 contain, respectively, m1 and m2 firms. The total number of firms is 
N=n+m1+m2. Car makers, carburettors and clutches industries are examples of these 
three types of markets (as in Swaminathan, 2002).  
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
1
2
3 27 17
4 1
5 21 26 5
6 9
7
8 11 2 23
9
10 3
11 25
12 8 12
13 4
14 14 15
15
16
17 30 7
18 22 10
19 5 20
20 13
21 28
22 18 16
23
24
25
26 24 6
27
28 29
29
30
31
32
33 19
34
35
36
37
38
Region 1
Region 2
 171 
6.3. Microeconomic foundations 
 
6.3.1. Networks, knowledge creation and diffusion 
 
According to Watts and Strogatz (1998), a network of firms may be represented as a 
graph containing vertices (nodes) and edges (links, arcs, or connections)86. The nodes 
represent the firms in the network, while links represent the connections for the 
purposes of knowledge diffusion.  
 
For every market (X, Y1, Y2), we consider a different kind of knowledge (or stock of 
capital) represented by kti , the stock of knowledge owned by firm i (i ∈ X, Y1 or Y2) at 
time t that is necessary to produce its product. Links between the firms allow for the 
diffusion of knowledge (the technological know-how) among the firms in the network. 
The decision of establishing a link and the flow of the knowledge inside the network is 
weighted by the distance between the firms, as we will see later in this section.  
 
In this work, the nodes are not always connected (networks need not to be fully 
connected), that is, some part of the firms are linked to other firms. Figure 6-2 illustrates 
an example of a graph where four firms of different markets interact in a network: 
  
Figure 6-2 - Example of a graph representing a network of firms in markets X, Y1, and Y2. 
Note: nodes 12 and 4 represent sellers in market Y2, while node 7 represent a seller of market Y1. Node 2 
represents a buyer in market X. In further representations the identification of the markets and links will 
be deleted for illustration simplicity. 
                                                 
86
 In our model, although links have all the same weight, the distance between nodes is implicitly 
accounted for. In addition, our graphs are undirected (meaning that there is no implicit direction in the 
links). 
12 7 
2 
4 
Y2 
Y1 
Y2 
X 
a 
b 
c 
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We may relate the basic network of Figure 6-2 to a spatial representation in the grid as 
follows: 
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Figure 6-3 – Representation of a network in NetOrg’s grid space 
 
The links can be represented in a (symmetric) square matrix (or adjacency matrix) in 
which the intersection between two nodes is either zero, if there is no link between 
them, or a positive number representing the identification of the link, otherwise. For 
simplicity, we will not use the identification of the link, which will be just replaced by 
the value 1. 
 
 2 4 7 12 
2 0 c b a 
4 c 0 0 0 
7 b 0 0 0 
12 a 0 0 0 
Table 6-1 – Adjacency matrix of the links in the graph of Figure 6-3 
 
Knowledge creation and diffusion is the main goal of the network. Once a link between 
two firms is created, there is an immediate knowledge transfer among the firms in the 
network according to some rules (we will exploit the decision associated with the 
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creation of links later in Section 6.3.2). Therefore, for every firm i, at instant t, the 
accumulation of knowledge k at time t is given by: 
 
t
i
1t
i
t
i kkk ∆+=
−
 ,
      Equation 6-1 
 
in which ∆kti represents the variation of the stock of knowledge of firm i (i ∈ X, Y1 or 
Y2) at time t.  
 
Additionally, we have:   
∑
∈
δ+=∆
i\Nj
t
j
)j,i(dt
i
t
i wwk
t
,     Equation 6-2 
 
in which tiw  denotes the innovation of firm i (i ∈ X, Y1 or Y2) at time t and δ is the 
transferability factor (or spillover87), i.e., the parameter that measures the share of new 
knowledge which is effectively transmitted through the network. We denote by dt(i,j) 
the total distance between firms i and j at time t. 
 
We assume that wti is a function of the knowledge previously owned by firm i with a 
certain probability, p, specifically: 
pk)p,k(fw 1ti1titi −− ==      Equation 6-3 
 
in which p
 
is particular value of a variable P having a Normal distribution with the 
following characteristics: 
 
P
 
~ N(λ, 0.1λ) .      Equation 6-4 
 
Additionally, we will assume that λ differs according to each product or market. 
 
                                                 
87
 According to Scitovsky (1954), spillovers (or technological externalities) deal with the effects of non-
market interactions, being realized through processes that affect the production (or profit) function of a 
firm. Spillovers may respect to the diffusion of learning across firms, which can take place through 
interfirm mobility of employees or cooperation. 
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We consider, as in Carayol (2003), that there is no knowledge transmission (or 
diffusion) between firms that do not share a network connection. In other words, 
knowledge is only transferred through links that are established. Therefore: 
• if firms i and j do not share a network connection then: )j,i(d tδ = 0.  
• if firms i and j share a network connection then: )j,i(d tδ > 0. 
 
Additionally, we will assume that each firm in a particular market owns a stock of 
knowledge of its type, but may also have some skills on other types of knowledge. For 
instance, a final good producer (e.g. car makers) detains a specific stock of knowledge 
in its industry but may also hold some knowledge about intermediate good industries 
(e.g. carburettors or clutches suppliers). For each type of market, this knowledge is 
associated either with the product itself or with the production process. 
 
The networks discussed above may be generically called collaboration networks, as 
there is, in some cases, a common goal among the firms in the network concerning 
knowledge creation and dissemination. However, as we will see later, this common goal 
may not be explicit in the network. In the next section we introduce collaboration 
networks and the process of network creation. 
 
6.3.2. Cooperation/collaboration networks 
 
In our study, collaboration networks emerge from the need of creating and diffusing 
knowledge concerning R&D (Research and Development) activities. R&D can be 
defined as any project to answer to scientific or technological uncertainty meant to 
accomplish an advance in science or technology. Advances include new or improved 
products, processes or services. In general, R&D activities are performed by specialized 
units or centres belonging to firms, state agencies or universities.  
 
Collaboration networks may proceed by adopting a vertical or a horizontal connection. 
As we have said before, we assume that horizontal links are connections between firms 
within the same market, while vertical links are connections between firms from 
different markets. All vertical and horizontal links are called collaboration links or 
cooperation links, as they aim at relating firms in order to create and diffuse 
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technological know-how. Besides, there are other types of collaborations, such as 
cooperation in production, which we will not study in this work, as they are seldom 
observed. Furthermore, organizations establish production links in the normal 
production process of the supply chain concerning buyer/seller relationships or 
seller/seller relationships.  
 
As seen above, we consider three types of markets where X is the final good market and 
Y1 and Y2 are the intermediate good markets. In the final good market, there are 
consumers and firms (or final good producers), which, at the same time, are buyers at 
the intermediate good market. We can therefore consider the existence of three layers in 
this economic environment:  
Intermediate goods producers (or sellers) 
Final good producers (or buyers) 
Consumers  
Figure 6-4 shows a schematic example of a network, including examples of both types 
of connections and indicating the type of firms (buyers, sellers). 
 
 
Figure 6-4 – Schematic representation of a collaboration network with both horizontal and vertical 
links 
8 19 
2 
Y1 Y1 
X 
6 11 
Y2 Y2 
a b 
c 
d 
3 
X 
e 
α β 
f Sellers 
Buyers 
Consumers 
Market X 
Market Y1 
Legend: 
 
Firms  (firms 8 and 19 are in market 
Y1; firms 6 and 11 are in market Y2; 
firms 2 and 3 are in market X) 
 
 
Cooperation links (a, b, c, d, e, f);  
 a, b, e and f 
are horizontal 
links 
 c and d are 
vertical links 
8 
Market Y2 
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The evolution of networks is a matter of interest in our work, as one of our aims is to 
analyse the effect of cooperation/collaboration on the survival of firms. Therefore, we 
have followed the evolutionary paths of the networks and registered the entry and exit 
of firms in the network. In the following figures, networks are illustrated with 
cooperation links only. We just represent the cooperation links as they are the matter of 
concern in this work. 
 
Figure 6-5 illustrates the evolution of a particular network. At the beginning (we call it 
Step 1 or generation 1), it contains three firms (2, 4 and 7) from three different markets. 
The network included two vertical links connecting these three firms. In generation 2 
one new firm from market Y2 (firm 12) joins the network. In the third generation, firm 4 
left the network and other firm (firm 21) entered. The evolutionary path would continue 
until the disintegration of the network. 
 
Generation 1 Generation 2 Generation 3 
 
 
Figure 6-5 - Example of some generations of a network evolutionary process 
 
6.3.3. Technological and geographical space 
 
One of the most important aspects related with collaboration networks for innovation 
purposes is the distance between firms. Although the geographical distance is important 
for knowledge transmission (e.g. Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 
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1996), the non-geographical distance between firms may also be relevant. Some authors 
(e.g. D’Agata and Santangelo, 2004) call it cognitive or technological distance and it 
plays a major role in the effectiveness of knowledge transmission that can be generated 
in inter-firm networks. This technological distance represents the difference of the 
technological know-how between two organizations. Sometimes, this difference cannot 
be calculated explicitly, and so economists use proxy indicators to obtain a value close 
to the technological distance. One of these proxies is the stock of knowledge88. 
 
Therefore, we considered two types of distances that were combined into one weighted 
distance:  
(i) dgeo(i,j) represents the geographical distance between firms i and j, which is 
measured by the Euclidean distance;  
(ii) dtech, t(i,j) represents the technological (or cognitive) distance between firms i 
and j at time t, which is measured by the difference of firms’ stock of 
knowledge. 
 
More precisely, the geographical distance is computed as a normalized Euclidean 
distance where the distance between the coordinates of two firms (i and j) is divided by 
the maximum distance between any two firms: 
 
ji,))j,i(d(Max
)ji()ji()j,i(d geo
2
yy
2
xxgeo ≠∀
−+−
=
 .   Equation 6-5 
 
where (ix, iy) are the coordinates of firm i in the grid and (jx, jy) are the corresponding 
coordinates of firm j. Max (dgeo(i, j)) is the maximum distance between any two firms of 
the population. Therefore, due to the definition used, dgeo(i, j) has the following property 
in our simulation: 
 
0 < dgeo(i,j) ≤ 1,  ∀i≠j       Equation 6-6 
 
                                                 
88
 The concept of stock of knowledge is related to the stock of capital, that is, to the investment in skills 
and education or intellectual property and also investments in equipments, machinery, buildings, etc. For 
that reason, in this research, stock of knowledge and stock of capital are used as synonyms. 
 178 
dgeo is never null (otherwise two firms would have the same coordinates and occupy the 
same space in the grid) . The technological distance, dtec is computed as follows: 
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where tik  is the stock of knowledge owned by firm i at time t and )Max(k t.  is the 
maximum stock of knowledge owned by any firm. Additionally, we assume that firms 
do cooperate if the difference between their stocks of knowledge is neither too large nor 
too small. In fact, and according to D’Ágata and Santangelo (2004), a small cognitive 
distance allows greater comprehensibility, but yields redundant, novel knowledge. 
Conversely, a large cognitive distance allows limited comprehensibility, although 
yielding non-redundant, novel knowledge. Therefore, a certain degree of cognitive 
distance is needed since it ensures that firms can connect their cognitive frameworks 
and being innovative as well as they can easily communicate between each others.  
 
Actually, two limits were defined to deal with this restriction, a’ and b’, which are 
defined exogenously in the simulation. Equation (6.7) shows that dtech is a normalized 
distance, satisfying the following property: 
 
0 ≤ dtech(i,j) ≤ 1,  ∀i≠j .     Equation 6-8 
 
It is important to note that the technological distance between two firms may be null. 
The final weighted distance is obtained by the equation:  
 
dt(i,j) = [Wtech dtech, t(i,j)] + [Wgeo dgeo(i,j)].    Equation 6-9 
 
Without loss of generalisation, we have assumed here that Wtech = 0.75 and Wgeo = 0.25, 
which gives more importance to the technological distance than to the geographical one.  
 
Example: Consider two firms, 1 and 2, which have stock of knowledge of 21 and 23, 
respectively, while )Max(k t
•
= 5. Therefore, the technological distance is 0.4. If the 
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geographical distance between them is 0.1, then the total distance between firms 1 and 2 
is 0.175: 
 dt(1,2) = [0.75 * 0.2] + [0.25 * 0.1] = 0.175.  Equation 6-10 
 
6.3.4. Market demand 
 
We considered a final good industry consisting of n firms, each producing a variant of 
the product. Consumers are assumed to have love-for-variety preferences (Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977), where the representative consumer has the following utility function: 
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where Ati denotes the current attractiveness of final product variant i and xt1, …, xtn the 
consumption of each variety of final good. The parameter b stands for the inverse of the 
intensity of love for variety over the differentiated product. When b is close to one, 
varieties are close to perfect substitutes; when b decreases, the desire to spread 
consumption over all varieties increases. 
 
The standard love-for-variety approach assumes equal attractiveness of the variants. In 
our approach, we will assume that the attractiveness Ati depends on the accumulation of 
knowledge, that is, consumers are more attracted to varieties of the final products that 
are more innovative: 
Ati  = ∆k ti       Equation 6-12 
 
in which  ∆kti represents the variation of the stock of knowledge of firm i (i ∈ X, Y1 or 
Y2) at time t, as shown before in Equation 6-1. The utility function is maximized subject 
to the budget constraint (Varian, 1992): 
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      Equation 6-13 
 
where Rt
 
is the overall amount of money allocated by consumers at time t to purchase 
goods produced by this industry and tip  is the unit price that consumers pay for variety i 
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at time t. Straightforward calculations yield the following inverse demand function (or 
price) for market i: 
bn
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6.3.5. Cost structure and profit function 
 
Final-good producers (or buyers) transform intermediate goods, Y1 and Y2, through a 
fixed coefficient technology89.  
Therefore, the unit cost of production of each final-good producer (or buyer) is then 
given by: 
cti = c + t1 + t2 - ∆kit  
⇔  cti = = c + t1 +t2 - wti - ∑
∈
δ
i\Nj
t
j
)j,i(d w
t
 (i = 1, …, n)  Equation 6-15 
where c accounts for stand-alone marginal costs90 that are analogous for all buyers in 
the same region91 and ∆kti is the variation of the stock of knowledge explained above. 
 
Buyers’ profit function is therefore:  
piti = (pti - cti).xti - g(wti) (i = 1, …, n)    Equation 6-16 
 
where g(wti) is the cost needed to create knowledge. As it is typical in R&D literature 
(e.g. d' Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), we assumed that there are diminishing returns 
to knowledge expenditures, that is, g’(.) >0 and g’’(.) > 0. Without loss of generality, we 
will assume that g(wti) = 0.5(wti)2. 
 
Similarly, we assume that the inverse demand functions that intermediate-good 
producers (or suppliers) face are: 
                                                 
89
 A fixed coefficient technology implies that inputs Y1 and Y2 are combined into a constant ratio to one 
another. That is, each unit of X uses a fixed quantity of both intermediate goods Y1 and Y2, which are 
perfect complementary (Besanko and Braeutigam, 2005). 
90
 Marginal costs take under consideration the production technology and the prices of the production 
factors, such as price of capital and price of labour. 
91
 We have defined two regions to which we have associated marginal costs: region 1 has higher marginal 
costs than region 2. 
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for market Y1 and  
∑
=
=
2m
1j
t
j
t
jt
2 y
A
t         Equation 6-18 
for market Y2. 
 
The sellers’ unit production cost is given by: 
cti = c1  - ∆ki t = c1 - wti - ∑
∈
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  (i = 1, …, m1) Equation 6-19 
cti = c2  - ∆kit = c2 - wti - ∑
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 ,  (i = 1, …, m2) Equation 6-20 
 
where c1, c2 accounts for stand-alone marginal costs, which are similar for each type of  
sellers (Y1, Y2) in the same region. 
 
The sellers’ profit function is then given by:  
piti = (t1t - cti).yti - g(wti)  (i = 1, …, m1)   Equation 6-21 
piti = (t2t - cti).yti - g(wti),  (i = 1, …, m2),   Equation 6-22 
 
where yti represents the quantity produced by firm i at instant t. 
 
 
 
6.4. Decision making 
 
6.4.1. Entry/Exit and Organizational Survival  
 
The entry and exit in the market (birth and death processes) were defined by a variant of 
the density dependence model (Campos and Brazdil, 2005). According to this variant, 
which was already discussed in Chapter 5, the chances of a firm to get born or die 
depend on the number of firms that are located in its neighbourhood.  
 
So, the firm’s entry and exit will be modelled in the same manner that it was made in 
CASOS: if the number of living organizations in the neighbourhood of a specific firm 
 182 
belongs to the survival interval [DSl ; DSu], then the organization will have a higher 
probability to stay alive92. Otherwise it will tend to die by the effect of “overcrowding” 
or “solitude”, depending on whether the number is greater than DSu or lower than DSl, 
respectively. The same idea applies to the process of founding.  
 
Therefore, we have defined (in Equation 5.4), the following rules that determine the 
state ( tijδ ), of a firm i in region j: 
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We have also considered the same birth and death (entry and exit) function for each of 
the firm attributes - density survival, size, and age – that was presented in the Figure 
5-5, for which a probability of survival can be computed. 
 
Concerning the death of a firm ( tijδ =0), some other conditions have been introduced: a 
firm also dies if in addition to the conditions presented in Equation 5.3, one of the 
following situations happens: 
• Firm dies if it stays more than three consecutive periods in the situation of 
having a negative profit: 
 ( 000 3ti2ti1ti <pi∧<pi∧<pi −−− )     Equation 6-23 
• Firm dies if it is not recovered by the Network support function. Firms with 
small profit (more than three consecutive periods with negative profits) would 
normally fail, unless they have been recovered by their neighbours based on a 
function called Network support.  This function will be explained later in 
Section 6.3.7. 
 
The conditions for new firms to be born are the same of CASOS: if the number of living 
organizations in the neighbourhood of a specific firm belongs to the founding interval 
[DBl ; DBu], then a new organization will be born. Nevertheless, a new condition has 
                                                 
92
  As in Chapter 5, the parameters are defined by the same symbols: DSl and DSu are, respectively, the 
lower and upper bounds of the density survival interval and DBl and DBu are, respectively, the lower and 
upper bounds of the density founding interval. 
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been imposed for firms’ birth to take place in a certain neighbourhood (defined later as 
a parameter of the simulation): the mean profit of the neighbouring firms must be 
positive.  
 
A function named location93 was implemented in order to determine the exact location 
(coordinates) of the new firm in our simulated space. The new firm will be associated 
with a certain product (X, Y1 or Y2), and will hold the stock of knowledge, kti . In our 
simulation a random process defines all these parameters. 
 
 
6.4.2. Creation and spread of innovation  
 
As stated before, innovation at time t, defined by wti depends on the knowledge 
accumulated by the firm (Equation 6-3). In line with empirical evidence, we assumed 
that all firms with positive profits would invest in R&D. That is, if 01ti >pi − , for a 
particular period time t, then the innovation tiw  will not be null.  
 
We have considered that in all generations of the evolution of networks, innovation is 
increased by a value, p, coming from a Normal distribution. This model is in line with 
the work of Carayol and Roux (2003), in which networking allows the flow of R&D 
innovation to spread within a network and, consequently, to increase the stock of 
knowledge of other firms that are connected in the same network. 
 
6.4.3. Collaboration/Cooperation Networks 
 
Cooperation is considered to be a bilateral process where a single firm can choose only 
one partner (another firm) to cooperate with. So, the decision to cooperate is determined 
by the two firms involved. In some cases, we can admit that a group of firms (more than 
two) can join together at the same time and form a cooperation network. 
 
                                                 
93
 The birth process is associated with the density in the region of a particular firm i. Therefore the new 
entrant firm is located close to firm i. Details about the implementation of the simulation algorithm, 
NetOrg, will explained in Sections 6.5 to 6.7 
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In the description of the strategies, refer that they are neither complementary nor 
alternatives. In addition, the decision of the strategy to use does not depend on the 
firms. The choice of the strategy is exogenous in the simulation. We use different 
strategies and compare their impact on economical indicators (such as profit and 
knowledge stock) and on the survival of the firms. 
 
There are two phases concerning the cooperation process in which firms can link 
together to form a network: the selection of the partner and the network formation. In 
the following we give several alternatives of these phases as different possibilities that 
firms can pursue in order to initiate cooperation. After that, in Section 6.9, these phases 
are combined to form different cooperation strategies94.  
 
A. Selection of the partner:  
 
A1. Preferential meeting process  
The selection of the partner in the network can be done by the preferential meeting 
process (Carayol and Roux, 2003; Campos, et al. 2006). In the preferential meeting 
process, we have defined a meeting affinity, mti,j, between two firms, in which firm i 
chooses the firm j that maximizes the value mti,j = [1-dt(i,j)]. In this expression, dt(i,j) 
represents the pooled (geographical and technological) distance between i and j. By this 
approach, we intend to capture the influence of both geographical and technological 
distance on the formation of networks, which is evidenced in empirical research (e.g. 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). 
 
A2. Average stock scenario  
Since the profit of firm i at time t depends on its stock of knowledge ( tik ) - which is 
improved by cooperation -, an alternative to the preferential meeting process is to select 
a partner that is already linked with other firms (the most linked one). After that, its 
expected growth is computed to see if the stock of knowledge is increasing. This 
                                                 
94
 The several alternatives considered in these two phases have been inspired in the literature (an 
overview of previous work is present later on). Strategies are neither complementary nor alternative. In 
addition, the strategy to adopt does not depend on the decisions of firms. We define different strategies 
independently and compare their impact on economical indicators (such as profit and knowledge stock) 
and on the survival of firms. 
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process is based on the perspective of rational choice from Simon (1955)95  and is 
systematized as follows: 
 The most linked firm is selected as a potential partner96; 
 Then, to decide about the formation of a network, we compute the increase 
on the stock of knowledge in the following way: 
 
(i) Let j be the selected potential partner to form a network with firm i in 
this process; let 1tjk
−
 be the stock of knowledge of j at ime t-1 (last 
generation). Then, the rate of variation of the stock of capital for firm j 
between time t-1 and t-2 is given by: 
1
k
k
v 2t
j
1t
j
j −=∆
−
−
     Equation 6-24 
 
(ii) Two expected scenarios for the increase of the stock of knowledge 
can then be computed by firm j for the actual period (t and t-1): either the 
increase is greater than ∆vj (let’s say, 10%), or it will be lower than ∆vj 
(again 10%). An estimate of the average scenario is made by pooling the 
two situations with a factor φ1: 
1) 1tjk −  ∆vj * 1.1     Equation 6-25 
2) 1tjk −  ∆vj * 0.9     Equation 6-26 
 
As a result, in the average scenario, the growth of the stock of knowledge 
at time t, defined by E( tjk ), is computed as the expected value for a 
discrete variable, as follows: 
E ( tjk ) = φ1( 1tjk −  ∆vj . 1.1) + (1−φ1)( 1tjk −  ∆vj . 0.9)  Equation 6-27 
 
                                                 
95
 This strategy could be called Reinforcement strategy as individuals tend to adopt actions that yielded a 
high payoff in the past, and avoid actions that yielded a low payoff. This is the standard learning model in 
behavioural psychology that has gained the attention of economists. As in imitative models, payoffs 
describe choice behaviours but it is “one’s owns past payoffs that matter, not the payoffs of others” 
(Young, 1998), as we have seen back in Chapter 3. 
96
 If more than one most linked firm exist, then one is chosen at random among firms in that condition.  
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Therefore, the decision of cooperation between firms i and j is based on 
the comparison between the expected value, E ( tjk ), and the growth rate 
of the stock of knowledge of firm i, ∆vi, as we given later in B.1.2. 
 
 
B. Network formation 
 
B1. Individual decision for integration in new/previous network 
We considered several forms of decision for the integration of a firm in a network: 
resource complementarity, expected growth of the stock of capital and the concentration 
process. 
 
B1.1. Stock ratio complementariness 
 
Stock ratio complementariness is a simple process in which two firms collaborate if 
they are able to reciprocally compensate some lack of profitability in the stock of 
knowledge (measured by the ratio piti / tik ) concerning some product. This process is 
inspired in the common sense idea of cooperation. For example, if firm i has higher 
profitability in the stock of knowledge than firm j, regarding product Y1, but firm j has 
higher profitability in the stock of knowledge than firm j regarding product Y2, then 
they can collaborate in exchanging knowledge concerning a new kind of product or 
process that may increase the quantities they both produce. This process can be defined 
by the following rule:   
 if (piti / tik ,Y1)> (pi
tj / tjk ,Y1) and (pi
t
i / tik ,Y2)< (pi
tj / tjk ,Y2) then ⇒  
⇒ firms i and j collaborate on Y1, Y2 .    Equation 6-28 
 
In this example, tik ,Y1 represents the stock of knowledge of firm i at time t concerning 
specifically product Y1. Generically tik ,Ys represents the stock of knowledge concerning 
product s (with s = X, Y1, Y2).  In the following table we give two examples in which 
we observe the conditions that drive to the collaboration between two firms: 
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Cooperating 
firms 
Product profit / stock of knowledge  
 
Region 
 
# Firm i Firm j Firm i Firm j piti / kti,Y1 pitj / ktj,Y1 piti / kti, Y2 pitj / kti, Y2 Firm i Firm j 
1 1 24 1 3 25.73 40.56 44.83 35.62 2 1 
2 2 24 1 3 16.31 22.32 28.05 19.56 2 1 
Table 6-2– Examples (identified as #1 and #2) of two firms that collaborate in stock ratio 
complementariness 
 
In this example, the first line represents a situation in which firms i = 1 and j = 24 
(producing products 1 and 3, respectively), have a complementary ratio of Profit / 
Knowledge Stock. In fact, considering product Y1, the ratio for firm i is smaller than the 
corresponding ratio for firm j (piti / kti,Y1 = 25.73 while for firm j is pitj / ktj,Y1 = 40.56). 
Meanwhile, considering product/process Y2, the situation is opposite: the ratio for firm i 
is greater than the corresponding ratio for firm j: piti/kti,Y2 = 44,83 while for firm j the 
corresponding ratio is pitj/ktj,Y2 = 35.62. So, in this case, the firms decide to collaborate. 
 
B1.2. Greater Expected Value  
 
This process is associated with the decision made in A2. Firm i decides to collaborate 
with firm j if the expected growth of the stock of knowledge for firm j, E ( tjk ), is greater 
than the growth of the stock of knowledge for firm i (∆vi).  
 
(i) If E ( tjk )>∆vi then cooperate; 
(ii) If E ( tjk )≤∆vi then do not cooperate. 
 
B1.3. The concentration process  
 
In the concentration process, the most linked firm is selected as a potential partner. 
Here, every firm will choose the most linked partner to collaborate with. No other rules 
interfere in the choice of the partner This is simply the choice of the firm that has more 
connections with other firms, also known as the “rich gets richer” paradigm of Barabasi 
(2002). 
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B1.4. Profit evaluation 
 
This approach was derived from Carayol and Roux (2003) and is based in the profit 
evaluation of the extended (or reduced) network, that is to say, the profit of the network 
considering the inclusion or the exclusion of nodes in the network. We denote by G the 
network containing i and j. Through the profit evaluation process, a new link between i 
and j is created if the profit of firm i in case j joins the network, denoted by piti(G+j), is 
greater than the profit of firm i in case j doesn’t join the network, piti(G).  
Simultaneously, the profit of j in case i joins the network,  pitj(G+i), must be greater than 
the profit of j in case i doesn’t join the network, pitj(G).  Therefore, the decision process 
of creating a link between firms i and j can be formalized as follows: 
 
if piti (G)< piti (G+j) ∧ pitj(G)<pij(G+i) then a link between i and j is created.   
Equation 6-29 
 
Along with the same idea, a link between i and j is not created or is deleted (if it already 
exists) if the profit of i in the current network in case j is in the network is lower than 
the profit of i in case j is deleted from the network, denoted by piti(G-j). Simultaneously, 
the profit of j in case i is in the network must be lower than the profit of j in case i is 
deleted from the network, that is, pitj(G-i). The decision of not creating a link (or deleting 
it) is made according to the following rule: 
 
if piti(G)<piti(G-j) and pitj(G)< pitj(G-i) then a link is not created or is deleted in the 
case where it already exists      Equation 6-30 
 
 
We have adapted the original model from Carayol and Roux (2003) by introducing the 
following restriction: firms which are looking for a partner to cooperate with must have 
a stock of knowledge value, tjk , smaller than the average stock of knowledge of all 
firms within that market. Table 6-3 illustrates this process with an example from the 
simulation algorithm. 
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Cooperating 
firms 
Product 
Firm i Firm j Firm i Firm j 
 
piti (G) 
 
piti (G+j) 
 
pitj(G) 
 
pitj(G+i) 
 
kti 
 
E(kt) 
15 1 2 1 5.355 72.484 205.009 212.470 0.581 0.584 
Table 6-3– Example of collaborations between firms in Profit evaluation 
Note: in this table, E(Kt)=0.584 represents the average value of the stock of knowledge for product Y2 
 
As we can see in this example, firms 15 and 1 are able to create a link because the profit 
of i in case j joins the network (or the extended profit of i, piti(G+j)), is greater than the 
profit of i in case j doesn’t join the network, piti(G). At the same time, pitj(G+i) is greater 
than piti(G). In this example, the profit of firm 15, piti=15(G), is computed by ignoring the 
existence of the firm j. The extended profit piti(G+j) is computed as follows (with i=15 
and j=1): 
 
pit15 (G+1)= (t1t - c1 + ∆ t15k + )1,15(d
tδ .wt
1
).yt15 - g(wt15) .   Equation 6-31 
 
Assuming that firm 15 is a seller, this equation is obtained from equations 6-19 to 6-22. 
The equation of the extended profit of firm 15 (by including firm 1 in its network) is 
therefore equal as the usual profit, except that expression )1,15(d
tδ .wt
1
 is added to the rest 
of ∆ t15k , (the stock variation), increasing the profit by ( )1,15(d
tδ .wt
1
) yt15. 
 
To delete the link between i and j, we should have piti(G) < piti(G-j) and pitj(G)<pitj(G-i). In 
that case, the decreased profit, piti(G-j), would be computed as follows:  
 
pit15 (G-1)= (t1t - c1 + ∆ t15k - )1,15(d
tδ .wt
1
).yt15 - g(wt15) .  Equation 6-32 
 
In this case, the expression )1,15(d
tδ .wt
1
 was deleted from the rest of ∆ t15k , (the stock 
variation), decreasing the profit in ( )1,15(d tδ .wt
1
) yt15. In addition, we can confirm, in this 
case, that the restriction that we have introduced is satisfied, i.e., that the stock of capital 
of firm 15, associated with product Y2 (kti = 0.581), is smaller than the average stock of 
knowledge for product Y2, E(kt) = 0.584. 
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B2. Collective formation 
As we will see later in Section 6.9, some networks are formed as a consequence of a 
collective will. In these collective initiatives, a group of organizations creates a network 
by joining at the same time. Collective contracts can exist in these types of networks. 
Links are created at the same time for all firms that belong to this group. In our 
simulation we assume that collective networks can be formed just once and can dissolve 
after the final of the collective contract. One example of such a process of collective 
formation is the groups of suppliers (see Chapter 2) in which the creation of a collective 
network represent an interesting opportunity for all the cooperating firms to organize 
more efficiently their supplies. 
 
We will distinguish two types of collective formation of networks: collaboration 
networks in which there is a common goal for the whole network and cooperative 
networks in which a common goal does not explicitly exist. 
 
B2.1 Collaboration networks 
 
In collaboration networks there is a common goal to all members of the network. To 
form this network, firms agree in setting up a collective contract that lasts for a 
predefined time interval, during which no new members are accepted. 
 
B2.2. Cooperative networks  
 
Cooperative networks are similar to collaboration networks except that for new 
members that want to enter the network. In these cases, they must negotiate directly 
with one of the members of the network via Stock ratio complementariness (B1.1). A 
contract may exist if the parameter contract is active in the simulation algorithm.  
 
Virtual Enterprises  
 
We have also introduced the possibility of network formation in which the transactions 
costs are lower and the physical distance between the elements of the networks has less 
importance. This is the case of e-Marketplaces, that we can consider as a particular case 
of a virtual enterprise in which a temporary alliance of enterprises is created. It consists 
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of tasks performed by autonomous teams of small and medium enterprises (Camarinha-
Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2004).  
 
To explore this type of relationships we used both types of collective formation: 
collaboration networks and cooperation networks, because they represent two important 
models of B2B e-Marketplaces (see Appendix IV). 
 
The main differences between these virtual collective networks and the former 
collective formation process lay in the pyisical distance which is not taken into account 
in the choice of the partner. Only the technological distance matters. Therefore, the 
distance between firms i and j, dt(i,j), is given by equation Equation 6-33, 
 
dt(i,j) = dtech, t(i,j),      Equation 6-33 
 
where dtech is given by Equation 6-7. 
 
Contracts 
 
The creation of a new link between firms may involve the definition of a contract. In 
our simulation the existence of a contract is configured as a parameter with two 
possibilities: Contract / No contract. In the case when the contract option has been 
activated, firms will maintain the link that connects them, until the end of the contract. 
In the case of no contract, the link between the firms may be deleted when the 
conditions for the link are no longer justified. For instance, in the negotiation type B1.1, 
the link will be dropped if stock ratio complementariness is no longer observed.  
 
There are cases where the existence of a contract may not imply the maintenance of a 
link. When a firm fails, all links connecting the firm that fails to other firms disappear. 
Nevertheless, to avoid the death of a firm, and the consequent elimination of its links, 
we may assume a mechanism of collective altruism, that we will call the Network 
backup or Network support. Firms that are linked to the failing firm are normally 
interested in its survival.  We will adopt a similar situation in our simulation. This 
mechanism will be explained in detail later in Section 6.4.8. 
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6.4.4. Production quantities    
 
In economic literature, every final product producer i must decide about the 
quantities tiX  that will produce at time t, having in mind the maximization of the profit. 
However, as firms have limited information about the demand function and other 
competitors’ production costs, we have used a heuristic approximation to determine 
their output quantity: 1tii
t
i xx
−α= . We assume that at the beginning of the simulation, 
firms have null profits. In the following generations, we admit that when the profit of 
firm i is positive, the output quantities increase by a factor α , which relates with market 
dynamics: 
 ( ) 1t
i
1t
i1t
ii
c
p1
−
−
−ε−=α        Equation 6-34 
where iε  is the price elasticity of demand
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 of final product i: 
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We assumed that intermediate good products are combined into a fixed proportion in 
the production of final good x: 
 x = min (y1, y2) 
Therefore, buyers’ demand quantity of each intermediate product98 is: 
y1 = y2 = x 
 
So, from Equation 6-17 and Equation 6-18 and since y1 = y2 = x, then the prices of 
inputs are given by: 
                                                 
97
 The price elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of the quantity demanded by consumers to the 
price (Besanko and Braeutigam, 2005). 
98
 That is, if buyers produce 10 units of final good X, then they will use 10 units of each intermediate 
product, Y1 and Y2. 
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6.4.5. Migration 
 
In our simulation, firms are placed in two different regions: Region 1, with higher 
marginal costs and Region 2, with lower marginal costs. Firms are allowed to migrate in 
order to increase their profit99.   
For now, only firms with negative profits and older than one period may migrate, in 
order to overcome their bad situation. Migration results will be analysed in Section 6.9. 
 
6.4.6. Cognitive modelling  - Learning, Network support and Risk  
 
As we have presented in Section 3.3, our aim is that the agent simulates diverse 
cognitive activities, in which we can distinguish beliefs, intentions and desires (the 
BDI-architecture). The learning component interacts with this mental configuration as 
all learning relates to beliefs (Ferber, 1999) and desires. In the following paragraphs, we 
will describe the learning mechanism that was implemented in the architecture of the 
agents, and some of the attributes that characterize them: one individual attribute, the 
risk, and one collective attribute, named Network support. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99
 Only two regions were consdeired, for reasons of model simplification. 
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Learning  
 
We have implemented a learning mechanism to give to agents the capability of forming 
certain beliefs of the world where they exist. This belief is related with the formation of 
a network, more specifically with the decision to cooperate with a particular partner.  
 
When links between firms exist, the firms can share information about the most and the 
least successful partners. A “so called” successful partner should be a stable partner, 
that is, it should be linked for a long time to other firms, in order to maintain 
cooperation and increase the profit100. This attribute of persistence of the partner j for a 
firm i will be defined as )j,i(P . 
 
Firm i that may or may not be linked to other firms in the network, can therefore decide 
to establish a link with a new partner (say, firm j), based on information about the 
success that firm j has already experienced with other firms. This information exists for 
all link and includes the identification of the partner j, its level of the stock of 
knowledge, ktj, and its profit, pitj. 
 
The learning algorithm that was implemented in agents’ architecture is the instance-
based learning. The algorithm looks for similar related actions retrieved from memory 
and use them to decide about the new action to adopt. This method is explained in 
Figure 6-6. 
                                                 
100
 We will see later that firms that cooperate have higher profits, in average. Simultaneously, long-term 
links increase average duration of life of firms involved. 
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Figure 6-6 – Steps of instance-based learning algorithm 
 
The results of the learning mechanism are given in Section 6.9. 
 
Attitude to risk 
We have implemented a very simple cognitive model of entrepreneurship101 to endow 
agents (firms) with more reactivity. Following Leibenstein (1969), we distinguish two 
kinds of entrepreneurship: routine (or conservative) and new type (or adventurous). 
Adventurous firms establish new connections with other markets, create and expand 
                                                 
101
 Entrepreneurship is the practice of starting new organizations, particularly new businesses generally in 
response to identified opportunities (often a difficult undertaking, as a majority of new businesses fail). 
Instance-based learning algorithm 
 
 Given a particular pair of firms, a, including  fi (the cooperating firm) and 
fj (the partner with whom is expecting to cooperate): 
(i)   Identify the total number of pairs p considering all existing 
firms (f1, the cooperating firm and f2, the partner) that established 
links to other firms in past actions; 
(ii)   Repeat for all pairs of linked firms, p: 
 Compute the average Euclidean distance d(a,p) between the 
actual pairs (fi, fj) and pairs from past actions (f1, f2) using 
profit and the stock of knowledge: 
2
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 Compute the persistence of the links, )f,f(Pˆ 21 , i.e. their 
average duration. 
(i) Taking into account the distance d(a,p), the k nearest 
neighbours p of a will be selected (a limit is previously defined).  
(ii) The algorithm returns the average value of the persistence 
of the links of the k nearest neighbours of a:  
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1)j,i(Pˆ    Equation 6-35 
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activities and are attracted to risk in their decisions, while, in general, conservative 
entrepreneurs avoid risk.   
 
For that reason, we have introduced a discrete attribute associated with the attitude to 
risk, in order to control the decisions of the agents involved in the simulation. In our 
simulation, the attitude to risk involves the decisions associated with migration and with 
avoiding other firms from failure:  
(i) Adventurous firms migrate to a different region when they 
are in a difficult situation and  
(ii) Adventurous firms are determined to save other firms from 
failure, even if it increases their costs.  
 
An attribute “risk level” was used to represent the attitude to risk assigned to each firm. 
We consider that the risk level takes discrete values within the interval [1, 10]. 
Conservative firms have a negative attitude to risk and therefore are associated to risk 
levels under 5, while adventurous have risk levels greater than or equal to 5. A random 
risk level is assigned to each firm and remains the same throughout its lifetime.  
 
Network support 
 
In some types of networks, essentially in those where a common goal exists, collective 
efforts are done in order to save firms from failing. This actually constitutes one of the 
advantages for firms integrating networks, since intense relationships are established 
between firms of the same network.  
 
Although in some situations this network support could be considered a type of 
altruism, we prefer not to call it that way. Actually, we observe that firms which decide 
to save other firms (in the same network) from failure are simultaneously helping 
themselves, since maintaining the network active provides a safeguard or guarantee to 
the firm in question. 
 
The way how we have implemented this network support in NetOrg is simple: if this 
mechanism (as well as birth and death parameters) is active, and if any firm, say, A, is 
about to get extinct due to the predefined conditions (expressed back in Section 6.4.1.), 
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then a collective effort is made to help firm A. These efforts are made by the 
adventurous firms (i.e., firms with a positive attitude to risk) that are connected to A. 
These efforts consist in transferring some of their knowledge, materialized under the 
form of stock of capital, to the failing firm. 
 
In the next sections, we focus on technical aspects of the simulation algorithm, namely 
the model evaluation, generic issues about communication between agents, the 
configuration of model parameters, implementation and issues concerning software for 
MAS. In Section 6.9 the results are provided. 
 
 
6.5. Communication between agents 
 
Communication between agents is of great importance in Agent-Based simulation. Our 
framework does not include protocols as KQML or ACL that were referred to in 
Section 3.3. However, we define other levels of communication that motivate individual 
and collective actions of agents. These levels do not take into account any formal 
protocol. 
 
 Group communication  
Agents react to the presence of other agents and to the conditions of the 
environment; migration is an action driven by rules used by agents when evaluating 
the environment within the beliefs, desires and intentions architecture; Network 
Support (a kind of an altruistic mechanism) is a collective action that is undertaken 
in order to save a partner firm from failure.  
 
 Individual (peer-to-peer communication)  
Agents search for the best partner for cooperation; in this search the agent takes into 
account the distance between both and the type of partner. For an agent to be aware 
of others and to be able to take this kind of decisions, we endow the agents with 
individual communication capability.  
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6.6. Simulation algorithm 
 
In this section, the simulation algorithm is presented both using an outline of the 
pseudo-code and a flowchart.  
 
 
 
 
Pseudo-code of NetOrg (outline) 
1. Initialization  
1.1. Initialization of general parameters 
1.2. Definition of the number of firms and consumers 
1.3. Creation of firms 
1.3.1. Firms are placed in the grid 
2. Cycle (iteration cycle for a fixed number of generations) 
2.1. Knowledge and financial indicators and cooperation decision 
2.1.1. Innovation and knowledge accumulation 
2.1.2. Market Demand and other financial indicators 
2.1.3. Cooperation (according to a predefined strategy) 
2.2. Migration 
2.3. Production Quantity and Age 
2.4. Birth and Death  
2.4.1. Death 
2.4.2. Birth  
 2.4.2.1. Location 
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Figure 6-7 – Flowchart of the NetOrg simulation algorithm. Steps in shaded boxes are associated 
with the cognitive model. The algorithm runs for 10 or 20 generations (iterations). 
 
Initialization of parameters and 
creation of firms and comsumers 
Iteration 
cycle  
Number of. 
generations 
reached? 
no yes 
STOP 
Knowledge 
Accumulation 
from the 
network 
Repeat for all living 
agents in the 
simulation 
Computation 
of Financial 
Indicators 
Conditions 
for 
cooperation 
reached ? 
 
Find a partner 
A link with 
this partner 
already 
exists? 
Maintain  
the link? Create a link? 
yes no 
no 
yes 
Set a contract 
duration? 
 
 
no yes 
Increase de 
duration of the 
link 
yes 
no 
yes no 
Firm dies? 
yes no 
New firms are 
born? 
yes no 
Decision about  
future production 
quantities 
Decision about 
future investment in 
R&D/innovation 
 
Cooperation 
strategy 
Decision about  
migration of the 
firm 
Decision about  
location of the firm 
 200 
 
6.7. Implementation and Software for MAS  
 
 
Our simulation has been implemented using R, a language and environment for 
statistical computing and graphics (R Development Core Team, 2005). R can be 
considered as a different and free implementation of S which was developed at Bell 
Laboratories (formerly AT&T, now Lucent Technologies) by John Chambers and 
colleagues (Becker and Chambers, 1985). Some important differences between S and R 
exist, but much code written for S runs unaltered under R.  
 
There are, of course, specific languages for MAS that could have been used in this 
work102, but we preferred to use R as various statistical computations are needed and so 
we exploited various functions from statistical libraries103.  
 
The simulation contains the following programs and functions created by the author: 
 NetOrg, v. 4.7 (the main program), which runs the whole simulation and 
includes the following functions: 
o Firmdeath: determines if death occurs according to the survival 
probability defined under the density dependence model; 
o location: determines the place (coordinates) in the space for a 
newborn firm; 
o LearningCooperationDecision: defines whether the firm 
cooperates according to instance-based learning;  
o DecisionPartners: defines whether the firm that is about to 
get extinct can be rescued by the Network Support mechanism; 
o generateGraph104: depicts graphs, according to the adjacency 
matrix. 
                                                 
102
 Examples of specific software and frameworks for MAS are JADE, Swarm, Ascape, Netlogo, etc. 
103
 One of the most useful R libraries that we use in NetOrg is the Igraph library developed by Gabor 
Csardi, Csardi (2005) from the KFKI University in Budapest. IGraph contains functions for generating 
regular and random graphs according to known algorithms and models in the network theory literature. A 
set of structural property calculation functions like diameter, transitivity, etc. are also included.  
104
 We are grateful to Kaustubh R. Patil  for helping us to with the implementation of this function. It 
needs the library Rgraphviz, which interfaces R with the AT&T GraphViz library to provide the ability 
for plotting R graph objects from the graph package. 
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Besides, NetOrg also calls another program (Network Analysis for NetOrg), 
in order to organize the information about the networks. In fact, it is a difficult task to 
follow which network is which because they are dynamic entities that are continuously 
changing their shape105.  
 
To help in the organization of the output data for specific purposes, as survival analysis 
and some statistical tests, other functions have been created by the author, as 
Survival and LinkStability. In the Appendix III we include function 
Firmdeath as an example of a function that has been used in NetOrg.  
 
6.8. Identification of the hypotheses and model validation  
 
Considering the main observations that were identified earlier in this work considering 
three different industries, we have built a table that systematizes all this information and 
makes a correspondence with the general questions of Chapter 4. 
                                                 
105
 In some cases it was too difficult to follow the evolution of networks and to distinguish which network 
is which. For instance, if a network breaks apart, producing two different networks in the following 
generation, then we consider that the network keeping the majority of the nodes of the breaking network 
is the same network that broke apart. Therefore it keeps the same identification. If two networks merge 
into one only, then we consider that the resulting network maintains the identification of the network that 
contains the most part of the nodes (between the two merging networks). 
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Specific 
Hypothesis 
 
Observations/Evidences obtained 
from literature 
 
Test applied  
 
Correspondence 
with general 
questions 
presented in  
Table 4-1 
H21 Buyers promote both a concentration of 
suppliers and room for creating important 
collaborations and alliances with suppliers 
and among suppliers and buyers; Networks 
are formed and several topologies are 
observed. 
Empirical 
observation  
 
H22 Some collaborative firms have increased 
their profits because of the reduction of 
costs due to the rationalization of some of 
their functions [through collaboration via 
network formation]. 
 
Mann-Whitney Test 
G4 
H23 Migration of firms to markets with lower 
marginal costs is as a way to rationalize 
production 
 Empirical 
observation 
 
H24 Contemporaneous density has a negative 
impact on the mortality of organizations 
Survival Analysis G1 
H25 Density at founding has a positive impact 
on the mortality of organizations 
Survival Analysis G1 
 
H26 Contemporaneous density (of networks) 
has a negative impact on the mortality of 
the networks 
Survival Analysis G2 
H27 Density at founding (of networks) has a 
positive impact on the mortality of the 
networks 
Survival Analysis G2 
H210 Contemporaneous density has a negative 
impact on the mortality of networks 
Survival Analysis G3  
H211 Density at founding has a positive impact 
on the mortality of networks 
Survival Analysis G3  
H28 Firms that have long-term relationships 
with other firms will live longer, in average 
Mann-Whitney Test G7 
 
H29 If the distance between two firms is short, 
they will have a higher tendency to 
cooperate horizontally; if the distance 
between two firms is high, they will have a 
higher tendency to cooperate vertically 
 
Mann-Whitney Test 
G8 
Table 6-4 – Summary of the Hypothesis that will be tested with NetOrg 
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Hypothesis H24, H25, H26, H27 and H210 and H211 are similar in what concerns the type of 
analysis. However, the levels of analysis are distinct: while H24, H25, H26, H27 are tested 
considering the same level of analysis (only firms or only networks), hypotheses H210 
and H211 measure the impact of firms in the survival analysis of networks. 
 
These hypotheses are going to be tested as a part of the process of model validation. As 
presented in Section 3.3.3, validation is important as it provides a way of obtaining the 
credibility of the simulation model. Our research methodology presents a practical way 
to evaluate the model by comparing simulation outputs and empirical studies in order to 
verify that the model is able to reproduce some historical data of the target industry.   
 
In NetOrg, validation of the model includes the following steps: 
(i) Analyse the impact of different parameter values in the 
simulation; this step is important to define the initial values 
for simulation parameters and corresponds to the stage 1 of 
the two stage research methodology presented in Figure 4.3. 
This step is carried out in Section 6.9.1. 
(ii) Run the model for different cooperation strategies and 
analyse if there is consistency between simulation outputs 
and empirical studies. The testing of some hypotheses that 
reproduce reality (presented above in table 6.4) can be used 
to analyse this consistency. This is done in Sections 6.9.2, 
6.9.3. and 6.9.4 
(iii) Explore more general questions about cooperation networks 
and industrial evolution, as the performance of the strategies, 
the evolution of network indicators, and the identification of 
evolutionary patterns. To achieve this goal we used Data 
Mining techniques as decision trees, and Multivariate Data 
Analysis Techniques presented in Sections 6.9.2 and 6.9.5.  
 
Our aim is to carry out validation and check whether all these three steps have been 
satisfied. 
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6.9. Experimental results 
 
NetOrg is a Multi-Agent model that has been used to capture the survival as well as the 
general dynamics of the network formation. The results given in this section are the 
outcome of the average of more than 100 different runs of the simulation where, in 
some cases, we have taken one representative output to illustrate the evolution of the 
graphs representing networks of firms.  
 
We start by defining and initializing all the parameters that are necessary to run the 
simulation. After that, we analyse and compare the collaboration strategies that 
reproduce networks’ literature. In this analysis we use non parametrical tests and 
decision trees to compare the performance of networks and survival analysis (through 
Cox Regression) to explore the impact of some variables on the mortality of 
organizations and networks. Finally, multivariate techniques are exploited to analyse the 
relevance of the variables on the evolution of the organizational networks.  
 
6.9.1. Model parameters 
 
 
Configuration  
We have defined a set of parameters considering that industry X would represent a 
buyer and industries Y1 and Y2 its suppliers. The marginal cost was defined differently 
for the three types of industries: marginal costs in region 2 were half of the 
corresponding values in the region 1.  
 
In the following tables, we present the initial configuration of parameters. Table 6-5 
presents the user defined parameters for the economic model, and Table 6-6 contains the 
user defined parameters for the general simulation set up. 
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User defined 
parameters for 
the economic 
model 
Description 
 
 
Notes Values  
NX Number of consumers of the 
final market X 
 Nx=5000 
 
RXi  
and 
uRXi 
Income of the individual 
consumer, i, (=1, 2, …, Nx) 
of the final market X and  
update value for the income 
of consumer i 
The income of consumers in market X is randomly 
defined by an Uniform distribution between a 
minimum and a maximum level. In every iteration, 
the income of a particular consumer is updated by a 
factor randomly defined (also by an Uniform 
distribution) in the following way:  
RXi = RXix uRXi 
 
RXi~U[50 ; 200] 
 
uRXi~U[-1 ; 1] 
Pki Price of capital Price of capital for each of the three markets  PkX=3 
PkY1=3 
PkY2=3 
ki Stock of Knowledge for the 
firms in each of the three 
different markets (X, Y1, Y2). 
Initialization of ki is made with 
wti, the innovation at instant t. 
 
To compute the number of firms in the beginning of 
the simulation, the average stock of knowledge is 
used. This average stock is the mid point between 
the minimum and the maximum stock defined 
previsouly for each the initial values of the Stock of 
Knowledge in each market (kiX, kiY1, kiY2). 
Min(kiX)=1 
Max(kiX)=20 
Min(kiY1)=1 
Max(kiY1)=15 
Min(kiY2)=1 
Max(kiY2)=15 
DSu, DSl Density Survival interval  DSl=1 
DSu=14 
DBu, DBl Density Birth interval  DBl=3 
DBu=5 
Sl Size limit  4 
Al Age limit  2 
X1, Y1, Y2 Quantity of product 
produced by firm i 
Initial quantity is obtained from a Uniform 
distribution. 
X~ U[1;500] 
Y1~U[1;500] 
Y2~U[1;500] 
αi Factors that increase or 
decreases the production 
quantity of a firm 
Quantity is updated in every iteration using a 
heuristic for the factor α  that increases or decreases 
the production quantity, based on the profit of a 
firm 
 
see Section 6.4.4 
 
b Indicator of the association 
between the final good 
varieties; b=1 means that 
goods are perfect substitutes 
 b=0.7 
δ Transferability factor Parameter that measures the proportion of new 
knowledge which is effectively transmitted through 
each edge. 
δ=0,9 
MCX 
MCY1 
MCY2 
Marginal Cost of the firms in 
each of the three different 
markets 
The marginal cost for a particular firm is defined 
randomly based on a Normal Distribution with 
mean = MCi (i.e. the marginal cost in one particular 
market i, with i=X, Y1, Y2)  
and standard deviation = 0.1Xmean 
MCX=0.1 
MCY1=0.05 
MCY2=0.05 
wti
 
 
Innovation of firm i at time t  Innovation wti is a function of the knowledge 
previously owned by firm i with a certain 
probability, p, given by kit-1 p, where p is based on a 
Normal Distribution with mean λ and standard 
deviation = 0.1X λ. We assume that λ differs 
according to each market (X,Y1,Y2), the value of λX 
being greater since it corresponds to buyer (larger 
firms)  
λX=0.03 
λY1=0.01 
λY2=0.01 
 
 
 
[a’,b’] Limits for firms to be 
considered similar in terms o 
technological distance 
 [5, 1000] 
Table 6-5 - User defined parameters for the economic model 
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User defined 
parameters for 
simulation’s set 
up 
Description Notes 
 
Range  
 
 
Default 
value 
Birth Activates the possibility of births of 
firms 
0=no births; 1=births {0,1} 0 
Death Activates the possibility of death of 
firms 
0=no deaths; 1=deaths {0,1} 0 
Migration Activates the possibility of migration 
of firms 
0=no migrations; 
1=migrations 
{0,1} 1 
Contract Activates the contract between firms 0=no contracts; 
1=contracts 
{0,1} 1 
Strategy Defines the strategy of cooperation  {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}  
Learning Activates the possibility of learning 0=no learning; 
1=learning 
{0,1} 1 
Generations Number of generations in the 
simulation 
Usually defined as 20 {10, 15, 20} 20 
Runs Number of runs Usually defined as 10 {5, 10, 15, 20} 10 
Cooperation Activates the cooperation between 
firms 
0=no cooperation, 
1=cooperation 
{0,1} 1 
Network Support Activates the network support 0=no network support; 
1=network support 
{0,1} 0 
Neighboughrood 
Ring 
(Neighbourhood 
Diameter) 
This parameter establishes a circle of 
radius 1, 2 or 3 cells which defines the 
diameter of the circle (or ring) of 
neighbours around a particular firm. 
 {1, 2, 3} 3 
Table 6-6 - User defined parameters for simulation’s set up 
 
All parameters presented in Table 6-5 and Table 6-6 are defined previously as they do 
not depend on others. We will see that in some cases, initializations depend on other 
parameters of the simulations. 
 
 
Initialization of the simulation  
As said before, no fitness measures are used here to adjust the parameters of the 
simulation. Corresponding to stage I in the research methodology (Figure 4-3), the 
choice of the initial values for the parameters was defined in such a way that the 
simulation would present reasonable results. Thus, after running the simulation for 
several times, we have found some problems with the magnitude of the variables. For 
instance, the profit of the firm was reaching very high values (or very low) when 
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compared to other variables. At the same time, we observed the complete extinction of 
firms in few generations or else a “demographic explosion”. For that reason, we made 
some changes in the initial settings of parameters. Table 6-5 presents the choices we 
made to reproduce reasonable patterns of behaviour. In other words, the choice of 
parameters was made in order to produce an output corresponding to the following 
goals: 
• Limited variance of some variables:  the coefficient of variation of some 
variables that follow the Normal distribution was set in 10%. For instance, 
innovation, wti, depends on p, which is a random variable that represents the 
update of innovation, being normally distributed with mean λ and standard 
deviation = 0.1X λ.  
• Coherent processing time and simplicity of the ouput: the number of firms 
should not be very small neither very large. Few firms do not produce enough 
number of networks to be analysed. A large number firms slows the algorithm, 
since the processing time grows drastically with be number of firms.  
 
As we stated before, reasonability is a somewhat subjective concept, but the idea here is 
to construct intervals of tolerance for the parameters in such a way that the results 
produced by the parameters belonging to those intervals are realistic enough to be 
conserved. Besides, Stage I of our research methodology (Figure 4-3) does not end with 
this initialization. In fact, some adjustments in the initial parameters were done after 
Stage II. We repeated these two states for several times, in order to obtain consistency 
between the simulation output and the facts from empirical studies106. 
 
The initialization of the number of firms in each market is obtained randomly, although 
it was somewhat controlled, based on the initial values of the knowledge stock in each 
market:  
 
n= f(Kx); m1= f(KY1); m2= f(KY2)      Equation 6-36 
 
                                                 
106
 Empirical studies are used as an orientation of our simulation. As explained above, there is no great 
concern in that the simulation follows exactly the same properties of these empirical studies. 
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with N=n +m1+m2, and n, m1 and m2 being respectively the number of firms in markets 
X, Y1 and Y2. The function f was defined as depending on Kti (the stock of knowledge), 
and RX, RY1 and RY2, (consumers’ average income in each market) as follows: 
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In these equations, Pk represents the price of capital and Px represents the price of the 
final good and it was defined in Equation 6-14. For a numerical example corresponding 
a particular simulation, given the initial values for Min(kiX), Max(kiX), Pk,X, etc., 
presented in Table 6-5, we obtained E(RX)=320.72, E(RY1)=572.49, and E(RY2)= 785.75, 
etc. Therefore, the number of firms in each market was n=3 +m1=9, m2=18 (the total 
being N=30). 
 
The price of the capital (Pk) was set to 3 in all of the industries as it seemed important 
not to discriminate capital values in different markets. Marginal cost for firms of 
industry X was set to 0.1 and marginal costs for firms of industries Y1 and Y2 were 
equal to 0.05. This difference is due to the fact that companies from industry X 
represent buyers – that are usually associated with higher marginal costs. The values of 
the innovation probabilities, (wit) were taken from the Normal distribution with mean 
0.03 for industry X and with mean 0.01 for industries Y1 and Y2. Corresponding 
standard deviations were set up to 10% of their mean values.  
 
The values of the density parameters, size and age (DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al) were 
obtained randomly within the parameter intervals defined in Chapter 5, and are defined 
in Equation 6-40: 
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<DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<1, 14, 3, 5, 4, 2>    Equation 6-40 
  
This set of parameters is more tolerant in what concerns the survival than for new 
births107. Finally, the Neighbourhood ring was set in 3. This was also defined randomly 
among the possible values of this parameter ({1, 2, 3}). 
 
Considering the simulation set up, the majority of the results were obtained given that 
new firms could not get born nor die. The reason for this choice is that the analysis of 
network evolution gets very complex if the parameter death is activated. Therefore, the 
parameters birth and death were disabled (turned to zero) in the majority of the 
simulation runs. Network support was also turned to zero, except when it was used, and 
learning was always activated (turned to 1 in all runs)108 . Contract has also been 
activated (Contract=1). 
 
The main variables of analysis that have been captured are: profit (pii), stock of 
knowledge (ki), marginal cost, (c,) form, and some other variable concerning network 
statistics (number of networks, nodes, etc.), at the firm or network level109 . These 
variables were collected within each strategy. 
 
Results provided in the following sections are the outcome of more than 100 different 
runs of the simulation, from where we have taken some representative outputs. The 
number of initial firms depends on Equations 6-37 to 6-39 and is defined endogenously 
at the beginning of NetOrg. Usually it ranges from 20 to 40 firms initially, according to 
the parameterization described earlier.  
 
The simulation results are shown separately: in Section 6.9.2, we give some network 
statistics, according to different collaborating strategies and for different values of user 
defined parameters. We test some hypotheses in Section 6.9.3, and in Section 6.9.4 we 
proceed with the validation of the model using Survival Analysis. In Section 6.9.5.we 
                                                 
107
 We recall that the solution obtained in Chapter 5 was: <DSl, DSu, DBl, DBu, Sl, Al>=<5, 28, 2, 20, 2, 
1> and was optimized for the region of Ave. 
108
 In the analysis that follows, some exceptions on these considerations were introduced. For instance, 
although we opted to disable death and birth in the majority of the runs, these parameters are activated in 
order to analyse the survival at the firm level (results are presented in Section 6.9.4). 
109
 Average values of profit, stock of knowledge, and marginal cost were considered at the network level.  
 210 
analyse the evolution of networks with evolutionary data analysis and, finally, in 
Section in 6.10, the concluding remarks are drawn. 
 
 
6.9.2.  The dynamics of the network formation 
 
In Section 6.4.3., we have presented the processes that have been considered for the 
formation of the networks. Two phases corresponding to two decision processes, in 
which firms can link together to form a network, were considered: selection of the 
partner and network formation strategies.  Those phases contain several alternatives as 
we have considered in that section: 
 
A. Selection of the partner:  
A1. Preferential meeting process 
A2. Average stock scenario 
B. Network formation: 
B1. Individual decision for integration in new/previous network 
B1.1. Stock ratio complementarity 
B1.2. Great Expected Value  
B1.3. Concentration process  
B1.4. Profit evaluation 
B2. Collective formation 
B2.1 Collaboration networks 
B2.2. Cooperative networks  
 
 
Analysis of collaboration strategies 
 
In order to analyse the performance of the networks, we have combined those phases 
and created six collaboration strategies for selection of the partner and network 
formation processes, as follows: 
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a) Peer-to-peer complementariness (Preferential meeting process, (A1) 
with Stock ratio complementariness (B1.1))  
b) Average Stock Scenario (A2.) with Great Expected Value (B1.2) 
c) Preferential meeting process (A1) with Profit  evaluation (B1.4) 
d) Concentration process (B1.3) 
e) Collaboration networks (B2.1+a) 
f) Cooperation networks  (B2.2+a) 
 
Two more strategies are analysed afterwards. They are associated with the evidences of 
e-Marketplaces in which the transactions costs are reduced and the physical distance 
between the elements of the network has no importance. These strategies are identified 
as:  
g) Virtual collaboration networks (B2.1+a) 
h) Virtual cooperation networks (B2.2+a) 
In terms of network formation, strategy g) has the same properties of collaboration 
networks and strategy h) is similar to cooperation networks. The main differences are in 
the physical distance, which is not taken into account in the choice of the partner. Only 
the technological distance matters110. 
 
The creation of these strategies reproduces what exists in literature and also in empirical 
evidence. Strategy a) is a mix of the works by Carayol and Roux (2003) and by 
Campos, et al. (2006). Strategy b) is a common strategy tested in game theory models. 
Strategy c) uses the preferential meeting process and includes the idea of profit 
evaluation as in Carayol and Roux (2003). Strategies d), e) and f) are based on empirical 
observations by CENESTAP (2000a to 2000e, 2001). Finally, strategies g) and h) are 
associated with virtual enterprises inspired in the observations of e-Marketplaces. 
 
Now, we are going to compare the networks resulting from each of these collaboration 
strategies. We aim at comparing the performance of the strategies using some 
economical and network indicators. Results show the network evolution and include the 
                                                 
110
 It is important to note that despite the large number of firms that are typical from these types of virtual 
networks, as observed in empirical evidences (see Appendix IV), we will not be able to simulate networks 
with the same high dimension, as it implicates a computation time that is not viable. Therefore, the output 
will not reproduce the dimensional properties of virtual enterprises. 
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analysis of profit, marginal cost, average stock of knowledge and several network 
statistics.  
 
Graphs are represented with the purpose of illustrating the evolution of the networks111. 
These graphs are representative examples of the networks produced in different runs of 
NetOrg.  
 
a) Peer-to-peer complementariness (Preferential meeting process, (A1) with Stock 
ratio complementariness (B1.1)) 
 
In strategy a) Preferential meeting process, (A1) with Stock ratio complementarity 
(B1.1), identified as Peer-to-peer complementariness, we have defined a meeting 
probability, mti,j, between two firms, in which firm i chooses firm j that maximizes the 
probability of the similarity between these two firms (that value being equal to mti,j=[1-
dt(i,j)]).  
 
Usually there is no network formation in the first three to five generations because firms 
have not enough stock of knowledge to start a cooperation process. When the 
simulation starts, firms’ stocks of knowledge are small and network formation is rare. 
Along their lifetime, the stock of knowledge of each firm increases and they start 
negotiating for cooperation purposes112. Table 6-7 shows an example coming out from 
the simulation with the negotiation results that allowed the first cooperation between 
three pairs of firms based in the Stock ratio complementarity’s indicator, piti / Kti,. (in 
which “.” designates the Market, X, Y1 or Y2)  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111
 Several topologies were observed (linear, star and multipolar), but the we noticed that the majority of 
the networks are star and multipolar networks (according to the definitions presented in Chapter 2). 
112
 To form the network via the Stock ratio complementarity process, we have imposed some restrictions 
in terms of horizontal and vertical collaboration. Therefore, in order to simulate most part of the 
supplier/buyer processes, firms only select other firms within the same market (horizontal collaboration 
between suppliers) or else they select firms of type X (buyers).     
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Cooperating 
firms 
Product/ 
Production 
Process 
Profit / Knowledge Stock 
 
Region 
 
# Firm i Firm j Firm i Firm j piti /kti,Y=1 pitj /kti,Y=1 piti /kti,Y=2 pitj /kti,Y=2 Firm i Firm j 
1 3 5 1 2 17.88 8.79 82.51 87.02 1 1 
2 22 3 3 1 26.24 27.07 659.72 289.43 1 1 
Table 6-7 - First cooperation results of NetOrg based in the strategy a) 
 
The corresponding networks formed during this process of partners’ selection and 
negotiation throughout the generations are represented in Figure 6-8113: 
 
 
Generation 8 
 
Generation 9 
 
Generation 10 
 
Generation 11 
 
Generation 12 
 
Generation 13 
Figure 6-8 – Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy a) 
 
As it can be observed, networks are not abundant is this simulation114. In fact, only few 
networks were created during the twenty generations. This seems to be a common 
situation in some cases of network formation (as referred to in the several works by 
CENESTAP [2000a to 2000e, 2001]). The first network was formed at generation eight 
                                                 
113
 In this case and in further examples of representations of networks, we consider that no hierarchy 
exists among the firms. For that reason, the following examples of network forms A, B, and C, in which 
one dark node is linked to four white nodes, are considered equivalent: 
 
 
A B C 
 
114
 Networks emerge at generation 3 or later, because in prevous generations the levels of profit , stock of 
knowledge, etc. are lower and it is not possible to start any type of negotiation between firms. 
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involving firms with numbers 3 and 5. Table 6-7 shows that this network was formed 
because firms 3 and 5 had complementary levels of their stocks of knowledge. At 
generation nine firm 22 entered the network by linking with firm 3. This network has 
kept its shape and size during the following two generations and, at generation eleven, 
firm 18 links with firm 3.  In the remaining generations, the links break and the network 
disappears. In this case, there are two main reasons for networks to disappear. It can be 
that there is no more stock ratio complementariness between the firms in the network, or 
else the contract between them is no longer active. These two reasons may occur 
simultaneously. 
 
b) Average Stock Scenario (A2) with Great Expected Value (B1.2) 
 
Using this strategy, firms first try to find a recognized partner that is already linked with 
other firms and compute its expected growth to see if the stock of capital is increasing.  
If the stock of knowledge of the partner is expected to grow, then a new link is 
established (we therefore assume that, in these conditions, the partner will agree with 
the link). Otherwise the link will not be established. Table 6-8 shows an example that 
leads to the creation of a link between firms 1 and 32 because the expected stock of 
capital, E(Ktj) of market Y2 is greater than the growth rate (∆vj) of the same market. 
 
 
Table 6-8 – Example of cooperation results of NetOrg based in the strategy b) 
 
 
In Figure 6-9, we can see an example in which the shape of networks evolve according 
to this strategy.  
 
 
Cooperating firms Product 
Firm i Firm j Firm i Firm j 
Expected stock 
of knowledge 
E (ktj) 
Growth rate 
1
k
k
v 2t
j
1t
j
j −=∆
−
−
 
1 32 1 3 0.570 0.356 
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Generation 3 
 
 
Generation 4 
 
 
Generation 5 
 
Generation 6 
 
 
Generation 7 
 
 
Generation 8 
 
 
Generation 9 
 
 
Generation 10 
 
 
Generation 11 
 
 
Generation 12 
 
 
Generation 13 
 
 
Generation 14 
 
Generation 15 
 
Generation 16  
Generation 17 
 
 
Generation 18 
Generation 19 
 
Generation 20 
  
Figure 6-9 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy b) 
 
Networks are denser in this strategy if we compare it with the earlier. Arising at 
generation three, first network includes firms 1, 20, 3, and 5. At generation four this 
network expands and incorporates firms 12, 16 and 17 (firm 3 becoming the center of 
the network). After some changes two centers emerge in this network (firms 3 and 1), 
which is easy to recognize on the graph of the eleventh generation (see Figure 6-9). 
There is one whole network formed by two clusters: a group centred at firm 1 (a buyer) 
and another group centred at firm 3 (also a buyer). Then, firm 3 disconnects and the 
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network structure becomes almost stable: a star vertical network that is centered in firm 
1. 
 
c) Preferential meeting process (A1) with Profit  evaluation (B1.4) 115 
 
As we have stated before in Section 6.3.2, a new link between two firms i and j is 
created within this strategy if piti (Gt)<piti (Gt+j) and pitj(Gt)<Pj(Gt+i), where G is the 
network where i and j belong and pit
 
its profit at time t. A link between i and j is not 
created or is deleted (if it already exists) if piti(G)<piti(G-j) and pitj(G)<pij(G-i). Although 
we based this proposal on Carayol and Roux (2003), an additional restriction has been 
introduced: firms which are looking for a partner to cooperate with must have their 
stock of capital smaller than the average stock of the capital. Figure 6-10 exemplifies 
the evolution of the networks according to this strategy: 
 
Generation 5 
 
Generation 6 
 
Generation 7 
 
Generation 8 
 
Generation 9 
 
Generation 10  Generation 11 
 
Generation 12 
 
Generation 13  Generation 14 
 
Generation 15 
 
Generation 16 
 
Generation 17  Generation 18 
 
Generation 19 
 
Generation 20 
Figure 6-10 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy c) 
                                                 
115
 We have presented a numerical example of this networking strategy back in Section 6.3.2 to illustrate 
how this process works. 
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After few generations, a star network grows and at generation eigth, includes firms 1, 6, 
14, 18, and 28 (firm 1 being the center of the network). At the same time, firms 3 and 24 
share a link and then, at generation 14, integrate the larger network. Firm 3 turns into 
the new center of the network until generation 19 in which the majority of the links in 
the network break down. A new network linking firms 21 and 27 emerges at generation 
17. This network lasts until the end of the period of analysis, together with a small 
network joining firms 19 and 22. 
 
d) Concentration process (B1.3) 
 
In the concentration process, firms just look for the most linked firm to cooperate with. 
No previous negotiation or complex process of partner selection exists. This is simply 
the choice of the firm that has more connections with other firms. At the beginning, 
sotck ratio complementatiness is used, but when some links exist, firms choose the 
partner with more links. Figure 6-11 shows an example of such a concentration process 
where some firms start linking to firm 2 (a buyer) without delay at generation three. 
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Figure 6-11 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy d) 
 
When firm 1 (a buyer) enters the network, at generation four, the other firms join up and 
a great number of links arise at generations five to seven. During those generations the 
graph is difficult to depict since some links cross the others, although it is possible to 
presume (and it was confirmed) that they are oriented towards nodes 1 and 2. After 
some generations, the separation of the two subgroups is clearer despite the fact that 
they are in the same network. Firm 2 leaves the network at generation twelve and firm 1 
keeps being the center of the network in the remaining generations. 
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e) Collaboration networks (B2.1+a) 
 
In collective formation networks, links are created at the same time for all the firms 
within a group. In collaboration networks there is a goal which is common to all firms 
of a networks and we assume that they will not admit new elements throughout their 
existence. Other firms outside this network use a different strategy, a) Peer-to-peer 
complementariness, to select the partner. Figure 6-12 shows an example of such type of 
networks: 
 
Generation 5 Generation 6 Generation 7 
 
Generation 8 
Generation 9 Generation 10 Generation 11 Generation 12 
Generation 13 
 
Generation 14 Generation 15 Generation 16 
Generation 17 
 
Generation 18 Generation 19 Generation 20 
Figure 6-12 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy e) 
 
A set of five firms (identified by the numbers 17, 18, 19, 20, and 22) formed a 
collaboration network at generation 5. As it can be seen from the evolution of the 
networks, according to this strategy, this network lasted for eight periods until 
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generation 12116. At the same time, at generation 7 another network was created linking 
firms 1 and 6. This is not a collaboration network (it changes its shape during the 
lifetime and disappears at generation 10, coming later with a different shape).  
 
In other examples we have observed that some of the firms of the collaboration network 
keep together in cooperation, even after the contract ends.  This may suggest that firms 
experiencing collaboration networks can gain in terms of stock of knowledge that will 
be used in further collaborations with other (or the same) firms. In fact, those two firms 
maintain their collaboration until the last generation. 
 
f) Cooperation networks (B2.2+a) 
 
As proposed previously in Section 6.4.3, cooperation networks are similar to 
collaboration networks except that for new elements that want to enter the network. In 
these cases, they must negotiate directly with one of the elements of the network. So, 
the common negotiation type will be the stock ratio complementariness (B1.1).  
                                                 
116
 In collaboration networks we assume that firms agree in setting up a collective contract that lasts for a 
predefined interval of time. No new members are accepted within the period of this contract. 
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Generation 18 
 
Generation 19 
 
Generation 20 
Figure 6-13 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy f) 
 
Figure 6-13 shows that the cooperative network that was formed in generation 5 joining 
firms 1, 18, 19, 20 and 21. The network changed its shape during the evolutionary 
process. In generations 6 and 8, firms 3 and 2, respectively, entered the network. The 
initial group of firms broke the contract in generation 10, but three of them keep the 
links between them (firms 1, 19 and 21). This may suggest that firms experiencing 
former collective networks can gain in terms of stock of knowledge that will be used in 
further relations with other (or with same) firms. In fact, firms 1, 19 and 20 of the initial 
group have links with others in almost all the generations until the end of the period of 
analysis. 
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g) Virtual collaboration networks (B2.1+a) 
 
Strategies g) and h) demonstrate the situations in which the physical distance between 
the elements of the network has relatively low importance (only the technological 
distance is considered). Figure 6-14 illustrates the evolution of such Virtual 
collaboration networks. 
 
 
Generation 5 
 
Generation 6 
 
Generation 7 
 
Generation 8 
 
Generation 9 
 
Generation 10 
 
Generation 17 
 
Generation 18 
 
Generation 19 
 
Generation 20 
  
Figure 6-14 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy g) 
 
As in strategy e) (collaboration networks), we will assume that virtuall collaboration 
networks do not admit new elements throughout their existence. In the example of 
Figure 6-14, there is a vertical network including firms 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 that was 
created in generation 5 and lasts until generation 10. There are no more networks until 
generation 17, in which a horizontal network (with firms 2 and 3) is created. This 
network lasts until the end of the period of analysis.  
 
h) Virtual cooperation networks (B2.1+a) 
As stated before, virtual cooperation networks are similar to cooperation networks, 
except that the physical distance has low importance here (only the technological 
distance is taken into account). For new elements that want to enter the network, they 
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must negotiate directly with one of the elements of the network. In Figure 6-15 we 
represent the evolution of a virtual cooperation network. 
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Figure 6-15 - Graphical evolution of the networks created via strategy h) 
 
In the evolution depicted in Figure 6-15, a virtual collaboration network is created in 
generation 5 and broke at generation 13. Meanwhile, at generation 9, firm 3 entered the 
network by linking with firm 2 (the center of the network) but left the network at 
generation 12. Another network has been formed during this period: at generation 7, a 
network joining firms 1 and 24 (and firm 15, later on) was created. From generation 13, 
a new network arises (connecting firms 2 and 3) which is maybe a result of the gain in 
terms of stock of knowledge that was achieved previously by these firms.  
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Discussion 
 
Table 6-9 shows some indicators associated with the simulations using different 
strategies. We have measured the profit, marginal cost, and the stock of capital of all of 
the networks that were created during the simulation runs117.  
 
Network structure indicators  
Collaboration Strategies 
 
Profit(*) 
 (pit) 
Marginal 
Cost 
(c) 
Stock of 
knowledge 
(**) 
(kt)  Diameter Path Transitivity Density (***) 
a) Peer-to-peer 
complementariness  3.27 0.0363 4247.8 1.19 1.07 0.00 2.22 
b) Average stock scenario 
with great expected value 4.61 0.0099 589.9 2.73 1.82 0.09 11.83 
c) 
Preferential meeting 
process with Profit  
evaluation 
4.31 0.0155 1798.0 2.06 1.50 0.06 7.36 
d) Concentration process 4.55 0.0104 504.2 2.75 1.82 0.10 13.07 
e) Collaboration networks 2.52 0.0268 726.2 1.59 1.34 0.03 4.13 
f) Cooperation networks 3.70 0.0250 4322.7 1.67 1.35 0.01 4.22 
g) Virtual collaboration 
networks 2.68 0.0290 197.2 1.75 1.47 0.01 5.36 
h) Virtual cooperation 
networks 3.50 0.0264 2525.7 1.64 1.32 0.04 3.88 
Table 6-9 –Comparison of collaboration strategies. 
Notes: average values within each variable were computed for all variables within each strategy; 
Only networks with three or more firms were considered in the analysis;  
(*) Log(Profit);  ; (**) Average stock of knowledge of three markets (X, Y1 and Y2); ;  (***) Average 
number of nodes (firms) per network.  
                                                 
117
 NetOrg was run ten times for each strategy many networks were produced. A file containing 4.113 
networks produced to perform further statistical analyses.  The average values of the networks within 
each strategy were taken for all the indicators. For the stock of capital we computed the average of the 
levels for the three industries, X, Y1 Y2
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The average of each variable (profit, marginal cost, stock of knowledge) in Table 6-9 
was computed for each strategy as being the corresponding sum of the variable values 
divided by the number of networks within each strategy. The same average was applied 
to the network structure indicators such as diameter, average path length, transitivity 
and density118 . 
 
Strategies b) and d) seem to be the most profitable out of all. The average profit is 
greater than in other strategies, although the standard deviation is quite large to be able 
to come to a definite conclusion119. Profit is also high in strategy c). Marginal costs are 
lower, on average, in strategies b) and d), while strategies a) and e) reach the highest 
levels of marginal cost. Strategies a) (Peer-to-peer complementariness) and f) 
(cooperation networks) are the ones in which the stock of knowledge is higher.  
 
Regarding network structure indicators, strategy a) has the lower diameter and average 
path length. Density (the average number of firms per network) is also very low when 
compared to other strategies (around 2 firms per network). The value of transitivity is 
zero in this strategy: a great number of the networks created under this strategy had two 
nodes only (and were not considered in the analysis) and the remaining networks within 
this strategy exhibit a linear form 120 . Average stock scenario (strategy b) and 
Concentration process (strategy d) present the highest values for all network structure 
indicators. These two strategies produce networks that are denser and more clustered, 
with higher diameter and average path length. 
 
                                                 
118
 As presented above in Chapter 2, network statistics are important to quantify the structure of the 
networks. The diameter of a network is a measure of the network length: diameter is the distance, in 
number of nodes, between the two farthest nodes of the network; the average path length or connectivity 
length (or just path) is the mean number of steps that are necessary to move in the shortest route between 
two nodes; transitivity is a network property that measures the connectivity (or clustering) inside the 
network. Finally we used the number of nodes in each network as a measure of density. A different 
measure could bee used here (as the number of links divided by the number of nodes), but we decided to 
choose the simplest way to compute the network density. 
119
 In what concerns the profit, the coefficient of variation, σi/µi, where σi is the standard deviation and 
µi is the mean of the population of all networks under any strategy i, stands between 0.27 (strategy d) and 
0.95 (strategy e). The variability of the stock of knowledge is higher (mainly in market X) since the 
networks within the same strategy present different patterns of evolution.  
120
 Transitivity measures the clustering or connectivity inside the network. As expected, Linear networks 
show lower values of transitivity, in average, than Star and Multipolar networks, as showed in the 
following table: 
Linear Star Multipolar
Transitivity 0,0085 0,0414 0,2577
Form
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There is, in fact, a positive relationship between network structure indicators. The 
association between them is represented in Table 6-10: 
 
  diameter path transitivity density 
diameter 1    
path 0.799 1   
transitivity 0.449 0.316 1  
density 0.598 0.674 0.392 1 
Table 6-10 -  Pearson correlation coefficients between network structure indicators 
 
It can be observed that strategy a) generates low profit, when compared to the others, 
but the corresponding stock of knowledge is one of the greatest among all strategies. 
We recall that, according to Equation 6-16, there is a cost associated with the creation of 
knowledge, which may decrease the profit value in certain cases such as in this strategy. 
However, in general, there is a significant positive correlation between profit and stock 
of knowledge - Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.495(6).  
 
In order to extract patterns from the data produced by network evolution, we have 
performed a classification with decision trees, using C5.0 (Quinlan, 1997). Emerging 
patterns can be used to gain insight into aspects of network collaboration. We used the 
same data file (used before to compute network indicators presented back in Table 6-9), 
containing 4.113 networks, produced by the eight strategies. In the first case, the eight 
strategies were analysed all together. The same process of rules extraction was done 
separately for each strategy afterwards.  
 
All the variables (profit, marginal cost, stock of knowledge  - split for markets X, Y1 
and Y2 -, diameter, path, transitivity and density) have been categorized into three 
different levels, according to their original values: 1-low; 2-medium; 3-high. A method 
of equal frequency categorization has been used. Profit was used as the classification (or 
output) variable. The designations for the new categorized variables are described in the 
following table: 
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Original name Name of categorized variable 
Profit Class_Profit 
Marginal Cost Class_MargCost 
Stock of Knowledge (market X) Class_StockX 
Stock of Knowledge (market Y1) Class_StockY1 
Stock of Knowledge (market Y2) Class_StockY2 
Diameter Class_Diam 
Path Class_Path 
Transitivity Class-Transit 
Density Class_Density 
Table 6-11 - Designations for the categorized variables used in the classification problem with C5 
 
Two of the main extracted rules (out of 21 rules, with a minimum accuracy of 87.8%) 
are summarized in the following lines (confidence levels are presented in brackets): 
 
IF Class_Transit = 1 
 THEN Class_Profit=1  [0.935] 
 
IF Class_StockY1=3 & Class_StockY2=3 & Class_Diam=2 
THEN Class_Profit=3 [0.878] 
 
 
These rules indicate that less profitable networks have lower transitivity (small 
clustering coefficient). Simulaneously, more profitable networks are associated with 
greater stock of knowledge and intermediate diameter.  
 
We have also produced rules for each strategy separately in order to look for specific 
patterns that are not found in the overall analysis. Table 6-12 presents the most 
important rules for each of the eight strategies. Rules are organized according to the 
strategy, attributes and the output classification value is in column Class_Profit: 
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Strategy Class-StockX 
Class_ 
StockY1 
Class_ 
StockY2 
Class_ 
Marg Cost 
Class_
Diam 
Class_ 
Trans 
Class_ 
Path 
Class_ 
Profit Confidence 
a)           1   1 0,947 
a)           2   2 0.947 
a)           3   3 0.947 
b)   2   2 1 2   3 0.857 
b)       1   2   3 0.837 
b)   3           3 0.706 
c) 1       2     1 0.981 
c) {2,3}       2   {1,2} 3 0,991 
c)         2 1   1 0.978 
c)   1   3   1   1 0.976 
c)         2   3 1 0.969 
d) {2,3} 1       1   2 0,9 
d)     3  2 3 0.697 
e) 3         {1,2} {2,3} 2 0.95 
e)         1     1 0.992 
e)         1     1 0.992 
e)         {2,3} 3   3 0.991 
e)         3   1 3 0.98 
f)           1   1 0.963 
f)         {2,3} 3   3 0.995 
g)         1     1 0.957 
g)         {2,3} {1,2}   2 0.917 
g)         {2,3} 3   3 0.95 
h)         {2,3} 3   3 0.895 
h)           1   1 0,951 
Table 6-12 – Summary of the main rules produced by C5 for the classification of Profit 
Note: all variables were categorized assuming the values: 1-low; 2-medium; 3-high 
 
Table 6-12 shows the rules with higher confidence values chosen among all the rules 
produced within each strategy. Profit has been classified in classes 1 (low) to 3 (high). 
We can observe that in general, when profit is high the stock of knowledge is high too, 
and in some corresponding cases, the marginal cost is low. On the other hand, we can 
observe that, in general, when profit is low the stock of knowledge is low too, and in 
some corresponding cases the marginal cost is high.  
 
In relation to other variables, there is not a clear emerging relationship: for example, 
rules shown in Table 6-12 seem to indicate that profit is inversely related to the average 
path length and, positively related to transitivity and diameter. In fact, most part of the 
rules that are associated with high profit has high values in transitivity.  
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We were also concerned with the evolution of the network indicators along the 
generations. Figure 6-16 illustrates the evolution of the profit across the networks 
lifetime.  
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Figure 6-16 - Evolution of network profit (logarithm of profit) in all strategies along the twenty 
generations of the simulation 
(Note:  the average profit of all networks within the same strategy was considered along the generations) 
 
We can observe that the profit increases, in average, along the generations. As we have 
seen above, links between the firms enhance the diffusion of the knowledge within the 
network and the profit increases as well. It is interesting to observe that some strategies, 
as g), which seem less profitable in the first generations, increase drastically their profit 
at the end of the period. 
  
In Figure 6-17 we depicted the evolution of networks’ average diameter over time for 
all the strategies. In all strategies we can observe that the diameter reduces along the 
generations.  
 
Strategy 
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Figure 6-17 – Evolution of network diameter in all strategies along the twenty generations of the 
simulation 
(Note:  the average diameter of all networks within the same strategy was considered along the 
generations) 
 
Strategy d) (concentration process) creates larger networks, in average, as we have seen 
before, although the diameter decreases along the iterations. The networks created with 
the peer-to-peer complementariness (strategy a), which we have seen that generate 
higher stock of knowledge and have lower diameter, slightly reduce their diameter, in 
average, during their generations.  
 
The increase of the profit and the corresponding reduction of the diameter all along the 
generations, is in line with what is said in literature about economic networks, i.e., that 
the diameter of networks decreases along time. (Leskovec et al. 2005). This is actually 
one property of the small-world networks, as we have seen in Chapter 2. 
 
Concerning the evolution of transitivity, it is important to note that it tends to increase 
strongly in the initial life of networks and tends to decrease slowly in the end of the 
twenty generations. This latter phenomenon is a consequence of the reduction on the 
network dimension that is observed in the final of the period of analysis. 
 
Strategy 
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In the following we will explore the outcome of other effects (introduced as user 
defined parameters) such as migration, attitude to risk, network support and learning on 
the characteristics of the networks. 
 
Location and Migration 
There are some cases where firms connect with other firms in other regions. In the next 
example, some of the networks were created involving firms from both regions. Figure 
6-18 shows four networks that involved firms from both regions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-18 – Networks with firms from different regions 
 
 
Firms migrate in order to increase their profit. We observed that firms and networks 
proliferate in region 2, the region with lower marginal costs. Some of the firms that 
migrated (from region 1 to region 2) were able to overcome negative profits. Some of 
them have increased their profits considerably and became top success firms, within 
higher profit and stock of knowledge. Although it seems that firms with higher values of 
risk are in general more profitable, it appears that there is no direct association between 
the profit of the firm and its level of risk (Pearson correlation coefficient revealed a 
weak value of -0.067).   
 
Figure 6-19 shows networks in the place where they have been created or in the new 
place after firm dislocation. We can observe that there are more networks in region 2 
than in region 1, as a result of the lower marginal costs in that region. Nevertheless, 
there are some firms and networks in region 1, as the firms’ clustering helps avoiding 
negative results.  
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Figure 6-19–Representation of the space showing the firms (in numbers), the links  (arrows) and 
the networks (in colored areas) in the 15th generation 
Note: the direction of the edges in the arrows are arbitrary and do not indicate the direction of the links. 
 
 
Attitude to risk 
 
In the simulation we consider that firms have different attidudes to risk. As we have 
seen before, the attitude to risk is associated with migration and with saving partner 
firms from failure, that is:  
• more risky firms tend to migrate to a different region when they are in a difficult 
situation, and  
• more risky firms tend to save other firms from failure, even if it brings costs to 
them.  
 
As said in Section 6.4.6 two kinds of attitude were considered: “conservative” and 
“adventurous”. We use the term “risk level” to represent this attitude. A certain level of 
risk was therefore defined for every firm (we considered an integer value from the 
interval [1, 10]:  conservative firms have risk levels under 5, while adventurous have 
these levels greater than or equal to 5. A risk level is assigned at random to each firm 
and it is not changed during its lifetime. Table 6-13 summarizes the average profit 
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obtained by firms, according to the levels of risk within the eight collaboration 
strategies: 
 
Profit* average 
 
Collaboration 
strategies 
Conservative 
firms 
Adventurous 
firms 
a) 1.4 1.6 
b) 1.9 3.2 
c) 1.0 4.2 
d) 1.9 4.0 
e) 2.6 2.7 
f) 0.7 3.1 
g) 0.8 2.6 
h) 0.4 3.4 
Table 6-13 – Average of firms’ profit according to the attitude to risk  
Notes: All firms have been considered independently of being located in a network or not; 
(*) Logarithm of Profit 
 
These results are not directly comparable with those of Table 6-9, because those were 
computed only for the firms in the networks, while the former were computed for all 
firms of the simulation. We observe that adventurous firms seem to perform better than 
conservative ones. The Mann-Whitney Test (Conover, 1999) was used to confirm that 
profit is lower in conservative firms (p-value<1%)121. This is really to be expected as it 
is a consequence of the built-in strategy (adventurous firms should migrate to regions 
with low marginal costs). The effects of migration to regions with low marginal costs 
for adventurous firms are clear and make them increase their profits. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
 The Mann-Whitney test (Conover, 1999), also known as the Mann Whitney non parametric U test 
involves studying the position or ranking of data from two independent samples (defined by 1 and 2). The 
null hypothesis (Ho) for this type of test is: µ1=µ2, which states that there is no difference between the 
samples 1 and 2, µ1 and µ2, representing respectively the medians (or means in the case where the samples 
are both symmetric) of the samples 1 and 2. Usually, the alternative hypothesis H1 is bilateral (µ1≠µ2) 
meaning that there is a difference the two samples. However, other alternative hypotheses can be defined 
(µ1<µ2 or µ1>µ2) depending on the types of analyses. The conclusions can be taken in terms of the results 
of p-values, in which a p-value lower than 5% indicates that the null hypothesis shall be rejected, meaning 
that the difference between the two populations is significant. When the p-value is lower than 1% we 
shall conclude that those differerences are highly significant. This is a non parametrical alternative to the 
t-Test for the comparason of means (that is used under the normal assumption). 
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Network support  
 
Network support is a mechanism that also has been introduced into NetOrg. In some 
types of network, essentially in those where a common goal exists, collective efforts are 
exerted in order to save firms from failing. This is one of the firms’ advantages of being 
linked, since relationships are established between firms existing in the same 
network122.  
 
The way how we have implemented network support in NetOrg is simple: if this 
mechanism (as well as birth and death parameters) is active, and if any firm, say, i, is 
about to fail due to the predefined conditions (see Section 6.4.1), then efforts are made 
to help the failing firm. These efforts are made by the firms that are connected to i and 
whose attitude to risk is positive (risk level greater than 5). The action consists in 
transferring some of their knowledge, materialized under the form of stock of 
knowledge to the potentially failing firm.  
 
Network Support was not considered active in any of the scenarios associated with the 
previous simulation outputs.  To analyse the impact of the network support function we 
run the same series of experiments maintaining the previous set of parameters, except 
for network Support, that has been activated in this case. All the collaboration strategies 
have been used. Table 6-14 shows the results for networks concerning both situations: 
                                                 
122
 As seen in Section 2.3., based on Hakansson approach, Ratti (1991) states that the cohesion of the 
network is determined by certain specific forces that are very important to the survival of the network and 
can be understood as the mechanism of the relationships that rules the network. 
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Network Support 
Strategy 
Profit* 
(pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 5.3 0.0084 846.4 
b) 4.4 0.0099 355.4 
c) 4.4 0.0072 277.3 
d) 4.6 0.0087 342.2 
e) 2.6 0.0094 240.2 
f) 3.4 0.0157 210.8 
g) 1.4 0.0244 118.4 
h) 2.4 0.0341 222.8 
average 3.6 0.0147 326.7 
No Network Support 
Strategy 
Profit* 
(pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 3.3 0.0363 4247.8 
b) 4.6 0.0099 589.9 
c) 4.3 0.0155 1798.0 
d) 4.5 0.0104 504.2 
e) 2.5 0.0268 726.2 
f) 3.7 0.0250 4322.7 
g) 2.7 0.0290 197.2 
h) 3.5 0.0264 2525.7 
average 3.6 0.0224 1864.0 
Table 6-14 – Networks’ results according to network support 
Note: The average of the three markets (X, Y1 and Y2) was considered for the stock of knowledge  
(*) Logarithm of Profit 
 
Marginal costs are higher, on average, when the network support is not activated. The 
average stock of knowledge is also higher when the network support is not activated. To 
compare the results of networks, we have performed a Mann-Whitney non parametric 
test, and concluded that the difference between the two situations (Network Support vs 
No Network Support, taken as the grouping variable) is significant for the Marginal Cost 
(p-value<1%) and Stock of Knowledge (p<1%) but it is not significant concerning the 
Profit (p-value>5%).  
 
Learning 
 
Learning is related to the question G5, formulated in Chapter 4: ”What is the effect of 
individual learning in the formation of networks?”. The learning mechanism 
implemented in NetOrg is based on instance-based learning. We recall that the learning 
mechanism allows firms to evaluate the performance of the potential partner and to 
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decide whether it would be a good link to consider before taking the final decision. A 
firm i decides to establish a link with a new partner (say, firm j), based on previous 
information about the success of that partner (or other similar partners) already 
experienced by other firms. This information includes the level of the stock of 
knowledge, Ktj, and its profit, pitj .  
 
To measure the effects of learning in the firms of NetOrg we have compared the 
indicators for the following two situations: when firms learn and when they do not. 
Table 6-15 present a summary of the results of the networks according to learning. 
 
Learning 
Strategy Profit* (pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 3.3 0.0363 4247.8 
b) 4.6 0.0099 589.9 
c) 4.3 0.0155 1798.0 
d) 4.5 0.0104 504.2 
e) 2.5 0.0268 726.2 
f) 3.7 0.0250 4322.7 
g) 2.7 0.0290 197.2 
h) 3.5 0.0264 2525.7 
average 3.6 0.0224 1864.0 
No learning 
Strategy Profit* (pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 3.8 0.0290 275.4 
b) 5.3 0.0096 6028.9 
c) 5.0 0.0074 725.2 
d) 5.1 0.0064 38254.7 
e) 2.4 0.0400 304.8 
f) 4.1 0.0147 2754.1 
g) 3.4 0.0161 3084.6 
h) 2.9 0.0149 691.0 
average 4.0 0.0172 6514.8 
Table 6-15 - Networks’ results according to learning  
Note: The average of the three markets (X, Y1 and Y2) was considered for the stock of knowledge  
(*) Logarithm of Profit 
 
Learning does not increase the profit of the firms in the networks, as well as their stock 
of knowledge. This background knowledge seems not to be of great importance for the 
decision making in the linkage process. In fact, there is statistical evidence that learning 
decreases the values of the profit (p-value<1%, in the Mann-Whitney independency 
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test) and increases the marginal cost (p-value<1%). On the other hand, the difference in 
the values of stock of knowledge is not statistical significant (p>10%). 
 
However, results differ, if we analyse the population of firms instead of networks. 
Considering all the firms in the simulation that are linked, learning slightly increases 
their profit although this increase is not significant (p-value>86%). The difference 
between the stock of knowledge (for Market X) in the two situations (learning and no 
learning) is significant (p-value<5%), with the stock being higher in the learning 
situation. We can therefore conclude that the learning mechanism improves the stock of 
knowledge if we consider the linked firms, but this is not true if we take networks 
instead of firms123.  
 
In the following sections, we proceed with the validation of the model, using statistical 
tests and direct observation from results. 
6.9.3.  Validation of the model: some hypotheses testing  
 
Previously we saw that different values of built-in parameters effectively lead to results 
that are quantitatively and qualitatively different. After defining the initial values for 
some parameers and obtaining the results of the simulation, it is now necessary to test 
the robustness of the hypotheses, as given in Section 3.3.3 and Section 6.8.  
 
Therefore, to verify that the model is able to reproduce some aspects of reality 
associated with the target industry, we are going to use the facts used in Section 6.8. 
(Identification of the hypothesis). In the following sections we will review these 
hypothesis and perform their testing. Hypotheses have been grouped according to 
different types of analysis. The first set of hypotheses, H21 and H23, are confirmed by 
the empirical evidence of data, while hypotheses H22, H29 and H28 will be tested using 
the Mann-Whitney non-parametrical tests (that is used to compare independent 
samples). Finally, we use survival analysis for firms and after that for networks, in order 
to test hypotheses H24, H25, H26 and H27.  
 
                                                 
123
 Although learning has been modelled as an individual process at the firm level, its impact can be 
measured either at firm or network level. 
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In all these cases we have maintained the same parameters: Neighbourhood Ring=3, the 
set of density interval limits, and activated Learning, Network Support and Migration, 
(some of the user defined parameters). All the collaboration strategies have been 
considered. 
 
Concentration and Migration  
 
Starting with empirical observations H21 and H23, we recall that:  
H21: Buyers promote both a concentration process of suppliers (…); 
H23: Migration of firms to markets with lower marginal costs is a way to 
rationalize production. 
 
Facts H21 and H23 are easy to verify and thus do not need any statistical confirmation. In 
fact, in Section 6.9.3 we saw that the simulation has produced several networks; some 
of them are concentrated in one ore more industries of type X, mainly when the strategy 
d) (concentration process) is used. 
 
When the migration option is active, some firms also opt to dislocate to markets with 
lower marginal costs. We have observed that some of the adventurous firms124 that 
migrate from region 1 to region 2, were able to overcome their situation of negative 
profits. Some of them increased considerably their profit and became top success firms. 
 
 
Comparing indicators for firms in and out of the networks 
 
The next hypothesis that we considered is H22. We have verified its validity by 
comparing performance indicators for firms that are included in networks with firms 
that are not linked to any network. 
 
H22: Some collaborative firms have increased their profits because of the 
reduction of costs due to the rationalization of some of their functions 
[through collaboration via network formation]; 
 
                                                 
124
 These are the firms with positive attitude to risk. 
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In Table 6-16 we compare the indicators for firms linked and not linked in networks. 
The performance of linked firms is better than not linked ones. The former have 
higher profit and stock of knowledge, and lower marginal cost, in average. 
 
 
Firms in networks 
Strategy 
Profit* 
(pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 5.8 0.0242 16409.6 
b) 6.0 0.0157 6935.7 
c) 7.9 0.0146 58539.7 
d) 7.9 0.0086 21023.4 
e) 5.4 0.0351 170640.6 
f) 8.2 0.0191 43717.6 
g) 2.8 0.0383 994.3 
h) 5.6 0.0141 75827.3 
average 6.2 0.0212 49261.0 
Firms not in networks 
Strategy 
Profit* 
(pit) 
Marginal  
Cost (c) 
Stock of 
Knowldege (kt) 
a) 0.9 0.0193 42.7 
b) -0.3 0.0498 3.9 
c) -0.4 0.0536 1276.0 
d) -0.2 0.0507 1110.5 
e) 1.1 0.0218 19.4 
f) 0.0 0.0315 4.4 
g) 1.3 0.0295 179.6 
h) 0.0 0.0206 4.9 
average 0.3 0.0346 330.2 
Table 6-16 - Networks’ results obtained for firms linked in networks and not linked 
Note: The average of the three markets (X, Y1 and Y2) was considered for the stock of knowledge  
(*) Logarithm of Profit 
 
Table 6-16 shows that the performance of the firms belonging to networks is different 
from the performance of firms not connected to networks. We concluded that the 
difference between these indicators in the two situations (Firms in networks and Firms 
not in networks) is significant for all the variables125. As expected, marginal costs are 
reduced and the stock of knowledge is greater for firms in networks. Besides, this was 
indeed expected, as networks should help to spread innovation and therefore increase 
the profit.  
 
                                                 
125
 The Mann-Whitney test of independence presented the following p-values: Profit (<0.1%), marginal 
cost (5%), stock of knowledge (0.1%) 
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To compare the life expectancy in the two situations, we have activated the user defined 
parameters birth and death. Then, we observed that the average age of firms in networks 
is higher (13.7 periods) compared to the not linked firms (8.7 periods)126. 
  
Now, we will test the observations associating the type of cooperation 
(horizontal/vertical127) with the distance between firms: 
 
H29: If the distance between two firms is short, they will have a higher tendency 
to cooperate horizontally; if the distance between two firms is high, they will 
have a higher tendency to cooperate vertically. 
 
In what concerns the hypothesis H29, we have interpreted it as a comparison of the 
distances (technological, geographical and total) between firms, taking into account the 
type of cooperation – horizontal and vertical. We recall that cooperation can be 
horizontal if it involves firms with the same type of product/market, while vertical 
cooperation occurs when it involves firms with different types of products /markets. 
Since the samples of the distances do not follow the normal distribution, a non-
parametrical Mann-Whitney test has been carried out to test the following set of 
hypotheses: 
Ho: µ1=µ2 
H1: µ1<µ2 
 
where µ1 represents the mean128 distance between firms having horizontal cooperation, 
while µ2 represents the mean distance between firms having vertical cooperation. So, if 
we reject the null hypothesis, Ho, this indicates that the mean distance between firms 
with horizontal cooperation is lower than that of firms with vertical cooperation. A 
grouping variable, type, was defined in the following way: type=1 (horizontal 
cooperation); type=2 (vertical cooperation). The following tables show the results of 
                                                 
126
 We used the average age as a proxy of life expectancy. 
127
 As we said before, we assume that horizontal links are connections between firms within the same 
market, while vertical links are connections between firms from other markets. 
128
 In several non parametrical statistical tests such as Mann-Whitney, the median is the parameter to be 
tested. However, since we assume that there is symmetry in data, the median and the mean are considered 
equivalent. 
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this test, showing the three types of distance: Geographical, Technological, and Total 
obtained from a set of 151 networks: 
 
(a) Ranks 
 
  Type N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
1 90 75.21 6768.50 
2 61 77.17 4707.50 
Geographical 
distance 
  
  
Total 151     
1 90 70.09 6308.00 
2 61 84.72 5168.00 
Technological 
distance 
  
  
Total 151     
1 90 71.47 6432.00 
2 61 82.69 5044.00 
Total distance 
  
  
Total 151     
 
(b) Test Statistics 
  Dgeo Dtec Dtotal 
Mann-Whitney U 2673.500 2213.000 2337.000 
Z 
-.333 -2.017 -1.547 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) 
.372 .022 .061 
Table 6-17 - Ranks (a) and test statistics (b) of the Mann-Whitney Test for the comparison of 
distance between networks according to the type of relationship (1 - horizontal vs. 2 - vertical) 
 
We can observe that when variable type takes the value 1 (horizontal cooperation), the 
mean rank of the geographical distances is lower in all distances (geographical, 
technological, and total) than when type takes the value 2 (vertical cooperation). 
However, only the difference concerning technological distance is significant (p-
value<5%). This means that for technological distance, the evidence H29 was confirmed: 
if the distance between two firms is short, they will have a higher tendency to cooperate 
horizontally; if the distance between two firms is high, they will have a higher tendency 
to cooperate vertically.  
 
Finally we test hypothesis H28: 
 
H28: Firms that have long-term relationships with other firms will live longer, in 
average  
 
To test this hypothesis, we activated the birth and death user defined parameters and 
collected information of firms during the runs concerning all strategies. We registered 
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the following data: Age of firm, to measure the duration of life, Duration of link (both 
measured in time periods), and Firm Status (dead=0 or alive=1). Table 6-18 presents a 
short statistical summary of the variable duration of link. 
 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Duration of link 78 3 131 10.60 17.368 
Table 6-18 – Descriptive statistics of variable Duration of links 
 
The maximum value of the duration of link should be, apparently equal to the number 
of generations, that is, 20. However, the numbers we present are the cumulative 
durations of all the links connected to a particular firm.  
 
In order to compare the survival of the firms in both situations of long-term and short-
term relationships, we created a new variable (relationship) that discriminates these two 
kinds of link duration. If the total duration of all the links of a particular firm is greater 
than 10 periods, we consider it a long-term relationship otherwise it is a short-term 
relationship. This threshold is the value of the mean of relationship.  
 
Table 6-19 shows some statistical indicators of the age of firms, taking into account 
these two types of relationships: 
 
Relationship Age of firms 
 Mean Std. Error Median 
Short-term 7.01 0.563 6 
Long-term 11.80 2.407 16 
Table 6-19 – Descriptive statistics of Age according to the type of relationship 
 
It seems that firms that have long-term relationships live longer, in average. To confirm 
this hypothesis, a non-parametrical Mann-Whitney test has been performed again to test 
the following set of hypothesis: 
Ho: µ1=µ2 
H1: µ1<µ2 
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where µ1 represents the mean duration of the links for firms with long-term 
relationships and µ2 represents the mean duration of the links for firms with short-term 
relationships. The duration of the links is measured by the age of firms. The null 
hypothesis was rejected (p<5%). 
 
Ranks (a) 
Relatioship N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Short-term 68 37.59 2556.00 
Long-term 10 52.50 525.00 
Total 78   
 
Test Statistics(b) 
 
Age 
Mann-Whitney U 210.000 
Z 
-1.966 
Exact. Sig. (1-tailed) 
.025 
Table 6-20 - Ranks (a) and test statistics (b) of Mann-Whitney Test for for the comparison of the 
duration of the links among firms with long-term and short-term relationships.  
 
From the simulated data it can be concluded that the difference in the duration of the 
links for firms with long-term and short or medium-term relationships is significant. 
Therefore, we can say that firms having long-term relationships liver longer in average.  
 
We also performed a survival analysis using the original variable duration of link as a 
covariate, but the result was not significant (p-value>70% in the omnibus test of model 
coefficients).  
  
6.9.4.  Validation with Survival Analysis 
 
As introduced in Section 5.6.2, Survival Analysis is a way to assess the impact of the 
variables on the survival of individuals. In our case, we will use Survival Analysis to 
explore the impact of some independent variables (here called covariates) when 
considering the mortality of firms and networks. We split our study in two parts 
according to the object of analysis: first, we will analyse the impact of some variables 
on the survival of networks. Next, we study the impact of some variables on the survival 
of individual organizations. 
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Survival of Networks 
 
In order to explore the impact of some independent variables in the mortality of 
networks129, we have collected 501 networks130, each of which being characterized by a 
set of 13 attributes that describe the features of a particular network in the problem:  
 Profit (profit) 
 Marginal Cost (mcost) 
 Stock of knowledge in Market X (StockX) 
 Stock of knowledge in Market Y1 (StockY1) 
 Stock of knowledge in Market Y2 (StockY2) 
 Age (Age) 
 Form of the network (Form=1,2) 
 Number of existing networks at the time of its birth (netbirths) 
 Number of existing networks at the time of its death (netdeaths) 
 Number of existing nodes (firms) at the time of its birth (BNodes) 
 Number of existing nodes (firms) at the time of its death (DNodes) 
 Status (dead=0 or alive=1) 
 Collaboration Strategy (Strategy=a), b),…, h)) 
 
Except for the two nominal variables Form, and Strategy131 and for Status (which is the 
state variable – with categories: death or alive - that determines the censored cases), all 
the rest are continuous or discrete attributes that can be treated as scale variables. 
                                                 
129
 The failure of a network occurs when it is not possible to continue following its evolution. As stated 
before, some networks are created, merged or deleted, during the several generations of NetOrg. For 
example, when two networks merge into one only, then we consider that the resulting network maintains 
the identification of the network that contains the most part of the nodes (between the two merging 
networks). In this situation the other network disappears. 
130
 To collect these observations of networks, we have run NetOrg once for each different strategy, taking, 
for each strategy, 10 runs containing 20 generations each. 
131
  In survival analysis, independent variables (covariates) can be continuous or categorical; if 
categorical, they must be dummy or indicator-coded. The impact of the latter in the Hazard function is 
measured by a contrast method, in which the different categories are compared with a reference category. 
In our case, Form and Strategy are indicator-coded categorical variables, and one new category, the last 
(the reference one) was created for each variable: category 4 in Form and category i) in Strategy. These 
reference categories contain the average of the remaining categories. Then, the deviation contrast method 
has been considered, in which each category of the predictor variable except the reference category is 
compared to the overall effect. 
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Variable Form indicates the shape of the network: it takes the value 1 when the shape is 
linear, the value 2 when it is a single star132 and the value 3 when it is a multipolar star.  
 
Covariates netbirths and netdeaths are collected in order to test, respectively, 
hypotheses H26 and H27, considering the contemporaneous density and founding 
density: 
 
H26: Contemporaneous density (of networks) has a negative impact on the 
mortality of the networks 
H27: Density (of networks) at founding has a positive impact on the mortality of 
the networks 
 
We also aim at testing hypotheses H210 and H211: 
 
H210: Contemporaneous density (of firms) has a negative impact on the mortality of 
networks 
H211: Density at founding (of firms) has a positive impact on the mortality of 
networks  
 
Just before employing the Cox Regression (we used SPSS version 15.0 again to perform 
survival analysis), we have tested the Proportional Hazard (PH) assumption. Since the 
Partial residuals are not normally distributed, although they are quite symmetrically 
distributed, we have computed the Spearman correlation between the Rank of Age and 
each one of the covariates’ partial residuals. We recall that this step aims at 
investigating if the hazard rate is constant over time, and therefore, the Age is used as a 
proxy of the time. 
 
Those networks that still existed at the end of the simulation have been censored from 
the database and were not considered in the analysis. Therefore all firms that were still 
                                                 
132
 Representation of the simplified forms of networks, according to Chapter 2: line (1), star (2) and 
multipolar network (3):  
 
Form (1) – Linear network       Form (2) – Star network    Form (3) – Multipolar network 
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alive in the moment of the final observation (i.e., the 20th generation) were censored. 
Table 6-21 presents the Spearman correlations between the Schoenfeld partial residuals 
(obtained for every covariate) and the ranked order of survival time (Age) for not-
censored observations.  
 
   
Rank of 
age 
Partial 
residual for 
profit 
Partial 
residual for 
mcost 
Partial 
residual for 
stockX 
Partial 
residual for 
stockY1 
Partial 
residual for 
stockY2 
Partial 
residual for 
netbirths 
Partial 
residual for 
netdeaths 
Partial 
residual for 
BNodes 
Partial 
residual for 
DNodes 
Rank of 
age 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 -.034 .108(*) -.160(**) -.023 -.189(**) -.163(**) -.089 .009 -.144(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) . .510 .035 .002 .652 .000 .001 .082 .866 .005 
Partial 
residual for 
profit 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.034 1.000 -.331(**) .452(**) .128(*) -.073 -.143(**) -.111(*) -.094 -.176(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .510 . .000 .000 .013 .155 .005 .031 .068 .001 
Partial 
residual for 
mcost 
Correlation 
Coefficient .108(*) -.331(**) 1.000 -.100 -.051 -.096 -.054 -.092 -.063 -.081 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .035 .000 . .053 .327 .063 .296 .074 .221 .116 
Partial 
residual for 
stockX 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.160(**) .452(**) -.100 1.000 .259(**) -.144(**) -.122(*) -.138(**) -.059 -.041 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .002 .000 .053 . .000 .005 .018 .007 .253 .422 
Partial 
residual for 
stockY1 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.023 .128(*) -.051 .259(**) 1.000 -.008 .017 -.137(**) .030 -.151(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .652 .013 .327 .000 . .875 .737 .008 .555 .003 
Partial 
residual for 
stockY2 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.189(**) -.073 -.096 -.144(**) -.008 1.000 .233(**) .312(**) .172(**) .069 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .155 .063 .005 .875 . .000 .000 .001 .183 
Partial 
residual for 
netbirths 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.163(**) -.143(**) -.054 -.122(*) .017 .233(**) 1.000 .659(**) .582(**) .356(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .001 .005 .296 .018 .737 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
Partial 
residual for 
netdeaths 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.089 -.111(*) -.092 -.138(**) -.137(**) .312(**) .659(**) 1.000 .395(**) .497(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .082 .031 .074 .007 .008 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
Partial 
residual for 
BNodes 
Correlation 
Coefficient .009 -.094 -.063 -.059 .030 .172(**) .582(**) .395(**) 1.000 .508(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .866 .068 .221 .253 .555 .001 .000 .000 . .000 
Partial 
residual for 
DNodes 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.144(**) -.176(**) -.081 -.041 -.151(**) .069 .356(**) .497(**) .508(**) 1.000 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .005 .001 .116 .422 .003 .183 .000 .000 .000 . 
  N 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Table 6-21 - Spearman correlations between the Schoenfeld partial residuals and the ranked order 
of survival time (Age) for each covariate - survival analysis of networks. 
Notes: **  Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed);; *  Correlation is significant at the 5% level 
(2-tailed). Only non-censored observations were considered 
 
As we have stated before in Chapter 5, if the correlations obtained with this process are 
significantly different from zero, and if the corresponding p-value shown in the table as 
Sig. (2-tailed) is lower than 5%, then it will mean that covariates are time-dependent 
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and an extended Cox Model must be computed. The p-value for the correlation test is 
the p-value for the PH test (in which the null hypothesis is that the PH assumption is not 
violated). As in Chapter 5, where we have analysed the survival of the firms using a 
cellular automata approach, the hypotheses for the PH test are as follows: 
H0: the PH assumption is not violated, 
H1: the PH assumption is violated. 
In the first line of Table 6-21 we can see that correlations are significant (p-value<5%) 
between Age and the covariates identified as mcost, stockX, stockY2, netbirths and 
DNodes, denoting that the covariate depends on time and therefore the Proportional 
Hazard Assumption is not supported for that covariate. Since we will continue our 
Survival Analysis with an Extended Cox Model, we must create time-dependent 
variables for the covariates in which the PH assumption is not assumed (see Chapter 5). 
Therefore, we have considered two choices among the most usual forms for defining 
time-dependent covariates: (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005) 
 the product between the time and the covariate, TimexCovariate; 
 the product between the natural logarithm of time and the covariate, 
ln(Time)xCovariate. 
 
Once again, we used a script in SPSS to create the time dependent covariates133 for 
those five covariates in which the correlations with Age were significant. The results of 
the two alternatives for the form of the time dependent covariates are shown in 
Appendix V and it does not seem to be a great difference between the two choices. 
Therefore, we have chosen the (Time)xCovariate approach to create time dependent 
covariates and proceed with the analysis of the extended Cox Model. The time 
dependent covariates are identified as Covariate(t), as, for example, stockX (t). 
 
Overall (score)  -2 Log 
Likelihood 
 
Chi-square df p-value. 
3900,157 223.929 20 .000 
Table 6-22 - Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients in Cox Regression 
                                                 
133
 SPSS does not perform automatically the Cox regression for more than one time dependent covariates 
simultaneously. Therefore, we created two scripts in Syntax mode, a common mode to write programs in 
a SPSS using a specific language in order to perform more complex computations. Then, we proceeded 
with the extended Cox model. More details concerning these scripts and the resuts they produced are 
presented in Appendix V. 
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The likelihood ratio and chi-square statistics in Table 6-22 are asymptotically equivalent 
tests of the omnibus null hypothesis that all the coefficients β’s are zero. In this case the 
null hypothesis is strongly rejected.   
 
  
Covariates βˆ  SE( βˆ ) Wald df p-value. Exp( βˆ ) 
profit 
-.035 .017 4.272 1 .039 .966 
mcost(t) 2.455 .678 13.119 1 .000 11.651 
stockX(t) 
.000 .000 10.063 1 .002 1.000 
stockY1(t) 
-.005 .002 5.551 1 .018 .995 
stockY2(t) 
.000 .000 2.739 1 .098 1.000 
netbirths(t) 
-.008 .036 .046 1 .829 .992 
netdeaths 
.180 .094 3.662 1 .056 1.197 
BNodes 
.044 .019 5.530 1 .019 1.045 
DNodes(t) 
-.007 .003 5.631 1 .018 .993 
Form 
    47.832 3 .000   
form(1) 
.595 .364 2.673 1 .102 1.814 
form(2) 
-.472 .372 1.609 1 .205 .624 
form(3) 
-.721 .389 3.429 1 .064 .487 
Strat 
    10.759 8 .216   
Strat(a) 
-.075 .203 .136 1 .712 .928 
Strat(b) 
.006 .187 .001 1 .976 1.006 
Strat(c) 
-.295 .211 1.954 1 .162 .744 
Strat(d) 
.412 .193 4.560 1 .033 1.509 
Strat(e) 
-.056 .183 .095 1 .758 .945 
Strat(f) 
-.073 .169 .188 1 .665 .929 
Strat(g) 
.053 .194 .073 1 .787 1.054 
Strat(h) 
.197 .189 1.084 1 .298 1.217 
Table 6-23 - Summary of covariates statistics in the Cox Regression Equation model134 for the 
survival of networks 
Note: In the case of categorical covariates Form and Strategy, the output uses the last category of the 
variable as reference 
 
 
                                                 
134
 As presented above in Chapter 5, column βˆ  contains the estimated coefficients of the covariates; in 
SE( βˆ ) the corresponding standard errors are represented; The Wald statistic is computed through the 
quotient between the coefficient β and its standard error SE(β), and then taking the Normal (0,1) 
distribution for computing the corresponding value. The column df stands for the degrees of freedom 
involved in the test of hypothesis. The exponentials Exp( βˆ ) measure the impact of the variables on the 
hazard of the firms. The column named p-value shows the significance of the predictor concerning the 
test: H0: β=0 versus H1: β≠0 
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Table 6-23 shows the coefficients and some corresponding statistics to evaluate the 
importance of each covariate on the Cox model. According to these coefficients, and to 
Equation 5-18, the Cox regression model can be written with some of the covariates or 
predictors as time-dependent variables, as follows: 
 
hˆ (t,X)= hˆ 0(t) x  
x e-0.035profit+2.455mcost(t)+0.000stockX(t)-0.005stockY1(t)+0.000stockY2(t) x 
x e 0.180netdeaths+0.044Bnodes-0.007Dnodes(t)  Equation 6-41 
 
The corresponding Cox Regression model is actually a mixed model, as it includes 
time-dependent and time independent variables135. 
 
In Table 6-23 mcost(t), stockX(t), stockY1(t), stockY2(t), netbirths(t) and Dnodes(t) are 
the six time-dependent covariates that were introduced in the extended model. The 
overall model is significant (p≤1%) and with exception of Strategy and Form, only 
stockY2(t), netdeaths and netbirths(t) have p-values greater than 5%, demonstrating that 
these covariates have no impact in the survival of firms.  
 
We may use the exponents Exp(βˆ ) to measure the impact of the variables on the hazard 
rate of the firms. In fact, Exp(βˆ ) is the predicted change in the hazard rate for a unit 
increase in the predictor. Thus, holding the other covariates constant, an additional unit 
in the contemporaneous density, for example, expressed by netdeaths increases the 
hazard rate by a factor of e+0,180=1.197 on average – that is, 19.7 percent. However, 
according to the Wald statistic, this coefficient ( βˆ =+0.180) is not significant (p-
value>5%).  
 
The coefficient related to the founding density (netbirths) is negative (βˆ =-0.008) and it 
is also not significant. Therefore, it seems the hypotheses H26 and H27 are not 
confirmed.  
 
In what concerns the other covariates, marginal cost, mcost(t) has the strongest impact 
on the hazard rate: it increases the hazard rate by 11 times more. BNodes is the other 
                                                 
135
 Time dependent variables are presented with the designation of time (t) after their identification. 
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covariate that has a positive impact in the mortalitity of networks. Other covariates 
produce the opposite effect on the hazard function: an additional unit of the profit 
decreases the hazard by a factor of e-0,035=0.966 (corresponding to almost 4% of 
decrease, on average). stockY1, netbirths(t) and DNodes(t) also have negative impact on 
the mortality of the networks. 
 
Bearing in mind hypotheses H26 and H27, we can conclude that they are not confirmed 
with survival analysis since netbirths(t) is found to have a negative impact on the 
mortality of networks, while netdeaths has a positive impact, although there is no 
statistical evidence to confirm these conclusions.  
 
However, it is worth noting that BNodes has a positive impact on the mortality of 
networks, and simultaneously DNodes(t) has a corresponding negative impact. That is, 
the number of firms at the time of a network’s birth has a positive impact on the 
mortality of networks and the number of firms at the time of a network’s death has a 
negative impact on the mortality of networks. This conclusion is in line with hypotheses 
H210 and H211, which are confirmed. 
 
Considering now the categorical variables, we may conclude that the variable Form is 
important to the survival of networks as we can see from the significance of the test (p-
value=0.000). We considered a reference category containing the average values of all 
categories. Therefore, the other categories are compared to this reference category. We 
conclude that Form(1), corresponding to linear networks increase the hazard rates of 
networks, while star and multipolar networks decrease the hazard rate (by almost 40%, 
and 50%, respectively)136.  
 
Concerning Strategy, it has no overall significant impact on the hazard function. 
However, considering the comparisons between the reference category and each 
strategy separately, we may conclude that strategy d) is the only one that shows any 
significant impact on the hazard rate. In fact, strategy d) increases the hazard rate by 
more than 50% when compared to the average of all strategies. 
 
                                                 
136
 The impact of the form on the survival of networks allows for an affirmative answer to question G6: 
“Does form matter?”. In fact, the shape of the network exerts influence in the mortality of networks. 
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The following figure shows the cumulative survival functions that are estimated in the 
analysis. Each collaboration strategy (a to h) is represented by a different colour. These 
survival curves are useful to describe how the strategies compare over the time period of 
the study. The survival function is given by: 
[ ] ∑= = β
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    Equation 6-42 
 
age
20151050
Cu
m
 
Su
rv
iv
al
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Survival Functions
h)
g)
f)
e)
d)
c)
b)
a)
Strat
 
Figure 6-20 – Cumulative survival functions according to the strategies  
Note: For visualization purposes, interpolation lines have replaced the original step functions considering 
all strategies 
 
The variable age along the X axis in Figure 6-20 represents the age of the networks at 
the time of their failure and the Y axis shows the cumulative survival. The permanent 
decrease of the lines in the graph is indicative of the fall of the survival of the networks 
during the twenty generations of their existence. We can see that all strategies have 
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similar cumulative survival paths. However, the values of the cumulative survival 
functions of strategies b), e), and f) are always higher than others, meaning that 
networks have higher survival rates, within these strategies. 
 
 
Survival of firms 
 
Now we will analyse the impact of the covariates on the survival of individual 
organizations. Two hypotheses are tested within this analysis: 
 
H25: Density at founding has a positive impact on the mortality of organizations 
H26: Contemporaneous density (of networks) has a negative impact on the mortality 
of the networks 
 
A set containing 308 firms was analysed, considering the following covariates: 
 Profit (profit), 
 Marginal Cost (mcost), 
 Quantity (quantity produced by a firm), 
 Links (the number of links connected to a particular firm), 
 Age (Age), 
 Number of existing nodes (firms) at the time of its birth (BNodes), 
 Number of existing nodes (firms) at the time of its death (DNodes), 
 Stock of knowledge in Market X (StockX), 
 Stock of knowledge in Market Y1 (StockY1), 
 Stock of knowledge in Market Y2 (StockY2), 
 Status (dead=0 or alive=1). 
 
BNodes is the covariate used to test H25, while DNodes is the covariate use to test H26. 
We repeated the previous Proportional Hazard (PH) test and started by computing the 
Spearman correlations (since the partial residuals do not follow the Normal distribution) 
between the Rank of Age and the partial residuals corresponding to the covariates. 
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Table 6-24 - Spearman correlations between the Schoenfeld partial residuals and the ranked order 
of survival time (Age) for each covariate - survival analysis of firms 
 
We observe in Table 6-24  that the covariates having significant correlations with time 
are: profit, Quantity, BNodes, DNodes, stockX, stockY1 and stockY2. Therefore, we 
created time dependent covariates profit(t), Quantity(t), BNodes(t), DNodes(t), 
stockX(t), stockY1(t) and stockY2(t) 137 , and obtained the following results in the 
extended Cox model: 
 
Overall (score) 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 Chi-square df p-value. 
3098.633 289.153 9 .000 
Table 6-25 - Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients in Cox Regression 
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 As before, we have chosen the (Time)xCovariate approach to create time dependent covariates, using a 
specific script in SPSS. 
   
Rank of 
Age 
Partial 
residual 
for 
logProfit 
Partial 
residual for 
mcost 
Partial 
residual for 
Quantity 
Partial 
residual 
for Links 
Partial 
residual 
for 
BNodes 
Partial 
residual 
for 
DNodes 
Partial 
residual 
for StockX 
Partial 
residual 
for 
StockY1 
Partial 
residual 
for 
StockY2 
Rank of Age Correlation 
Coefficient 1.000 -.578(**) -.088 -.943(**) .097 .156(**) .315(**) -.759(**) -.277(**) -.249(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) . .000 .121 .000 .091 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Partial residual 
for logProfit 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.578(**) 1.000 -.020 .654(**) .143(*) -.227(**) -.282(**) .413(**) .186(**) .104 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 . .721 .000 .012 .000 .000 .000 .001 .070 
Partial residual 
for Mcost 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.088 -.020 1.000 .001 -.258(**) .030 -.127(*) -.030 -.098 -.244(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .121 .721 . .992 .000 .597 .026 .597 .085 .000 
Partial residual 
for Quantity 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.943(**) .654(**) .001 1.000 -.086 -.157(**) -.315(**) .718(**) .245(**) .215(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .992 . .134 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Partial residual 
for Links 
Correlation 
Coefficient .097 .143(*) -.258(**) -.086 1.000 .027 .303(**) .103 .212(**) .164(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .091 .012 .000 .134 . .640 .000 .071 .000 .004 
Partial residual 
for BNodes 
Correlation 
Coefficient .156(**) -.227(**) .030 -.157(**) .027 1.000 .738(**) -.057 .036 .074 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .006 .000 .597 .006 .640 . .000 .321 .530 .194 
Partial residual 
for DNodes 
Correlation 
Coefficient .315(**) -.282(**) -.127(*) -.315(**) .303(**) .738(**) 1.000 -.077 .064 .126(*) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .026 .000 .000 .000 . .177 .260 .027 
Partial residual 
for StockX 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.759(**) .413(**) -.030 .718(**) .103 -.057 -.077 1.000 .210(**) .308(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .597 .000 .071 .321 .177 . .000 .000 
Partial residual 
for StockY1 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.277(**) .186(**) -.098 .245(**) .212(**) .036 .064 .210(**) 1.000 -.326(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .001 .085 .000 .000 .530 .260 .000 . .000 
Partial residual 
for StockY2 
Correlation 
Coefficient -.249(**) .104 -.244(**) .215(**) .164(**) .074 .126(*) .308(**) -.326(**) 1.000 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .070 .000 .000 .004 .194 .027 .000 .000 . 
  N 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 
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The model is significant (p-value<1%) and the impact of each of the covariates on the 
mortality of firms is identified in Table 6-26. 
 
 
 Covariates βˆ  SE( βˆ ) Wald df p-value Exp( βˆ ) 
profit(t) 
-.014 .011 1.693 1 .193 .986 
mcost 
.569 5.652 .010 1 .920 1.766 
Quantity(t) 
.000 .000 .199 1 .656 1.000 
Links 
-.281 .031 79.835 1 .000 .755 
BNodes(t) 
-.055 .009 34.108 1 .000 .947 
DNodes(t) 
.050 .005 91.326 1 .000 1.052 
stockX(t) 
.000 .000 1.984 1 .159 1.000 
stockY1(t) 
.001 .001 3.094 1 .079 1.001 
stockY2(t) 
.001 .000 2.115 1 .146 1.001 
Table 6-26 - Summary of covariates statistics in the Cox Regression Equation model for the 
survival of firms 
 
According to the p-values associated with the Wald statistic, we can conclude that only 
three covariates have a significant impact (p-values<1%) on the firms’ hazard rate: 
Links, BNodes(t) and DNodes(t). The Cox regression model can be written as follows: 
 
hˆ (t,X)= hˆ 0(t) x e-0.281 Links-0,055 Bnodes(t)+0,05 Dnodes(t)     Equation 6-43 
 
The number of links (Links) clearly decreases the hazard rate of the firms: the increase 
of one link decreases the hazard by 24.5%. The number of firms at the time of birth 
(BNodes) has a negative impact on the hazard rate, and the number of firms at the time 
death (DNodes) has a corresponding positive impact. This fact contradicts the initial 
hypotheses H24 and H25 that are not confirmed by suirvival analysis. 
 
 
In the next section, we search for temporal patterns that are related to the evolution of 
networks. Techniques of Multivariate Data Analysis are used, such as Multiple Factorial 
Analysis and the STATIS Method. 
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6.9.5.  Clustering the evolution of networks  
 
The aim of this section is to detect time clustering of networks and variables. The 
techniques that are used to perform such analysis fit in the methods of Temporal Data 
Mining or Evolutionary Data Analysis. In this study, such methods provide an 
underlying structure of networks having similar performance, and identify the variables 
that contribute most to the structure design. We start by presenting the database and 
proceed with STATIS Dual method that aims at describing the inter-structure and intra-
structure of the data. Finally a Multiple Factorial Analysis followed by a clustering 
meythod is applied in order to identify the main variables that characterize the patterns 
of network evolution. 
 
Data  
 
Data was generated by the simulation described in previous sections. Each observation 
(network) is characterized by a set of four attributes: profit (V1), stock of knowledge of 
market X (V2) 138 , marginal cost (V3) and network diameter (V4).  In this kind of 
analysis we build a data table D for every time step, where n observations at each time 
period, t, are described by a group of variables, V={V1, …V4}, as presented in Figure 
6-21.  
 
 
Figure 6-21 – Representation of the data sets to be analysed 
 
Twenty original time periods of the simulation, corresponding to the generations of the 
evolutionary process, were aggregated in five time periods, in order to simplify the 
                                                 
138
 For this analysis only the stock of knowledge concerning market X considered, since it represents the 
most representative values. 
time 
         V1=profitt  … V4=diametert   
  
1 
2      Dt 
… 
 
n 
(…) 
Dt 
D1 
DT 
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analysis 139  (each aggregation containing the arithmetic mean of the corresponding 
variables within each strategy). Therefore, concerning the variable profit (V1) and the 
network i, at time step t1, (aggregating periods 1 to 4), represented by the element 
Di,t1,V1, the temporal aggregation, is defined by:  
4
profit
D
4
1t
t,i
V,t,i 11
∑
=
=       Equation 6-44 
 
 
Consequently, five different periods (T1, …, T5) characterized by four variables in each, 
in a total of 5x4=20 variables were created. We have gathered 61 observations, each of 
which corresponds to an organizational network140. 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 
Period 1  (T1) 
(original time periods 1 to 4) 
Profit1 Stock1 MargC1 Diameter1 
Period 2 (T2) 
(original time periods 5 to 8) 
Profit2 Stock2 MargC2 Diameter2 
Period 3 (T3) 
(original time periods 9 to 12) 
Profit3 Stock3 MargC3 Diameter3 
Period 4 (T4) 
(original time periods 13 to 16) 
Profit4 Stock4 MargC4 Diameter4 
Period 5 (T5) 
(original time periods 17 to 20) 
Profit5 Stock5 MargC5 Diameter5 
Table 6-27 – Structure of the matrix where the variables are captured in five different time steps 
 
                                                 
139
 Since we are searching for evolutionary paths, it is preferable to use five time periods in the analysis 
than twenty (the complexity arises with the number of time periods). Therefore, each new period 
corresponds to the aggregation of four original time periods.  
140
 In each period of time we considered the same set of observations. Therefore, the n=61 observations 
(the networks) were organized according to the collaboration strategies in the following way: 
Network Strategy 
1 to 9 1 
10 to 16 2 
17 to 24 3 
25 to 29 4 
30 to 40 5 
41 to 46 6 
47 to 51 7 
52 to 60 8 
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In order to study the evolution of the networks and to discover possible similar growth 
paths, we started with a Time-Dependent Multivariate Analysis (using the STATIS Dual 
method), complemented by a Principal Component Analysis to follow the trajectories of 
the variables. A Multiple Factorial Analysis has also been performed in order to obtain a 
most clear clustering of the observations. 
 
STATIS Dual 
 
The STATIS 141  method (Escoufier and Pagés, 1988; Lavit, 1988; L’Hermier des 
Plantes, 1976; Dazy and Le Barzic, 1996) is suitable for exploring several data tables 
indexed by time simultaneously. It applies to quantitative data collected in one of the 
following situations: 
• T data tables collected in different occasions for the same set of observations; 
variables can be different; 
• T data tables collected in different occasions for the same set of variables; 
observations can be different. 
 
These two situations correspond to different strategies: the first one underlines the 
proximities among observations (STATIS), while the second one emphasizes the 
relationships among variables (STATIS dual), and that is the one we will apply in our 
analysis.  
 
Information was gathered for the same variables in different periods of time, and the 
number of individuals is the same in every period. Information was organized in such a 
way that the T data tables stay side by side in the data matrix. This information has been 
registered in a data matrix having the following format (considering four variables 
gathered in five time groups with the same n individuals in each): 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141
 The acronym STATIS stands for: Structuration de Tableaux à Trois Indices de la Statistique 
(Structuring of Three Index Tables of Statistics).   
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T1 T2 (…) T5  
V1 (...) V4 V1 (...) V4 V1 (...) V4 V1 (...) V4 
1             
2             
(...)             
n             
Table 6-28- Structure of the Matrix for the Statis Dual approach 
 
In what follows, we will analyse the inter-structure and the intra-structure of the data. 
These two steps correspond to two fundamental steps in the STATIS (and STATIS Dual 
methods). In the former, our goal is to measure the distances between the tables, i.e., to 
study the evolution of the time periods that characterize the organizational networks; in 
the latter we will analyse the association between the variables that belong to the same 
period of analysis, and find an optimal plan for the representation of the variables 
measured in different periods142.  
 
Data Inter-structure 
 
The analysis of data inter-structure corresponds to the study of the relationships 
between different time periods, given by tables T1 to T5. The Euclidean distances 
between the five correlation matrices, one for each period were computed and used to 
achieve this goal (see Table 6-29). With this information, we can evaluate the evolution 
of the networks along five time steps.  
 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
T1 0.000         
T2 0.464 0.000       
T3 0.638 0.727 0.000     
T4 0.839 0.993 0.380 0.000   
T5 2.210 2.525 1.970 1.682 0.000 
 
Table 6-29 – Euclidean distances between the five different correlation matrixes 
 
                                                 
142
 To perform the multivariate data analysis in this section (STATIS and Multivariate Factor Analysis), 
we used the statistical software SPAD (Sistème Portable d’Analyse de Données, Decisia, 1996-2007). 
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It is clear that distance between matrices increases with time. For example, the distance 
between T1 and T2 (0.464) is lower than the distance between T2 and T3 (0.767) and so 
on. A possible explanation for this behaviour is that networks change with time and that 
this change is greater along the periods. 
 
Table 6-30 shows the eigenvalues of the inter-structure matrix 143  after a Principal 
Component Analysis. The weight of each eigenvalue defines the relative importance of 
the corresponding axis. The column percentage in this table represents the weight of the 
corresponding eigenvalue in the sum of the eigenvalues and it is a measure of the 
importance of the axis (also known as component or factor) associated with the 
eigenvalue. The column cumulated percentage represents the total of explained variance 
of the data.  
 
Eigenvalue Value Percentage Accumulated percentage Histogram 
1 40.554 92.47 92.47 ********************************** 
2 0.268 6.11 98.58 *** 
3 0.0387 0.88 99.46 * 
4 0.0236 0.54 100 * 
5 0 0 100 * 
 
Table 6-30 – Eigenvalues of the Statis Duale inter-structure analysis 
 
We can observe that the first axis explains more than 90% of the total variance of the 
data. Representing now the five data tables in the system of coordinates built on the 
plane144, we will get the following graph (the edges have been added in order to give a 
sequence to the evolution of the tables – from table T1 to table T5): 
 
                                                 
143
 The inter-structure matrix contains the Hilbert-Schmidt scalar-products between tables Ti and Tj 
(i,j=1,2,…,5, with i≠j), (Dazy and Le Barzic, 1996).  
144
 The plane refers to the system of axis corresponding to the first two eigenvalues. This plane is also 
known as the first factorial plane because it is formed by the axes 1 and 2. In this type of representation, 
the coordinates of each point are the correlations between the variable and the corresponding axis. The 
terms axis, factor and component are used as synonyms. 
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Figure 6-22- Data inter-structure corresponding to the evolutionary path of Ti matrices.  
 
In Figure 6-22, Factor 1 and Factor 2 represent the axes associated respectively with the 
first and second eigenvalues.  Factor 1 discriminates tables T1, T2 and T5 from tables 
T3 and T4145. After computing the distances between the several tables and the average 
table (compromise table) we conclude that tables T3 and T4 are close to the 
compromise, while T1, T2 and T5 are distant from the compromise. On the other hand, 
Factor 2 clearly distinguishes T5 from the rest of the other factors. The period T5 
corresponds to last generations of the simulation (17 to 20), in which network attributes 
get the highest values.  That is why T5 is represented distant from the other tables.    
 
 
 
Data Intra-structure 
                                                 
145
 One step in STATIS methods that was not defined before is the definition of a compromise that aims 
to summarize the five T tables into one only, named compromise table. This table aims at being 
representative of the whole set of tables. This compromise is a weighted mean of the observations in each 
matrix Ti (i=1, 2, …, 5)  and is defined by a matrix of compromise correlations. In our case, this is a 4x4 
matrix containing the correlation between the four variables. 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 
V1 1    
V2 0.586 1   
V3 0.360 0.465 1  
V4 0.703 0.467 0.441 1 
 
 
 
T4 
T3 
T2 
T1 
T5 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
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The analysis of data intra-structure takes into account the correlations of the variables 
V1 to V4 and the representation of the observations (networks 1 to n), characterized by 
the whole set of T tables. The compromise table defines the correlations between 
variables (see footnote 145). A representation of the variables is shown in Figure 6-23 
in which the correlations between each principal component of the compromise table 
and each variable are represented through the STATIS method. Proximities between 
variables within this representation denote strong correlation between them. In this 
figure, the correlations between variables V1 (profit), V4 (diameter) and V2 (stock of 
knowledge) are higher than with V3 (marginal cost). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-23 – Representation of variables in the plan defined by Factor 1 and Factor 2 of the 
compromise table capturing data intra-structure   
 
V3 
V2 
V4 
V1 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
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In order to represent the evolution of the variables throughout the five periods of time, 
we have performed a Principal Component Analysis of the table composed by the five 
juxtaposed tables corresponding to the periods of time. The SPAD package offers the 
possibility of representing the trajectories of the variables corresponding to the five 
periods of analysis, by depicting the variables at time 1 and using the variables related 
to times 2 to 5 as supplementary variables. The factorial plane of this analysis is optimal 
for representing the set of points of the trajectory. Once again, the coordinates of each 
variable in this plane are defined by the correlations between the variable and the 
corresponding axis.  
 
Figure 6-24 – Trajectories of the variables represented in a PCA factorial plane  
Note: only the trajectories of V1 (profit) and V3 (Marginal cost) are represented in the graph. 
 
Taking into consideration the correlations between each variable and the corresponding 
axis or factor (see Appendix VI) we can state that the factor 2 is related to the marginal 
cost (V3) since the correlations are greater with this variable. On the other hand, factor 
1 represents the rest of the variables (profit, stock of knowledge and diameter), in the 
first, and in the succeeding periods. Therefore, the evolution of the trajectories is 
characterized by two different behaviours, according to the variables being analysed: 
marginal cost (that decreases, in average, along time) and the other variables (that 
increase, in average, along time). 
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We can do a similar analsys considering the observations (the networks) instead of the 
variables. However, we decided to perform a complementary type of analysis (Multiple 
Factorial Analysis) followed by a clustering of the networks in order to better 
discriminate the networks. 
 
Multiple Factorial Analysis (MFA) 
 
MFA (Escoufier and Pagés, 1998; Dazy and Le Barzic, 1996) is appropriate when we 
have the same number of variables and observations measured in different times. 
Although this is not the case (our observations, the networks are not the same in all the 
periods), such analysis is still relevant, because of the possibility of clustering the final 
results. Considering that observations (rows) will be filled with zeros in the data matrix 
for the times (groups of variables) where they were not observed, the AFM method can 
still be a good way to analyse the evolution of the networks.  
 
The data base is the same as in STATIS situation. We used the software SPAD again to 
perform the MFA, followed by a hierarchical clustering on the obtained factors. After 
the clustering step we have obtained the dendrogram shown in .  Two different relevant 
partitions (in 2 and in 4 classes) are depicted.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-25 -  Dendrogram of the clustering 
 
Classification hiérarchique directe
01  02  47  32  30  48  42  08  13  12  05  57  03  50  34  04  49  54  33  31  53  52  41  10  11  18  17  25  43  55  44  19  56  58  20  51  46  38  59  26  29  27  28  22  16  21  15  14  35  40  60  45  06  23  09  37  36  24  39  07  
4 clusters 
2 clusters 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
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The best partition (that discriminates better the networks in the study) is the one with 
four classes (according to the agglomeration schedule, provided by the output of SPAD 
- not given here). Table 6-31 distinguishes two groups of networks, according to the 
classes to which they belong (considering the partition in four classes). 
 
Classes Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Networks’ ID 1, 2, 47, 32, 30, 
48, 42, 8, 13, 
12, 5, 57, 3, 50, 
34, 4, 49, 54, 
33,  
31, 53, 52, 41, 
10, 11, 18, 17, 
25 
43, 55, 44, 19, 
56, 58, 20 
51, 46, 38, 59, 
26, 29, 27, 28, 
22, 16, 21, 15, 
14, 35, 40, 60, 
45, 6, 23, 9, 37, 
36, 24, 39, 7 
Number of 
networks per class 
19  9 7 25 
Table 6-31 – Identification of the networks according to the classes after the clustering method 
 
A question arises of what this aggregation in four classes discriminates in terms of the 
main variables that characterize the networks. SPAD provides a list of the variables that 
contribute most for each class, according to the partition in four classes. Table 6-32 
presents a summary of these contributions146 . Classes 2 and 4 are associated with 
similar sets of variables, but the means of the variables in Class 4 are lower than the 
general means, while the means of the variable in class 2 are higher (see Appendix VI 
for details). Networks of Class 3 are associated with great values of stock of knowledge 
(in periods T3 and T4) and great diameter. Concerning Class 1, networks are 
characterized by high values of Marginal cost, and low values of profit and diameter.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 After the clustering of the networks, it is possible to identify what are the variables that contribute 
most for each class. These variables (named characteristic variables) are those in which the difference 
between the mean of each class and the general mean is statistically significant, according to a particular 
statistical test (Escoufier et Pagés, 1998). A more detailed description of these classes and applied tests is 
provided in Appendix VI. 
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    Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
T1 V1 (Profit)  X  X 
 V2 (Stock Knowl.)  X  X 
 V3 (Marg. Cost)  X  X 
  V4 (Diameter)   X   X 
 
     
T2 V1 (Profit)  X  X 
 V2 (Stock Knowl.) X X  X 
 V3 (Marg. Cost) X   X 
  V4 (Diameter)   X   X 
 
     
T3 V1 (Profit)  X X X 
 V2 (Stock Knowl.)  X  X 
 V3 (Marg. Cost) X   X 
  V4 (Diameter)   X X X 
 
     
T4 V1 (Profit) X X   
 V2 (Stock Knowl.)   X X 
 V3 (Marg. Cost)     
  V4 (Diameter) X X     
 
     
T5 V1 (Profit)     
 V2 (Stock Knowl.)   X  
 V3 (Marg. Cost) X   X 
  V4 (Diameter)       X 
 
Table 6-32 – Importance of the variables to the class formation  
(characteristic variables are marked with a X)  
 
 
Looking at the networks (observations) that belong to each one of those classes, we may 
establish a correspondence between classes and strategies, by building a contingency 
table as follows: 
 
Strategy Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
a) 6   3 
b) 2 2  3 
c)  2 2 4 
d)  1  4 
e) 4 1  6 
f) 1 1 2 2 
g) 4   1 
h) 2 2 2 2 
total 19 9 7 25 
 
Table 6-33 – Number of networks according to the classes of the clustering and collaboration 
strategies 
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It can be seen that networks fall in different classes and that there is not a clear pattern 
that can be related to the collaboration strategies. Class 4 (related to lower values in all 
the variables) contains networks of all strategies and is difficult to identify any 
association with strategies.  
 
However, the other classes make clear some kind of association with collaboration 
networks: Class 1 is related to higher marginal costs that can be confirmed by its major 
association with strategy a), g) and e) (see Table 6-9). Class 2 is represented by several 
networks from strategies b), c) and h), with high average profit and diameter. Class 3 
contains networks from strategies c), f) and h) that are among the strategies with higher 
average levels of stock of knowledge.  
 
Therefore, looking at the networks (observations) that belong to each one of those 
classes, it seems that the clustering method has opposed the networks with higher levels 
of stock of knowledge from those with higher values of profit and diameter and from 
those with high marginal costs.  
 
6.10.  Concluding remarks: interpretation and systematization of the 
results 
 
The results presented in the previous sections allow us to draw several conclusions 
about our model. Observations of others, based on empirical studies, were taken into 
account in the development of the model, and therefore should be reproduced in the 
results. In the next paragraphs we summarize the main results and the main conclusions 
that we can obtain from NetOrg.  
 
We have analysed and compared the outputs of the model after running different 
collaboration strategies. Strategies b) (Average Stock Scenario with Great Expected 
Value), and d) (Concentration process), are the most profitable, on average147. Profit is 
                                                 
147
 In our work, central nodes of the networks following strategy d) (concentration process) show great 
values of profit and stock of knowledge. This effect is comparable to the “rich gets richer” paradigm of 
 267 
also high in Strategy c) (Preferential meeting process with Profit evaluation). 
Simultaneously, marginal costs are lower, on average, in these three strategies b), c), 
and d), being higher in strategies a) and g).  
 
Concerning the network properties, we found an association between transitivity (the 
cluster formation in networks) and profit: the higher the transitivity, the higher the profit 
of the networks, in average. The concentration process is considered the strategy with 
higher transitivity and density.  
 
We have found that profit is lower in conservative firms (the resulting p-value was 
lower than 1%). The network support, another cognitive attribute, produces an 
significant impact on marginal cost and on the stock of knowledge: marginal costs are 
lower and stock of knowledge are higher when network support is activated. On the 
other hand, no significant impact is observed on profit. 
 
The effects of learning are not significant for the increasing of the profit, concerning the 
population of networks. However, results differ, if we analyse the population of firms 
instead of networks. In this case, learning significantly increases the stock of knowledge 
of networks and slightly increases their profit although this increase is not significant. 
 
The effects of migration to regions with lower marginal costs make the firms increase 
their profits, because of the reduction of their marginal costs. Only firms with positive 
attitude to risk migrate and therefore these firms tend to perform better than the 
conservative ones. 
 
As expected, the spread of innovation is one of the main effects of the networks. Firms 
in networks have higher life expectancies (more than half  - when compared to the non-
networked firms) and their profit is considerably superior.  
 
In what concerns the technological distance between two firms (not the geographical 
one), we have concluded that, on one hand if it is short they tend to cooperate 
horizontally, and if it is high, they tend to cooperate vertically. On the other hand, for 
                                                                                                                                               
Barabasi (2002). According to this author, studies of the evolution of system structures showed that there 
is a "preferential attachment" to existing nodes leading to a "winner-take-all" outcome. 
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Technological distances the opposite is true: if the distance between two firms is high, 
they tend to cooperate horizontally; if the distance between two firms is short, they tend 
to cooperate vertically. We have also concluded that firms having long-term 
relationships liver longer in average. 
 
Regarding the survival analysis, and the significance of the Cox Regression coefficients, 
we have concluded that contemporaneous density has a positive impact on the mortality 
of the networks while density at founding has a negative impact. Therefore, the 
hypotheses H26 and H27 a not confirmed. Profit decreases the hazard rate and marginal 
cost increases it by eleven times more. Simultaneously, the number of firms at the time 
of a networks birth has a positive impact on the mortality of networks and the number 
of firms at the time of a networks death has a negative impact on the mortality of 
networks. Therefore hypothesis H210 and H211 are confirmed. 
 
The form of the network is relevant to the survival of networks as can be observed from 
the significance tests: The linear form increases the hazard rate, while star and 
multipolar forms strongly decreases the hazard rate by 40% and 50% respectively.  
 
The type of strategy has no overall important impact on the hazard function with the 
exception of Strategy d) (concentration process), which holds one of the highest 
average profits but it increases the hazard rate by more than 150%. 
 
The following table summarizes the conclusions reached in this chapter:  
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Specific 
Hypothesis Empirical evidence (summary) 
General 
Question Result 
H21 
Buyers promote both a concentration process of 
component suppliers and room for creating important 
collaborations and alliances with suppliers and among 
suppliers and  buyers; Networks are formed around 
buyers and several topologies are observed. 
 Confirmed 
H22 
Some cooperative firms have increased their profits 
because of the reduction of costs due to the 
rationalization of some of their functions [through 
cooperation via network formation]. 
G4 Confirmed 
H23 
Migration of firms to markets with lower marginal costs 
is as a way to rationalize production  Confirmed 
H24 
Contemporaneous density has a negative impact on the 
mortality of organizations G1 
Not 
Confirmed 
H25 
Density at founding has a positive impact on the 
mortality of organizations 
G1 
 
Not 
Confirmed 
H26 
Contemporaneous density has a negative impact on the 
mortality of the networks G2 
Not 
Confirmed 
H27 
Density at founding has a positive impact on the 
mortality of the networks G2 
Not 
confirmed 
H28 
Supplier firms that have long-term relationships with 
their buyers will live longer, in average G7 Confirmed 
H29 
If the distance between two firms is short, they will have 
a higher tendency to cooperate horizontally; if the 
distance between two firms is high, they will have a 
higher tendency to cooperate vertically 
G8 
Confirmed 
(for 
thechnological 
distance) 
H210 
Contemporaneous density (of firms) has a negative 
impact on the mortality of networks G3 Confirmed 
H211 
Density at founding (of firms) has a positive impact on 
the mortality of network G3 Confirmed 
Table 6-34 - Summary of the tests that were made in Chapter 6 
 
Finally, with Multiple Factorial Analysis and the Statis methodology, we have analysed 
the temporal evolution of the networks and concluded that the clustering method has 
opposed the networks with higher marginal cost to those with high levels of the stock of 
capital and to those with higher values concerning other variables, such as profit and 
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diameter. Networks were clustered considering these differences, and methods of 
evolutionary data analysis suggest that the stock of knowledge is one of the main 
features of the networks in NetOrg.. 
 
In this work we observe that organizations increase their stock of knowledge due to the 
spread of innovation and that is a direct consequence of the fact that organizations are 
linked to networks. The network is a mechanism undergoing adaptation148, where the 
internal synergies shape the course of evolution.  
 
We recall, as a conclusive remark, the phrase of Edgar Morin that configures our 
definition of network as an organization:  an organization ensures a high degree of 
interdependence and reliability, thus providing the system with the possibility of lasting 
for a certain length of time, in spite of chance disruptions.  
                                                 
148
 No individual fitness measures were defined in NetOrg, although the profit of a firm or network can be 
seen as an indicator of the individual or collective adaptation. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Final remarks 
 
In this work, we have analysed the interactions among organizations and between them 
and the environment, with the aim of studying: 
 the survival of organizations based on density dependence; 
 the legitimation limits of a population of organizations; 
 the way how cooperation motivates the formation of networks 
 the spread of innovation through organizational networks; 
 the effects of networking on the survival of organizations; 
 the effect of networking strategies on the overall profit and other variables; 
 the impact of cognitive capabilities on the survival and profit; 
 
Our main perspective of analysis is based on the works of organizational ecologists as 
well as on firm’ Demographers’, in which organizational populations are seen as a 
whole.  Ecological concern is most heavily concentrated on the probability of survival 
of the organizational form, not the individual organization. In this sense, we are much 
more interested in studying the evolutionary properties and the evolution of the 
populations rather than the individual firms behaviour.   
 
However, individual adaptation is determinant to the improvement of a group. In 
contrast with the majority of the works related to the Ecology of Organizations, we were 
concerned about individual decisions and the resulting impact on the whole population.  
 
This perspective is in line with mainstream economics, who use to focus on the 
individual firms. They attribute rational behaviour to firms in addition to profit motives. 
Individual decisions taken in organizations are commonly based in individual fitness 
measures, related to economical goals that are not captured by ecological models.  
 
For that reason we have defined a individual, microeconomic modelling and a set of 
individual attributes in order to model the behaviour of an individual organization and 
to study the impact of that behaviour on the whole population.  
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Within this individual bottom-up perspective, where the firm is the centre of the model 
configuration, we have introduced collaboration and cooperation. These nuclear 
concepts appeared as a need to complement the action and the capacities between 
organizations, namely in terms of technological innovation. Inter-organizational 
networks are a direct result of this aggregation between firms.  
 
Space and location were considered important components for the study of the 
organizational survival as the organizational environments have spatial components that 
affect the evolutionary dynamics of organizational populations. Each population of 
organizations occupies a different niche and the size of this niche may be determinant in 
a density dependence perspective.   
 
Therefore, we have developed two case studies using a simulation-based methodology. 
In the first study, a Cellular Automata-based application, CASOS, was implemented. 
Our main objective with this application was to analyse the effects of the 
contemporaneous and founding density on the mortality of organizations and, 
simultaneously, to determine the density interval limits of a population, a niche, that 
influence the survival and the founding of firms. 
 
We have used a Genetic algorithm to calibrate the simulation and therefore approximate 
the simulated results to real data. We have concluded that the system performance is 
rather consistent with the reality observed from collected data in what concerns the total 
number of firms and the birth rate, but the simulated death rates that intervene in the 
Fitness function of the calibration process differ much from the real ones. 
 
However, the final solutions for the values of the density interval limits, Size and Age 
appear to be stable if intervals are considered. They have been found to be the 
following: 
 
DSl={3:5}; DSu={10:28};  DBl={2:4}; DBu={14:25}; Sl={1:4}; 
Al={1}   Equation 5-21 
This roughly means that birth density interval limits are wider than survival density 
intervals. New firms are almost always accepted but only some of them will survive: 
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infant firms are most likely to fail particularly when they are born (the Age limit is 1) 
and firms that attain the age of 1 tend to prevail. The size limit is more tolerant: the 
higher limit Sl=4 makes part of the solution as the size limit for a firm to be considered 
legitimated.  
 
The density survival (DS) levels, measured in number of industries per square kilometre 
(x10), lay roughly between 3 and 28, for the period of analysis, constituting a type of 
legitimation limit implicitly established in the region. Within this point of view, this 
organizational population would reach the top of its legitimation at the upper bound 
Density Survival, i.e., a value close to 28. Actually, the real value of DSu for the region 
of Ave is 25. According to organizational ecology theories, we believe that the density 
survival upper limit has been reached in the region of Ave, and therefore the density 
will decrease fast. 
 
These conclusions can help in the definition of political measures to improve the birth 
of new firms in the region, and to avoid the disappearance of others.  
 
The signs of the covariates obtained with the survival analysis also confirm the 
capability of the model to reproduce the reality: the effect of the size on firm’s mortality 
is negative and statistically significant, confirming what was said in literature. The sign 
of the covariate contemporaneous density is also negative as in literature, but with no 
significance. 
 
In a second study, NetOrg, a Multi-Agent framework was developed to analyse the 
dynamics of organizational survival in cooperation networks. According to evolutionary 
theories, firms innovate in order to increase their survival rates and the process of 
innovation is related to the creation of networks of firms. So, the main goal here was to 
study the impact of individual attributes on the networks that emerged through the 
implementation of different collaboration strategies. 
 
In this second case, interactions between organizations are more complex, given that the 
framework includes a set of initial definitions, a microeconomic model, a decision-
making process, and a cognitive model.  
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Set of initial definitions: 
 technological, physical distances and a total distance; 
 model of knowledge creation 
 
The microeconomic modelling includes: 
 market demand; 
 production costs; 
 profit; 
 
The process of decision making considers: 
 creation and spread of innovation; 
 collaboration/Cooperation; 
 contracts: 
 organizational survival: 
 product quantities; 
 migration. 
 
The cognitive model includes: 
 Learning; 
 Risk; 
 Network support. 
 
To validate our modelling approach, we have considered some empirical evidence and 
therefore have decided to focus our analysis on three real life examples from the areas 
of Automobile manufacturing, Textile Industry and e-Marketplaces. The main empirical 
evidences that we took from real-life examples are part of our research hypotheses and 
have been used to guide the validation of our model. Other hypotheses that were tested 
served as a way to extract knowledge produced by the model. 
 
The main conclusions that we have drawn from NetOrg are the following: 
 
 Only firms with high values of risk are willing to migrate; these firms seem to 
perform better than conservative ones. The effects of migration to regions with 
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lower marginal costs allow firms to increase their profits, because of the 
reduction of their marginal costs.  
 The effects of learning are not significant if we consider the population of 
networks. However, in a firm perspective, it tends to increase significantly the 
stock of knowledge of networks (question G5) 
 Firms in networks have higher life expectancies compared to firms that re not in 
networks and their profit is considerably higher (question G4).  
 It can also be said that firms having long-term relationships liver longer in 
average (question G7) 
 Regarding the survival analysis, and the significance of the Cox Regression 
coefficients, we have concluded that Contemporaneous Density has a positive 
impact on the mortality of the networks while density at founding has a negative 
impact. Marginal cost increases drastically the hazard and the profit reduces it 
the by 4% (question G3) 
 We have also concluded that if the distance between two firms is short, they tend 
to cooperate horizontally and if the distance between two firms is high, they tend 
to cooperate vertically (question G8).  
 The Form of the network is relevant to the survival of networks as stated by the 
significance of the test. The hazard rate is increased with the linear form, and it 
decreased with star and multipolar forms. We concluded that the lattest forms 
support the survival of firms (question G6).  
 Strategy choice has an important impact on the performace of firms: strategies 
b), and d), are the most profitable of all. Marginal costs are higher in strategies 
a) and g)  
 The diameter of networks decreases along time and transitivity (the clustering 
coefficient of networks) tends to increase strongly in the initial life of neworks 
and decreases slowly at the end. 
 
Concerning questions G9 (“How does knowledge disseminate through networks?”), and 
G10 (“How do cognitive capabilities of the organizations intervene in the formation 
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and success of networks?”), the model we have built constitutes an implicit answer to 
them:  
 we concluded that strategy f) (cooperation networks) generates the higher stock of 
knowledge, in average, among all strategies. It corresponds to a strategy in which 
networks are formed as a consequence of a collective will and a common goal does not 
explicitly exist. In addition, it has been observed that most profitable networks have, in 
general, higher levels of the stock of knowledge (the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the profit and stock of knowledge in market X is approximately 0.5); 
 regarding cognitive capabilities, several mechanisms have been introduced in the 
model: learning, network support and risk. The effect of learning and network support 
is significant for the increase of the sock of knowledge; profit is higher in adventurous 
firms, corresponding to firms with higher attitude to risk.  
 
The research questions (G1 to G10) have been verified during this work. The dynamics 
of networks observed during the evolutionary process suggest that they are, in fact, 
dynamic entities running into a perfect adaptation, where the internal synergies and the 
relationships with other networks shape the course of evolution149 . Besides, if we 
consider networks as particular forms of organizations, the empirical evidence shows 
that certain structural characteristics of an organizational form are surprisingly stable 
over time (as has been said in Chapter 2,).  
 
 
Guidelines for future research 
 
Cognitive capabilities 
In the future, we shall deeply analyse the effects of cognitive capabilities (individual 
and social) in the performance of networks. In particular we aim at improving the 
definition of the environment understanding (associated with beliefs, in the architecture 
                                                 
149
 According to Wilkinson et al (2001), “Firms are operating in complex adaptive systems in which 
control is distributed through the system. No actor or entity coordinates or directs the behaviour of the 
network. Firms jointly create both their destiny an the destiny of others; they come to see themselves as 
parts of business ecosystems in which cooperative and competitive processes act to shape the dynamics 
and evolution of ecosystem”. 
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BDI). Furthermore, we plan to give networks the ability to choose collaboration 
strategies instead of imposing them externally. 
 
Concerning collective intelligence (eventually increased by collective learning) we aim 
at investigating the mechanism of “energy” that can be measured in coalitions. We 
follow the suggestion of as Axelrod and Benett (1997) that asks if it is possible to say 
that some networks are more “intelligent” than others. According to this author, firms 
should analyse some overall measures in networks (as energy or profit) before choosing 
(and joining) a particular network. But is profit enough? 
 
Density dependence 
Bearing on the key question of how population density affects the intensity of 
competition, we aim at comparing the models of Barron (2001) (see Equations 2-12, 2-
13, 2-14) with the model developed in Chapter 5, using data from Portuguese reality. 
 
Legitimation  
We intend to analyse the Legitimation of new forms of business as, for example, 
Collaborative Virtual Organizations (as web portals, etc)  
 
Knowledge diffusion 
The effects of the knowledge diffusion should be analysed in what concerns the 
underlying network topology. We will try to study the effect of knowledge diffusion in 
structural holes and in core and peripheral firms. The work of Gulati et al. (2000), and, 
more recently, Cointet and Roth (2007) are suggestive in this domain. 
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8. APPENDIXES  
 
8.1. APPENDIX I: 
Some Definitions of Network Structure 
 
 
Some researchers use a particular representation to define network structure. In a 
fundamental paper that aimed at studying the stability and efficiency of social and 
economic networks, Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) developed a framework that 
established a paradigm for network structure. This framework was then adopted by 
many other authors as Cowan et al. (2004), Carayol and Roux (2003), Purchase and 
Olaru (2003) and it is, nowadays, a reference to those researchers who study and 
explore network structures. Therefore, we will introduce some definitions of the 
network structure as they have been provided by the works of Jackson and Wollinsky 
(1996) and Jackson (2003). This set of definitions includes Agents, Graphs and Paths. 
 
Agents 
Let N={1, …, N} be a set of agents (may be called individuals, organizations – 
Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) and Jackson (2003) called them players-) who are 
connected in some network relationship. The network relations among those agents 
are formally represented by graphs whose nodes or vertices are identified with the 
agents and whose arcs capture the pairwise relations. 
 
Graphs and links 
The complete graph, denoted gN, is the set of all subsets of N  of size 2. The set of 
all possible graphs of N is then {g|g⊂gN }. Let ij denote the subset of N containing i 
and j and is referred to as the link ij. The interpretation is that if ij∈g, then nodes i 
and j are directly connected (or adjacent), while if ij∉g, then nodes i and j are not 
directly connected. It is important to note that within this context graphs are non-
directed, meaning that it is not possible for one agent to link to another without 
having the second individual linked to the first. Most economic applications 
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consider this situation as mutual consent and as such non-directed graphs will be our 
central focus. 
 
Let g+ij denote the graph obtained by adding link ij to the existing graph and g-ij 
denote the graph obtained by deleting link ij from the existing graph g, i.e.: 
g+ij = g∪{ij}     Equation 0-1 
g-ij = g\{ij} 
 
Paths and components 
Let N(g) = {i|∃j : ij∈g}, i.e., the set of all links that involve agent i A path in g 
connecting i1 and in is a set of distinct nodes {i1, i2,…, in}⊂N(g) such that {i1i2, 
i2i3,…, in-1in}⊂N(g). A path is therefore a contiguous way starting with the agent i1 
and ending in agent in .  
 
Paths divide a network into different connected subgraphs. These subgraphs are 
commonly referred to as components. Consequently the graph g’ ⊂ g is a component 
of g, if for all i∈ N(g’) and j∈ N(g’), with i≠j, there exists a path in g’ connecting i 
and j, and ij∈g implies that ij∈g’ 
 
Values, efficiency and allocation rules 
The network structure is the key determinant of the level of productivity or utility to 
the society of agents involved. There are methods that keep track of the overall 
value generated by a particular network. A value function is a function v: G→ℜ. 
Specifically, the value of a graph is represented by v: {g|g⊂gN }→ℜ. The set of all 
such functions is denoted V. In some applications, the value v will be an aggregate 
of individual utilities or productions, v(g)=Σi ui(g), where ui represents the utility of 
the agent (or node) i, such that: ui: {g|g⊂gN }→ℜ. 
 
A graph g⊂gN is strongly efficient if v(g)≥v(g’) for all g’⊂gN. The term strong 
efficiency indicates maximal total value of a network when compared to another. 
Allocation rules, Y, describe how the value associated with each network is 
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distributed to individual agents. Therefore, Yi(g,v) is the payoff to agent i from 
graph g under the value function v. An allocation rule may me formulated as  
Y: {g|g⊂gN } x V→ℜN such that Σi Yi(g,v)=v(g) for all v and g. 
 
Stability 
As the interest is in understanding which networks are likely to emerge in various 
contexts, we need to define a notion which captures the stability of a network. The 
definition of a stable graph represents the idea that agents have discretion to form or 
to dissolve links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both parts involved, 
but disconnection can be done unilaterally. Jackson and Wollinsky (1996) consider 
that a graph is pairwise stable in respect to value v and allocation rule Y if: 
 
(i) for all ij ∈g, Yi(g,v)≥ Yi(g-ij,v) and Yj(g,v)≥ Yj(g-ij,v) 
(ii) for all ij ∉g, if Yi(g+ij,v)>Yi(g,v) then Yj(g+ij,v)<Yj(g,v) 
 
In proposition (i), no agent wishes to delete a link that he or she is involved in. 
Besides, this proposition shows that for both agents i and j, the payoff obtained 
when the link exists is higher than the one observed if they delete it. Proposition (ii) 
requires that if some link is not in the network and one of the involved agents would 
benefit from adding it, then it must be because the other agent may suffer from the 
addition of the link.. 
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8.2. APPENDIX II: 
Representation of Actions in MAS: a Framework 
 
Ferber (1999) presented a framework that is oriented towards representing the actions of 
agents in a simulated world. Although it has not been used in the present our work, the 
framework is practical for modelling Multi-Agent Systems.  
 
Within this framework the states and the transformation of states are defined in a fist 
step: a state σs of the environment is a set of atomic facts that describe the environment 
at a particular moment. In other words, the term state is used to describe any overall 
configuration of a system. States can be transformed into new states by actions. 
 
The following definitions help to formalize this: 
 The set of all possible states of the environment E, is defined by  
Σ={σ1, σ2, …, σΩ,}.      Equation 8.2-1 
 
 An action is defined as something that produces a new state. Examples of 
actions are, for instance, go (to relocate an agent), join (to associate agents in 
networks), move (to move objects), etc; 
 Operators are functions of the type Op x Σ → Σ. There are important functions 
as Execute (Exec) or React (React) which after being combined to an appropriate 
action and state, σj , may result (or not) in a new state σk. For example, in the 
syntax Exec(move(A, C, +1), σ1), the operator Exec executes the action of 
moving an object C by agent A one step forward (+1) starting from situation σ1. 
In this case, one action (move) has been combined with a state (σ1) and executed 
by an operator (Exec). 
 If more than one action is combined with states, then it may give back influence, 
i.e:  
Exec: actions x Σ → Γ       
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where Γ is the set of influences, γ, resulting from the simultaneity of actions 
completed in a given state.  
 The environment can react to influences. React is the function that specifies how 
this reaction is made: 
React: Σ x Γ → Σ      
 
Reaction is a function that operates in the set of states combined with the set of 
influences and returns a final state. Reaction is the response of the environment 
to the influences. That is what happens, for example, when two actions are 
incompatible: one object, o, located in L1 cannot move to two different places L2 
and L3 at the same time. So, the reaction of the movements (the same object o 
moving in two opposite directions with the same speed) produces a reaction of 
the environment that forces the object o to return to the previous state σ ∈ Σ, 
where σ corresponds to the situation where object o is in the location L1. 
 An action can be applied to a local modification instead of the whole 
environment. In such a situation, the environment is represented only by a 
partial set of states confined to a particular space (as the neighbourhood in 
cellular automata applications). The cell of an automaton is represented by a 
transition function. It follows an example concerning this situation. 
 
Example 1 
Let us imagine that an agent A was situated in location L1 and that this fact corresponds 
to state σ1. Thus, the following example describes the function (Exec) that executes an 
action (go) that consists in producing a new state, σ2 as a result of the displacement of 
the agent A from the location L1 to the location L2 (both locations situated in the 
environment E).  
σ2 = Exec (go (A, L1, L2 ), σ1)     
 
In this example, the action is  go (A, L1, L2) and the function Exec executes the action.  
 
The next example describes the situation where action is viewed as a result of influence. 
It could be the case of life and death in a cellular automata simulation. The Game of 
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Life created by John Conway (Gardner, 1970) is a famous example of application of 
cellular automata, where the cells or automata “live” in a grid.  
 
Example 2  
In the Game of Life, as explained above, a cell can only survive if there are three other 
living cells, for example, in its immediate neighbourhood (that is, the eight cells 
surrounding it). If these conditions are not satisfied it will die either from the effect of 
overcrowding (if it has too many living neighbours) or from loneliness (if it has too 
few). Having n agents in this game, (A1, A2, …, An), and focusing on the survival of a 
particular cell, Aj, we can therefore define the influence occurring in this game as a set 
of actions: there is an action corresponding to the evaluation of the state of the cell 
(death or alive) for all the cells in the neighbourhood of cell Aj (eight cells only).  
 
Simultaneous actions are taken into account. Therefore, the influence γ depends on the 
overall evaluation of the states of the cells and may result either in the death or in the 
survival of the cell Aj: consequently the set of possible influences is to live (γ1) and to 
die (γ2). Considering that the cell only lives if there are three living cells in its 
neighbourhood, then this can be formalized as follows:  
 
γ
 1= {survive (Aj)};  if ε=3 
γ
 2 = {die (Aj)};  if ε ≠3    
 
 
 
γ
  
∈ { γ1, γ2}= 
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8.3. APPENDIX III: 
Example of R function: Firmdeath() 
 
This function is used in NetOrg to determine if a firm is going to fail. The function is 
based on the density dependence model and considers the piece-wise linear functions of 
Section 5.3 for the density survival interval, size and age. The function is invoked in the 
middle of the algorithm. At the end of the code, variable FirmStatus returns the value 1 
if the firm stays alive and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
firmdeath<-function()   { 
  ImitationFlag<-0 
  A<-runif(1,0,1) 
  B<-runif(1,0,1) 
  C<-runif(1,0,1) 
  D<-runif(1,0,1) 
  TemporalInfluence<-0.2 # To model firm deaths according to reality 
  #compute the equation line for the probability p1 of surival of 
'ponto'.   
######### probability for Density Survival 
  ponto1<-SumNeibrs[j] 
  x1<-E1 
  y1<-0 
  x2<-(E1+E2)/2 
  y2<-1 
  x3<-E2 
  y3<-0 
  if (ponto1 <E1 | ponto1>E2) p1<-0 else p1<-1 
  if (ponto1 >= E1 & ponto1 <= x2) p1<-((y2-y1)/(x2-x1))*(ponto1-
x1)+y1 
  if (ponto1 > x2 & ponto1 <=E2) p1<-((y3-y2)/(x3-x2))*(ponto1-x2)+y2 
  ######### probability for Size 
  s1<-0 
  v1<-0 
  s2<-SizeLimit  
  v2<- ProbabilityforSizeLimit 
  ponto2<-Pi[geracao,j] 
  if (ponto2 > s2) p2<-ProbabilityforSizeLimit 
  if (ponto2 <= s2) p2<-((v2-v1)/(s2-s1))*(ponto2-s1)+v1 
  ########## probability for Age 
  t1<-0 
  u1<-0 
  t2<-AgeLimit  
  u2<- ProbabilityforAgeLimit 
  ponto3<-Age[j] 
  if (ponto3 > t2) p3<-ProbabilityforAgeLimit 
  if (ponto3 <= t2) p3<-((u2-u1)/(t2-t1))*(ponto3-t1)+u1 
  if (B>p1 & (C>p2 | D>p3)) FirmStatus<-0 else FirmStatus<-1 
 FirmStatus 
} 
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8.4. APPENDIX IV: 
Collaboration networks: analysis of some case 
studies (data and trends) 
 
 
This appendix contains details concerning data of collaboration networks. Case studies 
are organized in three different areas: Automobile Manufacturing, Textile industry and 
e-Marketplaces.  
 
 
Automobile Manufacturing  
 
In many countries, the automotive sector has long been one of the main parts of the 
metalworking industry. Within the reasons that have motivated this fact, we could 
include the following150: 
(1) this sector includes the production of both vehicles and components; 
(2) it employs a significant percentage of people in industrialized countries;  
(3) it is viewed as a traditional stronghold of trade unions and collective bargaining; 
(4) it is viewed as a major source of innovation in areas such as the organisation of 
production and industrial relations, including the creation of networks.  
 
Once characterised by the prevalence of large national firms, which often evolved into 
multinationals, the sector has been undergoing significant restructuring in recent 
decades. Due to company reorganisation initiatives and to the introduction of new 
technologies and organisational models, the sector experienced an increase in mergers 
and acquisitions, and the establishment of partnership agreements between automotive 
firms. 
 
These and other trends from the Automobile manufacturing sector have been observed 
and synthesized in the following paragraphs. The first set of evidences concerns some 
                                                 
150
 See EIRO – The European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line in 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/12/study/ 
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trends in the automobile industry, while the following concern the facts related to the 
challenges, the survival of firms and the type of relationships between buyers and 
suppliers. The work of Swaminathan et al. (2002) is of great importance in terms of 
providing empirical evidences on automobile manufacturing. 
 
Trends 
Following the report from EMCC - European Monitoring Center on Change (2004), as 
car makers seek to cut costs, they outsource more and more to the supply industry. This 
externalizes a proportion of fixed (overheads) and variable (materials) costs, and shares 
the risks for new developments. Outsourcing also allows greater economies of 
specialization and scales, since suppliers are more experienced in certain functions and 
can supply several carmakers.  
 
Some manufacturers have sold off their in-house component companies in order to 
concentrate resources and raise funds (General Motors and Ford’s two component arms 
became Delphi and Visteon, respectively). (EMCC, 2004) 
 
Most important companies, that serve as buyers, as Ford, General Motors, VW, etc, 
known as OEM (Original Equipment manufacturers) concentrate, nowadays, their 
efforts in the design and assembly phases and transferred other responsibilities to the 
suppliers, promoting the emergence of “global” suppliers (Selada, et al. 1999) 
 
OEMs tend to migrate to emergent markets of Asia and South America as a way to 
rationalize production, need for dislocation and capacity reduction (Selada et al. 1998). 
The reduction of some OEM suppliers has always been observed because of their 
involvement in the conception of more complex modules and systems and because they 
follow their better clients in the globalization (Selada et al. 1998) 
 
There has been a kind of competition between nations and regions in the pursuit of the 
creation of local advantages to attract greater clients (manufacturers) and suppliers. 
These local advantages are not based in cost reduction anymore, but in intangible 
factors and intensive knowledge (Selada et al. 1998) 
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Survival 
We have also found some facts, concerning the survival of organizations within the 
context of organizational networks in the automobile sector. Structural changes that 
took place in the auto-parts industry involved a drastic decrease in the number of 
automotive suppliers, large requirements in terms of economic and financial capacity 
and risk and cost sharing with constructors of components development 
 
We expect supplier firms that have long-term relationships with their buyers will enjoy 
enhanced survival prospects - this is actually one of the Hypothesis of Swaminathan et 
al (2002). Therefore, we may say that stable and long term links improves supplier 
firm’s probability of survival. 
 
The higher the current and potential autonomy of a supplier firm, the less likely the 
supplier will fail. This potential autonomy will have, however, greater influence on the 
failure rates of suppliers of modular components than of suppliers of architecture 
components.  
 
Swaminathan et al (2002) have also shown that status presents more influence on the 
failure rate of suppliers of architectural components than on the failure rate of suppliers 
of modular components. 
 
Industrial relationships 
Ritter (1999) study the predisposition and competence to develop relationships and 
networks. While the vertical networks respect to relationships that a firm maintains with 
other located in a different area, the horizontal networks refer to relationships of firms 
located in the same region. (Dimara et al. 2003). Consequently, we could say that if the 
distance between two firms is short, they have more probability to cooperate 
horizontally; on the other hand, if the distance between two firms is high, they have 
more probability to cooperate vertically. 
 
Constructors promoted both a concentration process of component suppliers and room 
for creating some important collaborations and alliances among suppliers and suppliers-
constructors. Long-term supply relationships tend to be superior to short term 
relationships when products are complex, the technology is changing, and there are 
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complicated interactions among components; also, if information transfer is difficult 
and uncertain or when a trading relationship requires specialized human skills. 
 
The benefits of long term supply relationships arise from three related sources: The 
development of knowledge of each partner, the development of trust and the 
development of relationship-specific routines (Swaminathan et al 2002). 
 
Long-term relationships generate performance advantages for their members; Dyer and 
Nobeoka (2000) found a positive relationship between supplier-automaker 
specialization and performance.  
 
The benefits of long term relationships will be greater for suppliers of architectural 
components than for suppliers of modular components. Suppliers that become 
dependent on their buyers often face performance problems resulting from opportunistic 
behaviour by partners or from lack of access to necessary information.  
 
Due to the difficult in testing all the evidences that are available from previous studies 
in the Automobile Industry, we will focus on some of these facts, and will resume them 
as follows: 
 Reduction of some OEM suppliers; 
 Migration of OEM to emergent markets such as Asia and South America, as a 
way to rationalize production; 
 Contemporaneous density has a negative impact on the mortality of 
organizations (Carrol and Hannan, 1989). 
 Density at founding has a positive impact on the mortality of organizations 
(Carrol and Hannan, 1989); 
 Networks are formed around OEM organizations (several topologies are 
observed); 
 If the distance between two firms is short, they have more probability to 
cooperate horizontally; If the distance between two firms is high, they have 
more probability to cooperate vertically; 
 Stable and long term links improve supplier firms’ probability of survival. 
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Textile Industry  
 
We have consulted some information concerning the Textile Industry, and found some 
evidences, most of them brought up by CENESTAP, the Portuguese Center for Applied 
Textile Studies. We gathered some case studies from the Portuguese, Spanish, and 
Italian markets that have been made in the context of “Rede Têxtil” (CENESTAP, 
2000a, to 2000e, 2001), a project supported by the Portuguese Government in order to 
improve and promote inter-firm cooperation in Portugal.  
 
In the following, we present a summary of the results obtained in those case studies that 
can bring about important details about cooperation and the formation of networks. 
 
Evidences concerning past information: 
In almost all of the studies from CENESTAP there were between six and thirty firms, 
directly involved in the creation of networks. One or more new firms were created to 
formalize the network. In some cases, these new firms were the “image” and the 
“brand” of the networks.  
 
Evidences concerning collaborative goals of the networks: 
We have observed the integration of several (or all) the phases of the production chain 
in one same formal network. Some of the networks were created as a coalition of small 
and medium companies from the textile sector in order to distribute the orders. With this 
kind of cooperation firms, the time to deliver an order will be minimized, and the 
production capacity of the network will be increased;  
 
New firms that were created (and constitute the image of the network) are often viewed 
as an interface for clients and suppliers in the production chain.  
In terms of horizontal cooperation, those new firms sometimes are responsible for 
R&D, commercialization, and/or quality issues.  
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Evidences concerning the evolution of the network 
In almost every situation, the responsible for each case-study confirms that the network 
has explored the complementarity associated with the firms’ specificities at several 
levels; Cooperation had a positive impact on sales, in product upgrading (innovation) 
and in the concentration of tertiary functions as Marketing, Quality control, R&D, etc. 
 
Cooperation has endorsed the development of coordination mechanisms to reduce the 
time for order delivery. Some networks have gained the power of negotiation next to 
their suppliers and some cooperative firms have increased their profits because of the 
reduction of costs due to the rationalization of some of their functions. 
Consequently, some evidences were emerged: 
 Small firms can therefore observe new business opportunities;  
 International contacts with foreign markets have increased; 
 Profitable networks indicate that one of the reasons for their success is a clear 
definition of the services to develop in cooperation: a common structure with 
juridical autonomy; 
 New functions are available for some firms (as publicity and advertising) 
because they are accessible to all the firms in the network;  
 In some cases there are signs of rivalry, when the distribution of the orders 
through the network is not compatible with the goals of some particular firms. 
There are situations of opportunistic behaviours and asymmetric benefits. 
 
e-Marketplaces  
 
Definitions and evolution  
E-Marketplaces, a particular type of e-business, is a term often used to identify 
businesses that are made through electronic means, generally the Internet. The concept 
of e-business is associated with electronic commerce (e-commerce). In practice, both 
terms are often used interchangeably. In the last years, the growth of Internet services 
improved the way economic transactions were made. Electronic inter-organizational 
information systems are services that enhanced the way how buyers and sellers 
exchanged information about prices and product offerings (Oppel et al. 2001).  
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Within the Business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, a new concept has emerged: the B2B 
E-marketplaces. Generically, an e-marketplace (EM) is an open electronic platform 
facilitating activities related to transactions and interactions between organizations 
(Wang and Archer,  2004) including all Internet-based technical solutions that aim at 
facilitating the establishment of new trading relationships between companies or at 
supporting existing relationships (eMarket services, EU).  
 
B2B e-marketplaces are information technology systems that bring together several 
business buyers and several business suppliers and facilitate the transaction process by 
using the Internet (Oppel et al. 2001), and offering the advantage of lower transaction 
and searching costs (Osterle et al. 2001). The portal eMarket Services (a service created 
to favour the development of e-marketplaces151), uses the following characteristics of a 
B2B e-Marketplace: 
 it is open to several buyers and several sellers; 
 it is a trading platform; the e-marketplace itself does not sell 
nor buy  goods or services traded on the platform; 
 it has at least one trading function . 
 
Organizations can certainly derive benefits for participating in electronic markets. 
Although some e-Markets are actually demising, it seems that e-business and, 
particularly, e-Marketplaces are consolidating. Besides, it is even questionable whether 
organizations which do not participate in electronic markets will survive (Osterle et al, 
2001). According to the research, we are now in the third generation of the e-
marketplace concept152, where collaboration plays an important role.  
                                                 
151
 eMarket Services is neither a e-marketplace nor a for profit project. It is a web-based service funded 
by the trade promotion organizations of Australia, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and The 
Netherlands. Staff from these organizations work together to produce services and exchange knowledge 
on electronic marketplaces. Their aim is to provide knowledge and information about e-marketplaces in 
different industries all over the world. 
 
152
 Following Wang and Archer (2004), the first generation of EMs aimed at creating a more competitive 
market, eliminating some interactions between buyers, suppliers and between buyers and suppliers. 
Organizations moved to the second generation looking for more feasibility in the business models. This 
second generation focused on transaction fulfilment: placing and tracking orders online, contracting 
logistics electronically, etc. However, some firms were still not willing to spend enough money to cover 
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Collaboration in e–marketplaces covers the sharing of risks, information sharing, 
business complementarities, among other outcomes and driving forces. As we have 
shown in previous chapters, these are the characteristics of networks, and, more 
specifically, cooperative networks that are growing within the e-business area.  
 
E-marketplaces and (existing) networks 
 
We need now to distinguish from the two types of collaboration between organizations 
as it was explained in Chapters 2 and 3. We shall remember that in our topology, the 
concepts of cooperation and collaboration in networks can be distinguished in this 
summarized form: cooperation is the lowest level of commitment between two or more 
organizations, while collaboration offers the highest level of commitment. Sharing of 
mutual goals exists in collaboration, while in cooperation, either there are different 
goals, or the mutual goals among organizations are not clear.  
 
Based on this classification, we consider the possibility of organizations to cooperate or 
collaborate, and this is done in different manners. Inspired by the e-business industry, 
we can classify the B2B e-marketplaces, according to the product offerings  in vertical 
marketplaces, which are industry-specific marketplaces used to trade manufacturing 
inputs, and horizontal marketplaces which are not industry-specific marketplaces, but 
rather fulfill a specific function in a enterprise used to trade operating inputs (Oppel et 
al. 2001).  
 
The following table shows the classification of e-marketplace’s (EM’s) business 
models, according to the types of existing relationships and the type of offering 
products. It has been inspired by the works of Oppel (2001) and Wang and Archer 
(2004). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
these services. Consequently, EMs entered in their third generation, by adding collaboration facilities that 
are compatible with corporate needs in order to maintain longterm relationships with business partners. 
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Type of relationship / products offering  Type of interaction 
Horizontal (Teamwork) Vertical (supply chain 
activity) 
Cooperation Suppliers Catalogues Market Making 
Collaboration  Pooled purchasing systems Corporate portals 
Examples of B2B e-marketplace’s classification of e-marketplace’s (EM’s) business models, 
according to the types of existing relationships and the type of offering products 
 
These four EMs business models also differ in the way they use the technologies 
offered by e-marketplaces. Therefore, Wang and Archer (2004) consider that EMs 
cannot support all levels of collaboration equally well. The reason for that to happen is 
related with communication between the participants of the EMs.  
 
The more structured or standardized is the communication, the easier is to codify it into 
EM software applications. For communication to be easily structured it needs to have 
patterns and to be relatively stable. In some cases there is even no need to communicate. 
In horizontal cooperation, for instance, the needs of communication are low, and EMs 
almost eliminate the interaction among participants.  
 
On the other hand, in horizontal and vertical EMs collaboration models, communication 
is much unstructured. System developers always lack some part of human 
communication such as trust, facial expression, social relationships, and tacit knowledge 
that are difficult to communicate electronically (Wang and Archer, 2004). 
Consequently, EMs are best at supporting functions with structured communication; for 
collaboration purposes the information must be well structured and therefore the 
applications for dealing with such level of communication are few or inexistent.  
 
Even though EMs are best suited for cooperation than for collaboration purposes due to 
these communication limitations, we can find real industry examples of the four types 
of EM business models. 
 
Supplier Catalogues are online catalogues for selling goods from different brands. They 
are not industry specific; they fulfil a particular requirement inside organizations. That 
is the case of Grainger (www.grainger.com), a B2B EM in the area of the Office supply. 
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Grainger's customers are 1.7 million different businesses and institutions across North 
America. Grainger works with more than one thousand suppliers to provide customers 
with access to more than 800,000 products from categories including Adhesives, 
Sealants and Tape, Electrical, Fasteners and Hardware, Heating, Ventilation and Air 
Conditioning,  Lighting, etc. 
 
Market Making EMs, or simply electronic Market Makers are industry specific vertical 
business models. Covisint  (www.covisint.com) is a joint venture of General Motors, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Nissan, Renault and other companies that bridges gaps created 
by dissimilar business systems and adapts businesses to work with the myriad of 
business processes and technologies used by partners. It is an automobile-industry 
specific business Electronic Marketplace. 
 
Pooled Purchasing Systems are typical from teamwork or horizontal networks in which 
two or more organizations join together to form a network with a common goal.   
 
Newportex (www.newportex.com) is an example of this type of horizontal collaboration. 
Supported by the Portuguese Government, Newportex aims at responding successfully 
to the challenges and opportunities created by globalization and the new technologies. 
The newportex.com is an EM equipped to carry out the mission of pooling efforts in the 
Portuguese Textile Industry. The aim is to help companies that belong to 
newportex.com to find customers and to assist them in responding quickly and 
effectively.  
 
Corporate portals are other kind of collaborative networks in e-business, appropriate to 
supply-chain networks. Autoeuropa, with the Volkswagen supply.com e-marketplace, is 
an example of vertical collaboration EM that was developed and implemented 
strategically to promote a closer interaction between VW Autoeuropa and its suppliers 
for industrial materials and Services, in almost all phases of the supply chain.   
 
The following table summarizes this classification and presents other examples of 
existing B2B EM business models.  
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 e-marketplaces 
business models  
Examples of e-marketplaces 
 
Supplier Catalogues 
(Horizontal cooperation) 
Grainger (www.grainger.com) 
Grainger is an online catalogue for selling goods from different brands in the office supply 
industry. Grainger’s idea is to offer a one-stop shopping to help customers saving time and 
money by providing them the right products “to keep their facilities up and running”. They do 
that by avoiding the interactions between buyers and suppliers and between suppliers 
themselves. Grainger’s on line catalogue is a powerful e-commerce–based system. 
Covisint  (www.covisint.com) 
Covisint is a joint venture of General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Nissan, Renault and 
others. Covisint bridges gaps created by dissimilar business systems and adapts businesses 
to work with the myriad of business processes and technologies used by partners. Covisint 
reduces partner collaboration costs by providing a unique framework for collaboration called 
an 'Industry Operating System'. Covisint manages all of the document translations and maps 
required to conform to the myriad of customers or partners' requirements - all with a single 
connection point. Covisint is specialized in the Automotive industry and also in the Health 
services. 
GNX (www.globalnetxchange.com) 
GNX is an e-business solution and service provider for the global retail industry. GNX 
solutions help retailers, manufacturers and their trading partners reduce costs and improve 
efficiency by streamlining and automating sourcing and supply chain processes. With a 
hosted platform, restricted to registered buyers or sellers, GNX simplifies the implementation 
process - and makes technology investments go further.  
 
 
 
Market Making 
(Vertical cooperation) 
Avnet Marshall (www.avnet.com) 
Avnet, Inc. (NYSE: AVT), is one of the world's largest B2B distributors of semiconductors, 
interconnect, passive and electromechanical components, enterprise network and computer 
equipment, and embedded subsystems from leading manufacturers. Serving customers in 70 
countries, Avnet markets, inventories, and adds value to these products and provides supply 
chain management and engineering services. Avnet Marshall’s costumers (as Nokia) 
outsource part of their procurement process to Avnet Marshall. 
 
Pooled purchasing 
systems 
(Horizontal collaboration) 
Newportex (www.newportex.com) 
The newportex.com is a web portal equipped to carry out the mission of pooling efforts in the 
Portuguese Textile Industry. The aim is to help companies that belong to newportex.com to 
find customers and to assist them in responding quickly and effectively. The newportex.com 
is totally geared to making business deals more simple and speeding their conclusion. It is 
supported by a textile association (ANIVEC) and by the Portuguese Government and aims to 
respond successfully to the challenges and opportunities created by globalization and new 
technologies. 
 
Corporate portals 
(Vertical collaboration) 
Autoeuropa e VW supply.com 
The VW Autoeuropa factory, a production unit located in Palmela, Portugal, is the largest 
foreign investment project ever done in Portugal. Its goal was to produce three "MPVs" (Multi 
Purpose Vehicles) from three different brands: VW Sharan, SEAT Alhambra and Ford 
Galaxy. VW Autoeuropa has a highly positive impact on the Portuguese economy, especially 
in what exports are concerned. VW Autoeuropa is highly oriented to follow the new worldwide 
procurement tendencies as well as VW Group strategy of supplier partnership using Internet. 
Therefore, an e-marketplace (www.vwgroupsupply.com) was developed and implemented 
strategically to promote a closer interaction between VW Autoeuropa and its suppliers for 
industrial materials and Services.  The aim of this facility is to reduce administrative tasks, 
accelerate processes and improve planning accuracy and transparency in the collaboration 
with suppliers. 
Examples of several e-marketplaces according to their business models. 
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Evidences from e-Marketplaces 
In the previous paragraphs, we have been describing the business models and some 
examples of e-Marketplaces.  We are now going to systematize some of the observed 
facts from the e-business area, in order to serve as empirical evidences to our work. 
 
Evidences concerning the structure of an EM network 
An EM is usually composed of much more organizations than a conventional (not 
electronic) network. Just to have an idea of the dimension of these electronic networks, 
we should remark that Grainger, a suppliers’ catalogue in the office supply industry is a 
network with more than 1,000 suppliers. The Covisint joint venture of General Motors, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler, etc. links more than 30,000 companies and has over 266,000 
users in 96 countries.  
 
The duration of these networks is, for sure, difficult to measure. We admit that the 
network may change its shape during its existence, due to the frequent entrance and exit 
of partners. Nevertheless, as Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2004) point out, 
“most collaborative forms are based on long-term relationships”.  
 
Compared to the other sectors (Automobile and Textile industries), the geographical 
distance between firms has a different importance in the study of these types of 
networks. The use of communication and information technologies to support agile 
collaboration brings this approach to a new level of effectiveness. In effect, 
collaboration at a global scale is expected to substantially increase, as distance will no 
longer be a major limiting issue, Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2004).  
 
Evidences concerning economical aspects 
As previous examples have shown, one of the principal interesting aspects in e-
Marketplaces, is the reduction of transaction and search costs. As Oppel et al. (2001) 
state, “the value of using Electronic B2B marketplaces for buyers lies in reducing 
purchasing costs. Purchasing costs comprise the actual purchasing price plus 
transaction costs”. Furthermore, search costs are also reduced, because of the features 
existing in e-Marketplaces. In fact, the electronic search and comparison of products is 
one of the most important advantages of EMs.  
 
 297 
Grainger.com, for instance, shows a table comparing the costs of several similar 
products selected by the user. Thus, the time spent with the search of the product may 
be drastically reduced. 
 
Evidences concerning the relationships between firms 
As we have seen before, some levels of interaction and communication such as trust, 
facial expression, social relationships, and tacit knowledge are difficult to transmit 
electronically (Wang and Archer, 2004). For that reason, cooperative EMs as Suppliers 
Catalogues and Market Makers are most suited for e-Marketplaces than collaborative 
EMs. Cooperative EMs have structured and standardized communication and the levels 
of communication are kept small and appropriate to codify it into EM software 
applications.  
 
Summary of the evidences in e-marketplaces 
 Horizontal and vertical cooperation deals with large networks; 
 The links are based in long relationships; 
 The physical distance between the elements of the network has very low 
importance: 
 Transaction and search costs are reduced. The electronic search and comparison 
of products is one of the most important advantages of EMs;  
 
All the evidences presented before are used later in Chapter 6 to support the hypotheses 
to be tested in this work. This identification will take into account the general questions 
proposed earlier in this chapter.  
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8.5. APPENDIX V: 
Creating time dependent covariates in the Cox 
Extended Model (Chapter 6) -  
SPSS syntax scripts and results 
 
SPSS does not perform automatically the Cox regression for more than one time 
dependent covariate simultaneously. Therefore, we created two scripts in syntax mode, a 
common scripting mode in SPSS used to perform more complex computations in order 
to proceed with the extended Cox model. Therefore, we have considered two choices 
among the most usual forms for defining time-dependent covariates: Kleinbaum and 
Klein, 2005): 
• the product between the time and the covariate, TimexCovariate; 
• the product between the natural logarithm of time and the coavariate, 
ln(Time)xCovariate. 
 
Considering the product between the time and the covariate, TimexCovariate, the 
following script syntax has been run in SPSS: 
 
 
Considering now the product between the natural log of time and the coavariate, 
ln(Time)xCovariate, the only change in the code would be in the following lines: 
 
 
TIME PROGRAM. 
COMPUTE T_mcost = (T_)*mcost . 
COMPUTE T_stockX = (T_)*stock1 . 
COMPUTE T_stockY2 = (T_)*stock3 . 
COMPUTE T_netbirths = (T_)*netbirths. 
COMPUTE T_DNodes = (T_)*DNodes . 
COXREG 
  age  /STATUS=Status(0) 
  /CONTRAST (Strat)=Deviation 
  /CONTRAST (form)=Deviation 
 /METHOD=ENTER profit T_mcost  T_stockX stock2 T_stockY2 T_netbirths 
netdeaths BNodes T_DNodes form Strat 
  /PLOT SURVIVAL HAZARD 
  /SAVE=SURVIVAL HAZARD 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) . 
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The last formulation of the time dependent covariate considering the natural logarithm 
of the time, originated the following results: 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficientsa,b
3888.067 232.637 20 .000 245.247 20 .000 245.247 20 .000
-2 Log
Likelihood Chi-square df Sig.
Overall (score)
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Step
Chi-square df Sig.
Change From Previous Block
Beginning Block Number 0, initial Log Likelihood function: -2 Log likelihood: 4133.315a. 
Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enterb. 
 
 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
  B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
profit 
-.031 .017 3.511 1 .061 .969 
T_mcost 9.789 2.251 18.902 1 .000 17827.796 
T_stockX 
.000 .000 10.718 1 .001 1.000 
stock2 
-.005 .002 5.171 1 .023 .995 
T_stockY2 
.000 .000 3.301 1 .069 1.000 
T_netbirths 
-.074 .114 .420 1 .517 .929 
netdeaths 
.208 .095 4.808 1 .028 1.231 
BNodes 
.045 .019 6.010 1 .014 1.046 
T_DNodes 
-.036 .012 9.074 1 .003 .965 
form 
    48.459 3 .000   
form(1) 
.592 .364 2.651 1 .103 1.808 
form(2) 
-.460 .372 1.531 1 .216 .631 
form(3) 
-.726 .388 3.508 1 .061 .484 
Strat 
    9.916 8 .271   
Strat(1) 
-.113 .202 .312 1 .576 .893 
Strat(2) 
-.007 .187 .002 1 .969 .993 
Strat(3) 
-.259 .211 1.503 1 .220 .772 
Strat(4) 
.408 .194 4.441 1 .035 1.504 
Strat(5) 
-.073 .184 .158 1 .691 .930 
Strat(6) 
-.062 .169 .133 1 .715 .940 
Strat(7) 
.036 .194 .035 1 .852 1.037 
Strat(8) 
.164 .189 .751 1 .386 1.179 
 
 
COMPUTE T_mcost = LN(T_)*mcost . 
COMPUTE T_stockX = LN(T_)*stock1 . 
COMPUTE T_stockY2 = LN(T_)*stock3 . 
COMPUTE T_netbirths = LN(T_)*netbirths. 
COMPUTE T_DNodes = LN(T_)*DNodes . 
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8.6. APPENDIX VI: 
Evolutionary Data Analysis:  
Additional results  
 
 
In this appendix we present some results (obtained with the software SPAD) that led to 
the conclusions drawn in the evolutionary data analysis presented in Chapter 6. Methods 
such as STATIS, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Multiple Factorial Analysis 
(MFA) were used. The next table contains the coordinates and the contributions of the 
time periods (T1 to T5) in the anlaysis of the Inter-struture: 
 
  Coordinates Contributions 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
T1 0.23 0.34 -0.31 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.36 
T2 0.48 0.67 -0.10 -0.14 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.04 
T3 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.24 
T4 0.15 -0.23 0.29 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.01 0.31 
T5 3.45 -1.85 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.85 0.05 
 
Coordinates and the contributions of the time periods (T1 to T5) in the anlaysis of the Inter-
struture 
 
Concerning the analysis of the intra-structure after the Principal Component Analysis, 
we obtained the correlations between the variables and the axes or factors. We 
considered the variables at period 1 and used the variables related to periods 2 to 5 as 
supplementary variables. The first two axes or factors retain 88.14% of the total 
variance of the data. In the following table, correlations between active variables and 
factors are presented.  
 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
     
Profit1 0.86 -0.44 -0.13 -0.24 
Stock1 0.87 -0.17 0.45 0.12 
MargC1 0.74 0.66 0.05 -0.14 
Diam1 0.91 0.04 -0.34 0.23 
 
Correlations between the active variables and the axes or factors 
after the Principal Component Analysis 
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With reference to the supplementary variables and factors (identified with the numbers 
of the periods), the following table presents the correlations with the factors: 
 
 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
     
Profit2 0.79 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 
Stock2 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.06 
MargC2 0.50 0.45 0.12 -0.05 
Diam2 0.87 -0.03 -0.17 0.16 
Profit3 0.63 -0.04 0.07 0.02 
Stock3 0.29 0.09 -0.07 0.07 
MargC3 0.23 0.38 -0.01 0.07 
Diam3 0.60 -0.10 -0.01 0.15 
Profit4 0.31 -0.28 0.05 -0.05 
Stock4 0.09 0.11 0.05 -0.02 
MargC4 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 
Diam4 0.17 -0.33 -0.18 -0.01 
Profit5 -0.07 -0.32 0.08 -0.09 
Stock5 -0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
MargC5 0.10 0.36 0.02 -0.03 
Diam5 0.31 0.13 -0.04 0.11 
 
Correlations between the supplementary variables and the axes or factors 
after the Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
 
After the clustering of the networks, it is possible to identify what are the variables that 
contribute most for each class. These variables are identified as characteristic variables 
in the following table. A description of the clustering in four classes, is also provided, 
through the comparison, for those specific variables, the mean of each class with the 
general mean.  
 
For each variable, the test-value is obtained through the statistic: 
qx
q
s
xx −
 
where x is the general mean of a particular variable, and qx is the mean of the variable 
for a particular class q. The form of the standard deviation 
qx
s can be found in Escoufier 
et Pagés (1998). The statistic presented above follows a Normal distribution. 
 302 
 
  
Test 
Value 
p-
value Mean Std. Dev. 
Characteristic 
variables* 
      Class General Class General   
Class 1 5.73 0.000 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 20.MargC5 
18 observations 4.82 0.000 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.06 8.MargC2 
 4.66 0.000 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.06 12.MargC3 
 2.39 0.008 653.49 390.33 664.17 553.40 7.Stock2 
 -2.94 0.002 6.40 11.53 5.80 8.78 14.Profit4 
  -3.16 0.001 1.75 3.42 1.93 2.66 17.Diam4 
Class 2 
       
9 observations 6.00 0.000 71.25 15.18 34.78 30.15 3.Stock1 
 5.93 0.000 9.10 1.82 5.29 3.96 2.Profit1 
 5.33 0.000 8.27 2.61 2.89 3.43 9.Diam2 
 5.21 0.000 7.57 1.87 4.17 3.54 5.Diam1 
 5.14 0.000 15.92 5.43 2.43 6.58 6.Profit2 
 4.97 0.000 21.35 9.29 0.67 7.82 10.Profit3 
 4.52 0.000 6.93 3.23 1.30 2.64 13.Diam3 
 4.21 0.000 22.97 11.53 3.80 8.78 14.Profit4 
 3.83 0.000 12549.79 4335.59 9600.61 6919.12 11.Stock3 
 3.38 0.000 970.34 390.33 402.19 553.40 7.Stock2 
 2.99 0.001 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.06 4.MargC1 
  2.66 0.004 5.61 3.42 2.27 2.66 17.Diam4 
Class 3 
       
7 observations 5.35 0.000 22954.06 5557.07 13361.85 9082.25 19.Stock5 
 4.62 0.000 145144.78 35947.65 83800.98 65998.23 15.Stock4 
 3.17 0.001 6.43 3.42 2.20 2.66 17.Diam4 
  2.86 0.002 20.51 11.53 1.75 8.78 14.Profit4 
Class 4 
       
26 observations -2.50 0.006 11357.58 35947.65 17098.73 65998.23 15.Stock4 
 -2.88 0.002 0.12 1.82 0.59 3.96 2.Profit1 
 -3.33 0.000 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 4.MargC1 
 -3.37 0.000 0.07 15.18 0.33 30.15 3.Stock1 
 -3.47 0.000 0.04 1.87 0.19 3.54 5.Diam1 
 -3.53 0.000 0.97 1.26 0.47 0.56 21.Diam5 
 -3.55 0.000 97.73 390.33 245.33 553.40 7.Stock2 
 -3.62 0.000 608.91 4335.59 908.81 6919.12 11.Stock3 
 -3.95 0.000 1.56 5.43 4.21 6.58 6.Profit2 
 -4.11 0.000 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 20.MargC5 
 -4.17 0.000 0.48 2.61 1.23 3.43 9.Diam2 
 -4.17 0.000 1.58 3.23 1.67 2.64 13.Diam3 
 -4.33 0.000 4.25 9.29 5.27 7.82 10.Profit3 
 -4.37 0.000 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 12.MargC3 
  -4.59 0.000 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.06 8.MargC2 
 
Description of the classes in the clustering of networks, based on the variables that contribute most 
for each class 
 
Note: * characteristic variables are identified by a sequential number and the time period 
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